Antonio Trujillo-Ponce

What Determines the Profitability of Banks? Evidence from Spain

This paper empirically analyses the factors that determine the profitability of Spanish banks for the period of 1999–2009. We conclude that the high bank profitability during these years is associated with a large percentage of loans in total assets, a high proportion of customer deposits, good efficiency and a low doubtful assets ratio. In addition, higher capital ratios also increase the bank’s return, but only when return on assets (ROA) is used as the profitability measure. We find no evidence of either economies or diseconomies of scale or scope in the Spanish banking sector. Finally, our study reveals differences in the performance of commercial and savings banks.

Analyzing the Role of Mutual Guarantee Societies on Bank Capital Requirements for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises

This paper analyzes the impact of the guarantee provided by mutual guarantee societies (MGSs) on the risk premium that banks should charge for small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) loans under the new Basel Capital Accords (Basel II and III). We also examine whether the foreseeable decrease in the theoretical credit risk premium would be compensated by the cost of the MGS guarantee. To do so, we develop a rating system for SMEs that uses a large sample of Spanish firms over the period from 2005 to 2009. We find that the final effect of the guarantee on the SME risk premium depends on the values taken by the credit variables of the MGS (essentially, the probability of default).

Moving toward risk-based deposit insurance premiums in the European Union: the case of Spain

This article provides a scenario-based analysis of how the European Union proposal for a new funding model for deposit insurance systems (DISs) would affect the Spanish banking sector. We examine the risk profiles of commercial banks, savings banks and credit cooperatives over the period 2007 to 2011 and compare the contributions to the deposit insurance fund (DIF) under the current flat-rate regime with those that would have occurred under the new risk-sensitive system. We find that a risk-based scheme could provide an incentive for sound management by reducing the premiums for credit institutions with better risk profiles. We also conclude that the proposed reform may help to mitigate the moral hazard associated with larger credit institutions.

Ethical Reputation of Financial Institutions: Do Board Characteristics Matter?

This paper examines the association between board characteristics and the ethical reputation of financial institutions. Given the pivotal governance role of the board of directors and the value-relevance of ethical corporate behavior, we postulate a positive relationship between ethical reputation and board features that foster more effective monitoring and oversight. Using a sample of large financial institutions from 13 different countries, we run several alternative panel regressions of ethical reputation on board characteristics and firm-specific controls. Our results demonstrate that the ethical reputation of financial institutions is positively associated with board size, gender diversity, and CEO duality, while being negatively related to the busyness of the board members and a composite index reflecting poor monitoring. Nevertheless, inconsistent with our hypothesis, we also document that financial institutions with less frequent board meetings have better ethical reputation. Overall, our empirical findings suggest that stronger board oversight may promote ethical behavior in the financial industry.

New Rules for Calculating Contributions to Deposit Guarantee Schemes in Europe: An Application to the Spanish Banking System

This paper analyses the effects on the Spanish banking system of the new rules for calculating bank contributions to deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) established by the European Directive dated 16 April 2014. Our sample represents over 90% of the covered deposits in Spain during the period from 2008 to 2014. We follow the guidelines published by the European Banking Authority in 2015, which propose two different methods for calculating risk weights: the bucket method and the sliding scale method. We find that most banks would increase their contributions to DGSs under the new system based on risk-adjusted contributions, indicating a cross-subsidy in the flat-rate system from lower-risk credit institutions to higher-risk institutions. Moreover, we report that the bucket method would provide stronger incentives for banks to engage in prudent risk management. Finally, we conclude that the new system could reduce the moral hazard often associated with larger banks.

A note on the adequacy of the EU scheme for bank recovery, resolution and deposit insurance in Spain

Abstract This article analyzes whether the funds set by the recent EU directives on bank resolution and deposit insurance to create a safer and sounder financial sector (that is, 1 and 0.8 per cent of covered deposits, respectively) are adequate to cover unexpected losses for the Spanish banking system. By applying a framework based on the foundation internal ratings-based approach established in Basel Capital Accords, we find that the fixed target levels proposed by the EU bank rules would not ensure the highest credit quality for a bank resolution and deposit insurance Fund in Spain. Nevertheless, these resources would be sufficient to ensure a good solvency level for the Fund, equivalent to an AA S&P rating in 2013.