Arend Lijphart

Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method

This paper is a systematic analysis of the comparative method. Its emphasis is on both the limitations of the method and the ways in which, despite these limitations, it can be used to maximum advantage. The comparative method is defined and analyzed in terms of its similarities and differences vis-A -vis the experimental and statistical methods. The principal difficulty facing the comparative method is that it must generalize on the basis of relatively few empirical cases. Four specific ways in which this difficulty may be resolved are discussed and illustrated: (1) increasing the number of cases as much as possible by means of longitudinal extension and a global range of analysis, (2) reducing the property space of the analysis, (3) focusing the comparative analysis on “comparable†cases (e.g., by means of area, diachronic, or intranation comparisons), and (4) focusing on the key variables. It is argued that the case study method is closely related to the comparative method. Six types of case studies (the atheoretical, interpretative, hypothesis-generating, theory-confirming, theory-infirming, and deviant case analyses) are distinguished, and their theoretical value is analyzed.

Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1996

Low voter turnout is a serious democratic problem for five reasons: (1) It means unequal turnout that is systematically biased against less well-to-do citizens. (2) Unequal turnout spells unequal political influence. (3) U.S. voter turnout is especially low, but, measured as percent of voting-age population, it is also relatively low in most other countries. (4) Turnout in midterm, regional, local, and supranational elections—less salient but by no means unimportant elections—tends to be especially poor. (5) Turnout appears to be declining everywhere. The problem of inequality can be solved by institutional mechanisms that maximize turnout. One option is the combination of voter-friendly registration rules, proportional representation, infrequent elections, weekend voting, and holding less salient elections concurrently with the most important national elections. The other option, which can maximize turnout by itself, is compulsory voting. Its advantages far outweigh the normative and practical objections to it.

Constitutional Design for Divided Societies

Scholarly experts can be more helpful to democratic constitution-writers in ethnically divided countries by formulating specific recommendations than by overwhelming them with a barrage of options. Especially the following deserve the highest priority and should be the points of departure in constitutional negotiations: elections by proportional representation (specifically, closed-list proportional representation in not overly large districts), a parliamentary form of government, a cabinet in which power-sharing is prescribed in ethnic or partisan terms, a constructive vote of no confidence, a head of state elected by parliament or whose office is combined with the prime ministers, federalism and decentralization, a federal chamber that is less powerful than the lower house and in which the smaller states are only slightly over-represented, publicly funded autonomous schools for religious groups, and little or no use of the referendum.

Electoral laws and their political consequences

electoral laws and their political consequences agathon electoral laws and their political consequences agathon series on representation bernard grofman on amazon com free shipping on qualifying offers the aim of this book is to provide an overview of recent research on electoral laws and their political consequences by scholars who have helped shape the field after several decades of virtual neglect except for douglas rae s seminal work, holdings electoral laws and their political consequences electoral laws and their political consequences edited by bernard grofman and arend lijphart jf 1001 e388 1986 electoral participation a comparative analysis edited by richard rose, electoral laws and their political consequences electoral laws and their political consequences grofman bernard and arend lijphart eds electoral laws and their political consequences new york agathon press 1986 feel free to contribute with a summary under comments, electoral laws and their political consequences google books electoral laws and their political consequences electoral laws and their political consequences bernard grofman arend lijphart limited preview 2003 bibliographic information title electoral laws and their political consequences volume 1 of representation series representation vol 1, electoral laws and their political consequences bernard the university of chicago press books division chicago distribution center, electoral laws and their political consequences google books his edited and co edited books include choosing an electoral system praeger 1984 electoral laws and their political consequences agathon press 1986 and parliamentary versus presidential government oxford university press 1992 he has also published numerous articles in leading journals on comparative politics and democratic theory, electoral laws and their political consequences electoral laws and their political consequences author unknown subject electoral laws and their political consequences keywords unknown electoral laws and their political consequences created date 8 2

Corporatism and Consensus Democracy in Eighteen Countries: Conceptual and Empirical Linkages

This research Note has two complementary theoretical objectives. First, we shall attempt to place the form of interest representation and the involvement of interest groups in policy formation known as corporatism – or as democratic, societal, liberal or neo-corporatism – in a broader political context: is corporatism systematically linked with other democratic institutions and processes? Secondly, we shall try to fill a gap in the theory of consensus democracy. This theory holds that types of party, electoral, executive and legislative systems occur in distinct clusters, but it fails to link interest group systems to these clusters.

The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation

India has been the one major deviant case for consociational (power-sharing) theory, and its sheer size makes the exception especially damaging. A deeply divided society with, supposedly, a mainly majoritarian type of democracy, India nevertheless has been able to maintain its democratic system. Careful examination reveals, however, that Indian democracy has displayed all four crucial elements of power-sharing theory. In fact, it was a perfectly and thoroughly consociational system during its first two decades. From the late 1960s on, although India has remained basically consociational, some of its power-sharing elements have weakened under the pressure of greater mass mobilization. Concomitantly, in accordance with consociational theory, intergroup hostility and violence have increased. Therefore, India is not a deviant case for consociational theory but, instead, an impressive confirming case.

The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945-85

A systematic analysis of the relationships between the main electoral system variables (electoral formula, district magnitude, and ballot structure) and electoral outcomes (the degrees of disproportionality and multipartism) in the 20 Western democracies from 1945 to 1985—representing 32 distinct electoral systems (an electoral system being defined as a set of elections held under basically the same rules)—shows that the effects of both formula and magnitude on proportionality are very strong, much stronger than Douglas W. Rae and subsequent researchers have suggested; that on the other hand, their effects on the number of parties participating in elections is surprisingly weak; and that ballot structure affects the degree of multipartism only in single-member district systems. These findings suggest that strategic behavior by politicians and voters plays a less important role in reducing multipartism than is usually assumed.

Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and Poland 1989-91

Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and Poland have made different constitutional choices with regard to their new electoral systems (ranging from extreme proportional representation to a moderately majoritarian system) and with regard to parliamentarism-presidentialism (ranging from a semi-presidential to a pure parliamentary system). Stein Rokkans two explanations of the adoption of proportional representation in Continental Western Europe around 1900, which can be logically extended to the choice of parliamentarism or presidentialism, turn out to be the best explanations for the constitutional choices of the three East European countries around 1990 as well: (1) the logic of democratization which requires a bargain between the old-established parties and the new parties; and (2) the needs of ethnically diverse societies. These factors were reinforced, but not fundamentally determined, by the attachment to single-member district representation, the distrust of political parties, the influence of earlier and foreign democratic models, and inaccurate assessments of partisan strengths.

Religious vs. Linguistic vs. Class Voting: The “Crucial Experiment” of Comparing Belgium, Canada, South Africa, and Switzerland *

For the purpose of determining the relative influence of the three potentially most important social and demographic factors on party choice–social class, religion, and language–a comparison of Belgium, Canada, South Africa, and Switzerland provides a “crucial experiment,” because these three variables are simultaneously present in all four countries. Building on the major earlier research achievements in comparative electoral behavior, this four-country multivariate analysis compares the indices of voting and the party choice “trees” on the basis of national sample surveys conducted in the 1970s. From this crucial contest among the three determinants of party choice, religion emerges as the victor, language as a strong runner-up, and class as a distant third. The surprising strength of the religious factor can be explained in terms of the “freezing” of past conflict dimensions in the party system and the presence of alternative, regional-federal, structures for the expression of linguistic interests.

Institutional design in new democracies : Eastern Europe and Latin America

* Institutional Design and Democratization Arend Lijphart and Carlos H. Waisman. The Design Of Electoral Systems * Initiation of New Democratic Institutions in Eastern Europe and Latin America Barbara Geddes. * Electoral Systems and Electoral Reform in Latin America Dieter Nohlen. * Proportional Representation Versus Majoritarian Systems: Free Elections and Political Parties in Poland, 19891991 Stanislaw Gebethner. * Electoral Engineering and Democratic Stability: The Legacy of Authoritarian Rule in Chile Peter Siavelis and Arturo Valenzuela. The Design Of Executive-Legislative Relations * Executive-Legislative Relations in Crisis: Polands Experience, 19891993 Jerzy J. Wiatr. * Parliamentarism in the Making: Crisis and Political Transformation in Hungary Gyrgy Szoboszlai. * Changing the Balance of Power in a Hegemonic Party System: The Case of Mexico Juan Molinar Horcasitas. * Hyperpresidentialism and Constitutional Reform in Argentina Carlos Santiago Nino. The Design Of Market Economies * Privatization in Central Europe: Can It Be Designed? va Voszka. * Obstacles to Economic Reform in Brazil Juarez Brando Lopes. * The Multiple Roles of Privatization in Argentina Roberto Frenkel and Guillermo Rozenwurcel. * The Design of Democracies and Markets: Generalizing Across Regions A. Lijphart and C. H. Waisman.