Christian R. Grose

Secretaries of Pork? A New Theory of Distributive Public Policy

Scholars have focused attention toward congressional influence over distributive grant allocations, but they have less frequently examined the extent to which administrative agencies play a role in that process. We present a new theory of ideology-contingent executive decision making within a multiple-principals framework to explain the geographic distribution of policy benefits. Our theory is novel in that it locates interbranch ideological conflict and confluence at the center of bureaus’ allocational strategies. Discretionary Department of Labor (DOL) grants and Department of Defense (DOD) contracts from 1991 to 2002 are examined to provide evidence that agencies deliver more grants to senators with proximate ideologies. To measure bureaucratic ideology, we generate comparable ideology estimates for cabinet secretaries, presidents, and members of the U.S. Senate via an item-response model. Our findings suggest that ideological congruence between senators and DOL or DOD is associated with significantly larger amounts of grants or contracts, respectively. These findings are important as they recast our understanding of distributive politics into ideological terms.

The Electoral Consequences of Party Switching by Incumbent Members of Congress, 1947–2000

What are the electoral consequences of switching parties for incumbent members of Congress? Do incumbents who switch fare better or worse after their switch? Aldrich (1995) and Aldrich and Bianco (1992) present a model of party affiliation for all candidates. We empirically extend this model for incumbent legislators who have switched parties. Specifically, we look at the universe of incumbent representatives who have run for Congress under more than one party label since World War II. We find that the primary and general election vote shares for party switchers are not as high after the switch as before. Additionally, we learn that party switching causes the primaries in the switchers party and in the the opposing party (the switchers �old� party) to become more competitive in the short run. Over the long run, however, primaries in the switchers new party are less competitive than those in the old party before the switch.

Race, Political Empowerment, and Constituency Service: Descriptive Representation and the Hiring of African-American Congressional Staff

Do democratic legislators, African-American legislators, and/or legislators from black-majority districts hire a higher proportion of district staff that are African-American? Legal experts and policymakers are engaged in discussions over the efficacy of districts with significant African-American populations in the wake of the extension of portions of the Voting Rights Act. With the Acts extension, critics have planned to file suit against districts likely to elect African-American legislators, alleging that these districts may harm African-American constituents. In contrast, we argue that these districts may be useful in enhancing African-American political empowerment and that the presence of African-American staff in legislative district offices is an indicator of this empowerment. Based on interviews with staff in 41 congressional district offices, and on quantitative analysis, we find that African-American-majority districts and the presence of African-American and Democratic legislators lead to a higher proportion of African-American district staff. The results suggest that contrary to the conventional wisdom of some voting rights scholars, in the aggregate the election of African-American legislators (and thus the drawing of African-American-majority or influence districts) enhances the empowerment of African-American constituents when based on an examination of African-American district staff and constituency service.

The spatial model and the Senate trial of President Clinton

Most accounts of the Clinton Senate trial are based on legal theories and description or suggest that the Senate trial was sui generis, unrelated to regular Senate business. Alternatively, we argue that presidential removal trials can best be explained through a spatial voting model, with ideological estimates for senators best predicting the trial outcome. To examine these hypotheses, we generate (a) ideal-point estimates using Markov chain Monte Carlo methods on roll-call data as well as (b) text-based (wordscores) point estimates scaled from public statements. Our results support the spatial hypothesis, but not legal or idiosyncratic accounts. Moreover, the significant discrepancy between text- and vote-based estimates provides support for Mayhew’s contention that position taking for constituency benefit is rather costless. We conclude that when asked to be judges, senators, faced with multifarious political incentives, are more likely to act like legislators.

Partisan Politics and Electoral Design: The Enfranchisement of Felons and Ex-Felons in the United States, 1960–99:

The authors thank Chris Uggen and Angie Behrens for sharing their data and Poonam Kumar for assistance with data collection. DISENFRANCHISEMENT due to a felony conviction remains one of the few legal voting prohibitions for adult citizens in the United States. In fact, felons and ex-felons are the largest group of disenfranchised citizens. According to one estimate, there are more than four million Americans disenfranchised due to felony convictions (Uggen and Manza 2002). Moreover, African Americans, Latinos, and the poor are disproportionately affected by the disenfranchisement laws (Demeo and Ochoa 2003; Harvey 1994; Hench 1998; Shapiro 1993). One study estimated that 14 percent of black adult males nationwide were disenfranchised in 1996 due to felony convictions (Fellner and Mauer 1998). In particular, in the South, felony disenfranchisement has had a signifi cant impact on minority voters; in Alabama in 1996, for instance, over 30 percent of black men were disenfranchised (Fellner and Mauer 1998). As of 2002, 48 states disenfranchised incarcerated felons. Thirty-four of those states also disenfranchised felons on parole, probation, or both. Of those 34 states, 14 also disenfranchised ex-felons who had completed their sentences (Behrens, Uggen, and Manza 2003). While the numerical impact of felon disenfranchisement is well documented, scholars have only recently begun to explore the political ramifi cations (e.g., Ewald 2002; Manza and Uggen 2004; McLeod, White, and Gavin 2003; Miles 2004; Uggen and Manza 2002).1 A study of the political ramifi cations of the repeal of felon disenfranchisement laws is well overdue since debates about felon disenfranchisement are often overtly partisan. Even if not, politicians are acutely aware of the possible electoral impact of any change in voting laws. Since the 2000 U.S. presidential election, legislators have been faced with multiple election-related grievances brought by voters and groups claiming to have been improperly disenfranchised. Such displays of activism suggest that the disenfranchisement laws can— and do—make a difference in the electoral arena. Although widespread popular pressure for changes in felon disenfranchisement laws has been generally minimal, many states have modifi ed their voting statutes and constitutions since the 1960s in order to become more inclusive. The likelihood of a statutory change in any given year has been rare, but the cumulative effect of states enfranchising Partisan Politics and Electoral Design: The Enfranchisement of Felons and Ex-Felons in the United States, 1960–99

Bridging the Divide Interethnic Cooperation; Minority Media Outlets; and the Coverage of Latino, African-American, and Asian-American Members of Congress

Are minority press outlets more likely to provide coverage of minority legislators than white legislators? Does this coverage translate across racial and ethnic lines? This article assesses whether minority members of the 107th Congress (2001–02) are covered by minority media sources more than white legislators. The author examines the frequency of media coverage of Latino,African-American, and Asian-American legislators in the Latino press, the African-American press, and the Asian-American press.The author argues and finds that minority elected officials are more likely to receive coverage in newspapers geared specifically to minority communities. Minority legislators are more likely to be covered by minority media, and these results are robust across minority media.The author also finds that minority media are more likely to give coverage to legislators from other minority groups as well. African-American and Latino legislators receive more coverage from Latino media outlets than other legislators,while the same results are found for African-American media outlets. Asian-American media outlets are more likely to cover both Asian-American and African-American legislators.

Ideological Hedging in Uncertain Times: Inconsistent Legislative Representation and Voter Enfranchisement

Can ideological inconsistency in legislators’ voting records be explained by uncertainty about constituent preferences? Do legislators ‘hedge their bets’ ideologically when faced with constituency uncertainty? This article presents an uncertainty-based theory of ideological hedging. Legislators faced with uncertainty about their constituent preferences have an incentive to present ideologically inconsistent roll-call records. Legislators experiment with a variety of roll-call positions in order to learn the preferences of their constituents. An examination of US senators during 1961–2004 shows that uncertainty due to black enfranchisement and mobilization led to higher ideological inconsistency in legislative voting records. Ideologically inconsistent behaviour by elected officials can be characterized as best responses to a changing and uncertain environment. These results have implications for representation and the stability of democracy.

Plus ça Change: Race, Gender, and Issue Retrospections in the 2008 US Presidential Election

Abstract What role did race and gender play in vote choice for US president in 2008? With an African‐American Democratic presidential nominee and a female Republican vice presidential nominee, were the black–white racial gap and the gender gap different in 2008 than in previous years? We find that the racial gap between black and white voters was larger in 2008 than it was in three of the four previous presidential elections, but not significantly larger than the gap in 1996 when white Democrat Bill Clinton won reelection. This gap is still present after we include control variables. On the other hand, the apparent gender gap whereby women are more likely than men to support Democratic candidates goes away once we include controls. Other factors – namely Iraq retrospections, ideological voting, and partisan identification – played a role as large or larger in citizen vote choice as did race or gender in the 2008 general election. Even though a voter’s race was a key predictor in 2008 and even though there may be a widening racial gap, it is important not to overstate the role of race relative to other well‐known predictors of the vote.

Campaign Finance Transparency Affects Legislators' Election Outcomes and Behavior

Do audits by executive agencies impact the behavior of those audited? Does revealing negative information about legislators affect electoral results and behavior? Institutions that encourage transparency, such as campaign finance disclosure, influence mass and elite behavior. Campaign finance transparency provides information to voters during legislative campaigns about the character of candidates, and this information affects voter and legislator behavior. The U.S. Federal Election Commission conducted random audits of 10 percent of U.S. House members in the 1970s. This FEC program is the only randomized experiment a U.S. agency has conducted on federal legislators and their electorates. We find that audited legislators were more likely to retire and faced more competitive re-elections relative to the control group, an effect that is amplified among incumbents whose audits revealed campaign finance violations. Further, campaign finance scandals are associated with lower incumbent vote shares and approval; and more negative advertisements in the 2000s.