Bruce G. Blair

Crisis stability and nuclear war

PART I. THE STRATEGIC SETTING: Introduction The strategic setting Historical prologue The evolution of Western nuclear capabilities American strategic options U.S. Command improvements and Command vulnerability The evolution of Soviet forces, strategy and command PART II. CRISIS STABILITY: Preamble Post-Hiroshima crises Potential arenas for crisis and conflict Crisis phenomena and sources of instability Technical developments and arms control Glossary

Accidental Nuclear War

If nuclear war breaks out in the coming decade or two, it will probably be by accident. The threat of a cold-blooded, calculated first strike is vanishing, but beneath the calm surface of constructive diplomacy among the traditional nuclear rivals lurks the danger of unpremeditated use of nuclear weapons. The accidental, unauthorized or inadvertent use of these weapons has become the most plausible path to nuclear war.

One Hundred Nuclear Wars: Stable Deterrence between the United States and Russia at Reduced Nuclear Force Levels Off Alert in the Presence of Limited Missile Defenses

Nuclear exchange models using Monte Carlo methods were used to test the stability of U.S.-Russian deterrence for reduced nuclear force sizes off alert in the presence of missile defenses. For this study U.S. and Russian weapons were partitioned into a postulated First Echelon, consisting of single-warhead, silo-based ICBM launchers that can be generated in hours to launch-ready status, and into a postulated Second Echelon of more diverse nuclear forces including multiple-warhead, road-mobile and sea-based systems that require days to weeks to become launch ready. Given reasonable estimates of weapons characteristics, First Echelon nuclear forces can survive to retaliate in numbers that satisfy the requirements of deterrence, given limitations on the numbers of missile defense interceptors, a result which is bolstered by the added capabilities of the more deeply de-alerted Second Echelon.

Command in Crisis: A Middle East Scenario

Several methodologies are commonly employed to investigate these issues, including historical study, pure analysis, and the use of simulations or ’war games’. We incorporated each in our study of command in crisis. One particularly instructive tool was a simulated Middle East crisis. Participants in our study first concocted the initial stages of the crisis and then adopted the roles of the various actors in the American political/military command structures. The progress of the crisis yielded considerable insight not only on crises in the Middle East, but on the