David Holloway

War, Militarism and the Soviet State*

This paper surveys the obstacles to disarmament in the Soviet Union, and analyses both internal and external factors of Soviet militarism, the role of Russian political/military tradition, and the centrality of the defense sector to Soviet society. Although the sources of militarism are strong, the author argues that they are not absolute, and that there is scope for demilitarization initiatives. Most of the demilitarizing tendencies will come from internal influences and the working out of internal contradictions, such as that between declining economic growth and an increased military burden. Nevertheless, the West should not foreclose through their own policies the possibility of Soviet moves toward disarmament.

The revised Soviet military doctrine

“Now military doctrine concentrates on the prevention of war” writes the head of the Military Science Administration of the Soviet General Staff. General Gareyev explains the political and military changes this involves.

The Reagan strategic defense initiative: A technical, political, and arms control assessment

This study examines SDI in the overall context of the U.S.-Soviet strategic posture and concludes with recommendations on how best to integrate SDI research into the requirements of the ABM commitments.

Preserving the ABM Treaty: A Critique of the Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative

I n his speech on March 23, 1983, President Reagan offered a vision of escape from grim reliance on the threat of retaliation to deter aggression and prevent nuclear war: “What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our soil or that of our allies?” The way to realize this vision, he said, was to ”embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive. . . . I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.”’ This vision appeals to powerful moral sentiments. The impulse to look to our weapons and armed forces to defend ourselves rather than threaten others is a natural one, and is not new. At a press conference in London on February 9, 1967, the Soviet Premier A.N. Kosygin said: ”I think that a defensive system which prevents attack is not a cause of the arms race. . . . its purpose is not to kill people but to save human lives.”2 Two years later President kchard Nixon, in explaining his reluctant decision to forgo a nationwide anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense in favor of the limited Safe-

Nuclear weapons and the escalation of the Cold War, 1945–1962

Nuclear weapons are so central to the history of the Cold War that it can be dificult to disentangle the two. Did nuclear weapons cause the Cold War? Did they contribute to its escalation? Did they help to keep the Cold War “cold”? We should also ask how the Cold War shaped the development of atomic energy. Was the nuclear-arms race a product of Cold War tension rather than its cause? The atomic bomb and the origins of the Cold War The nuclear age began before the Cold War. During World War II, three countries decided to build the atomic bomb: Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Britain put its own work aside and joined the Manhattan Project as a junior partner in 1943. The Soviet effort was small before August 1945. The British and American projects were driven by the fear of a German atomic bomb, but Germany decided in 1942 not to make a serious effort to build the bomb. In an extraordinary display of scientific and industrial might, the United States made two bombs ready for use by August 1945. Germany was defeated by then, but President Harry S. Truman decided to use the bomb against Japan. The decision to use the atomic bomb has been a matter of intense controversy. Did Truman decide to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order, as he claimed, to end the war with Japan without further loss of American lives? Or did he drop the bombs in order to intimidate the Soviet Union, without really needing them to bring the war to an end? His primary purpose was surely to force Japan to surrender, but he also believed that the bomb would help him in his dealings with Iosif V. Stalin. That latter consideration was secondary, but it confirmed his decision. Whatever Truman’s motives, Stalin regarded the use of the bomb as an anti-Soviet move, designed to deprive the Soviet Union of strategic gains in the Far East and more generally to give the United States the upper hand in defining the postwar settlement. On August 20, 1945, two weeks to the day after Hiroshima, Stalin signed a decree setting up a Special Committee on the Atomic Bomb, under the chairmanship of Lavrentii P. Beriia. The Soviet project was now a crash program.

The Soviet Union and the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Abstract The Soviet Union responded sceptically to Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ speech in December 1953 but eventually entered negotiations on the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It believed the IAEA would provide opportunities for political influence and scientific collaboration. It did not want the peaceful uses of atomic energy around the world to be dominated by the United States. It pressed for close ties between the new agency and the United Nations and supported India and other developing countries in their opposition to safeguards. The new Agency was to be a forum for competition as well as cooperation.

How the Bomb Saved Soviet Physics

(1994). How the Bomb Saved Soviet Physics. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: Vol. 50, No. 6, pp. 46-55.

Foreign and Defence Policy

The judgement which Khrushchev’s successors pronounced on his foreign and defence policy was not essentially different from their assessment of his leadership in other fields. His ‘voluntaristic and unrealistic approach to the phenomena and events of international life’ was attacked for `giving rise either to smug overconfidence or to weakness in the face of the military threat from imperialism’.1 The military leaders denounced subjectivism in defence policy and called for greater attention to military advice and recommendations.2 It was not the general objectives of Khrushchev’s policies that were disputed, but the manner in which they were pursued. He was seen to be moving too precipitately towards better relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, and with unnecessary haste towards a complete break with China. His impending visit to Bonn was cancelled, and the tone of Soviet policy towards China was changed in an unsuccessful attempt to improve relations. The new leaders endorsed the policy of detente with the United States, but evidently felt that this did not lessen the need for military strength. Khrushchev’s attempts to exploit Soviet military power for political ends — as for example in Cuba and Berlin — were condemned as adventuristic. The verdict on Khrushchev was that he had been guilty of the solecism of, power: he had pursued ends he had not the means to attain.

US–China relations in the shadow of the future

China is often seen as a rising power challenging the dominant position of the United States in the international system. Theory and history suggest that this is a dangerous situation, and Chinese leaders have called for a new type of great power relations. This article applies some of the concepts developed at SCICN in an effort to see how the risk of war might be mitigated. Four questions, relating to the future, to trust, to loss, and to equity, are discussed. These questions map well onto the China–US relationship and suggest ways in which the risk of war might be reduced. Past experience suggests that the challenge by a rising power can be dangerous, but the appropriate response is to focus on a shared future.

Soviet Scientists Speak Out

In this article, Russian bomb designers answer the KGBs claim that espionage, not science, produced the Soviet bomb. Yuli Khariton and Yuri Smirnov wholly reject the argument that Soviet scientists can claim little credit for the first Soviet bomb. In a lecture delivered at the Kurchatov Institute, established in 1943 when Igor Kurchatov became the director of the Soviet nuclear weapons project, Khariton and Smironov point to the work done by Soviet nuclear physicists before 1941 and refute assertions that have been made in Western literature regarding the hydrogen bomb.