B. Meuffels

Fallacies and Judgments of Reasonableness

1. Theoretical backgrounds and organization of the study. 2. Considerations for the study design. 3. Ad hominem fallacies an exemplary study. 4. The confrontation stage the freedom rule. 5. The opening stage the burden of proof rule I (shifting the burden of proof). 6. The opening stage the burden of proof rule II (evading the burden of proof). 7. The argumentation stage the argument scheme rule. 8. The concluding stage the closure rule. 9. The conventional validity of the pragma-dialectical discussion rules.

The (Un)Reasonableness of Ad Hominem Fallacies

Starting from a pragmadialectical concept of reasonableness, the judgments of ordinary arguers concerning the reasonableness of discussion moves were investigated, concentrating on argumentum ad hominem fallacies. Three variants of ad hominem were presented to the respondents: (a) the abusive direct personal attack, (b) the circumstantial indirect personal attack, and (c) the you too! (tu quoque) variant. These fallacies were incorporated in items of three types: (a) a scientific discussion, (b) a political debate, and (c) a domestic discussion. As predicted, the respondents regarded speech acts with an ad hominem fallacy as lacking in reasonableness. They considered the direct personal attack least reasonable, then the indirect personal attack, then the tu quoque fallacy. In a scientific discussion, ad hominem fallacies were viewed as less reasonable than in the other two types of discussion.

The Extended Pragma-Dialectical Argumentation Theory Empirically Interpreted

The notion of strategic maneuvering, introduced by van Eemeren and Houtlosser, is basically an analytic concept enabling a more refined, accurate and comprehensive account of ‘argumentative reality’ than can be achieved by means of the existing, purely dialectical tools of canonical, standard pragma-dialectics.

Differential appraisal of age thresholds for mammographic screening in Holland and Switzerland

Abstract Introduction Information campaigns on breast cancer screening need to convince women above 50 years of age to have biannual mammograms, and women below 50 years of age that regular mammograms are not recommended for them. Earlier experiments in the Netherlands showed that type of evidence (statistical vs. anecdotal) and message framing (gain vs. loss) had no effects on attitudes to breast cancer screening. It also emerged that screening was widely accepted for women above 50, but women were reluctant to accept the exclusion of women under 50 from routine screening, although many and good arguments for this were presented. Aim This study aims at finding out whether these results are specific to the Dutch culture by replicating the experiments in Ticino, Switzerland. Methods A leaflet, constructed for the purposes of the study and informing women about breast cancer screening, served as the experimental stimulus in a pre-post-test design. Results Findings show that in Ticino gain-framing appeared to be systematically more persuasive than loss-framing. Moreover, Ticino women were more willing than the Dutch to accept that women under the age threshold of 50 are not recommended routine mammography every 2 years. Borrowing from reactance theory, the higher acceptance of an age threshold in Ticino is explained by differences in the regulations. Lower attention to the issue there as well as the broader context of culturally tailored health communication also play a role.

Justifying Age Thresholds for Mammographic Screening: An Application of Pragma-Dialectical Argumentation Theory

Information campaigns on breast cancer screening in the Netherlands need to convince women above 50 years of age to have biannual mammography, and women below 50 years of age that regular mammograms are not recommended for them. This article reports the results of two experiments in which the construction of the persuasive messages was informed by argumentation-theoretical insights. No differences were found between either statistical and anecdotal evidence or gain- and loss-framing in the attempt to convince women under 50 that they normally do not need regular mammography. A striking contrast emerged, however, between the overwhelming acceptance of breast cancer screening for women above 50 and the relative restraint and reluctance to consent that mammography is usually not recommended for women under 50. The reluctance to accept that regular mammography is not recommended for women under 50 is traced back to ego involvement.

The disguised ad baculum fallacy empirically investigated: Strategic maneuvering with threats

Threatening the other discussion party with negative, unpleasant consequences—for instance, by threatening him with physical violence or (more subtly) by threatening him implicitly with sanctions—if that party is not willing to refrain from advancing a particular standpoint or from casting doubt on a particular standpoint, is an outspoken example of a fallacy (“Of course, you can hold that view, but then you should realize that it will very hard for me to control my men in response to you”).

Effectiveness Through Reasonableness: A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective

According to van Eemeren (Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse. Extending the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. John Benjamins, Amsterdam, 2010), the participants in argumentative discourse are in the predicament of having to reach the results that are the most advantageous from their points of view while remaining within the boundaries of reasonableness. This is why they have to maneuver strategically to reconcile their pursuit of effectiveness with the maintenance of reasonableness (p. 40). In pragma-dialectical terms, this means that in their strategic maneuvering they try to be convincing by combining artful rhetorical operating systematically with complying fully with the dialectical rules for critical discussion.

Baas in eigen borst: waarom gezondheidsvoorlichting (soms) faalt

Information campaigns on breast cancer screening in the Netherlands have to convince women above 50 to have biannual mammography, and women below 50 that regular mammograms are not recommended for them. This article reports the results of three experiments in which the construction of the persuasive messages was informed by argumentation-theoretical (i.e. pragma-dialectical) insights. No differences were found between either statistical and anecdotal evidence or gain- and lossframing in the attempt to convince women under 50 that they normally do not need regular mammography. A striking contrast emerged, however, between the overwhelming acceptance of breast cancer screening for women above 50 and the relative restraint and reluctance to consent that mammography is usually not recommended for women under 50. The reluctance to accept that regular mammography is not recommended for women under 50 is traced back to ego-involvement.

De vermomde ad baculum drogreden empirisch onderzocht

The disguised ad baculum fallacy empirically investigated In argumentative discourse fallacies occur regularly. They often seem not to be noticed by the participants in the discourse. This also goes for the ad baculum fallacy. Threatening the other party with unpleasant consequences if that party doesn’t retract his standpoint is generally considered as a very unreasonable discussion move. In this paper it is argued that this paradox can be explained by analysing ad baculum threats as a mode of strategic maneuvering which takes on a reasonable appearance when it mimics, as it often does, legitimate pragmatic argumentation. The following hypothesis was tested in two experiments: ad baculum fallacies are regarded as less unreasonable than clear cases if they are presented as well-meant advices in which the speaker can’t be held responsible for the occurrence of the unpleasant consequences.

De uitgebreide pragma-dialectische argumentatietheorie empirisch geïnterpreteerd

In de zogenoemde ‘uitgebreide versie’ van de pragma-dialectiek, de argumentatietheorie waarin de retorische dimensie geincorporeerd wordt binnen het kader van de dialectiek, vervult de notie ‘strategisch manoeuvreren’ een analytische functie. In dit artikel wordt deze analytische notie op een empirische wijze geinterpreteerd, zodanig dat er drie toetsbare predicties over het discussiegedrag van gewone taalgebruikers uit kan worden afgeleid: (1) gewone taalgebruikers zijn zich, op pre-theoretisch niveau althans, min of meer ervan bewust wat de dialectische verplichtingen in een discussie behelzen en waar precies de grenzen van het dialectisch kader gesitueerd moeten worden (2) gewone taalgebruikers gaan ervan uit dat hun gesprekspartners zich, tot op zekere hoogte althans, evenzeer bewust zijn van de dialectische verplichtingen waaraan ook zijzelf gecommitteerd zijn (3) gewone taalgebruikers gaan ervan uit - en gaan ervan uit dat hun gesprekspartners daar ook van uitgaan - dat discussianten die zich schuldig maken aan een overtreding van de regels voor kritische discussie, onredelijk discussiegedrag vertonen waarop zij kunnen worden aangesproken en terechtgewezen. Na een korte bespreking van al eerder verricht empirisch onderzoek waarin predictie 1 centraal stond, wordt de opzet en resultaten van twee experimenten besproken waarin is nagegaan of predictie 2 en 3 geconfirmeerd kunnen worden.