Bart Garssen

Fallacies and Judgments of Reasonableness

1. Theoretical backgrounds and organization of the study. 2. Considerations for the study design. 3. Ad hominem fallacies an exemplary study. 4. The confrontation stage the freedom rule. 5. The opening stage the burden of proof rule I (shifting the burden of proof). 6. The opening stage the burden of proof rule II (evading the burden of proof). 7. The argumentation stage the argument scheme rule. 8. The concluding stage the closure rule. 9. The conventional validity of the pragma-dialectical discussion rules.

'In varietate concordia' - United in diversity: European parliamentary debate as an argumentative activity type

In Varietate Concordia—United in Diversity, the motto of the European Union printed proudly on all official paperwork of the European Parliament, proves a smart choice now so many Europeans are ambivalent about the European project. On the one hand the Europeans are afraid that they will lose control over their own national identities as a consequence of the rapidly increasing power of Europe’s central administration; on the other hand they realize that the European Union brings more prosperity and makes it possible to fight the financial and economic crisis much more effectively.

Comparing the Incomparable: Figurative Analogies in a Dialectical Testing Procedure

The evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins argues that punishment is, scientifically speaking, out of date. He points out that it makes no sense to punish a car when it refuses to start and that it is equally irrational to punish criminals, because in their case something is broken as well: they come from poor families, received poor education or have poor genes. In comparing criminals to broken inanimate objects Dawkins uses argumentation that is based on an analogy. In most approaches to argument schemes this type of argumentation is considered to be a special type of reasoning by analogy or comparison argumentation, often called figurative analogy because of the abstract nature of the comparison. In spite of the many differences that can be observed among the various typologies of argument schemes, there seems to be general agreement about the importance of analogy or comparison argumentation as a separate category of argumentation: all typologies include a category of this type of reasoning. On closer look however, there are terminological and conceptional differences among the approaches. Whately, one of the first modern authors who dealt with categorizing types of argumentation includes comparison argumentation and the argumentation form he calls “comparison of ratios” (1846/1963, pp. 90–91). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (trans. 1969) include analogy, identity relation (quasi logical) and the use of the rule of justice. Hastings (1962) distinghuishes between comparison argumentation and figurative analogy. Both Kienpointner (1992) and Schellens (1985) follow Hastings and make a similar distinction. Govier (1987, p. 58) who does not have the ambition of presenting a complete list of argument forms makes a distinction between comparison argumentation (inductive analogy) and the a priori analogy (logical analogy). Chapter 10 Comparing the Incomparable: Figurative Analogies in a Dialectical Testing Procedure

Argumentation by analogy in stereotypical argumentative patterns

As a consequence of the institutional preconditions applying to the strategic manoeuvring taking place in specific communicative activity types, certain context-dependent argumentative patterns of argument schemes and argumentation structures can be observed in argumentative discourse. Pragma-dialecticians are interested in discovering these patterns and in determining to what extent they are stereotypical of the communicative activity types associated with a specific communicative domain. This paper focuses on the way in which argumentation by analogy manifests itself in argumentative practice and the stereotypical argumentative patterns it is part of in various communicative domains. In the process, the pragma-dialectical view of argumentation by analogy is explained.

The Extended Pragma-Dialectical Argumentation Theory Empirically Interpreted

The notion of strategic maneuvering, introduced by van Eemeren and Houtlosser, is basically an analytic concept enabling a more refined, accurate and comprehensive account of ‘argumentative reality’ than can be achieved by means of the existing, purely dialectical tools of canonical, standard pragma-dialectics.

Exploiting the room for strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse: Dealing with audience demand in the European Parliament

Against the background of the standard pragma-dialectical theory, some fifteen years ago Van Eemeren en Houtlosser set about to extend the available analytic and evaluative tools by introducing the notion of ‘strategic maneuvering’ (van Eemeren and Houtlosser in Dialectic and rhetoric: the warp and woof of argumentation analysis. Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht, pp. 131–159, 2002). Strategic maneuvering refers to the arguers’ continual efforts to reconcile in their argumentative moves aiming for effectiveness with being reasonable. Strategic maneuvering takes place in all stages of the argumentative process of resolving a difference of opinion on the merits.

The disguised ad baculum fallacy empirically investigated: Strategic maneuvering with threats

Threatening the other discussion party with negative, unpleasant consequences—for instance, by threatening him with physical violence or (more subtly) by threatening him implicitly with sanctions—if that party is not willing to refrain from advancing a particular standpoint or from casting doubt on a particular standpoint, is an outspoken example of a fallacy (“Of course, you can hold that view, but then you should realize that it will very hard for me to control my men in response to you”).

Truth, Negation and Meaning

‘True’ and ‘False’ are defined through a linguistic rule requiring the negation operator. This is the elaboration of an idea proffered for the first time by the Stoics on the basis of some remarks by Aristotle and then in modern times by Frege and Wittgenstein. Another thesis of this essay is the following: the true/false rule is a sort of UR-Regel underlying all linguistic practices (including prayers and commands) and all human cultures. Reinterpreting the notion of Spielraum put forward by Wittgenstein in 4.463 of the Tractatus, I will present an implicational pragmatic theory of a true proposition. Jokes and reductio ad absurdum are explained as examples of Spielraum.

Some Highlights in Recent Theorizing: An Introduction

Since the early 1990s is has been our habit to publish regularly volumes with a collection of essays that are indicative of the kind of developments taking place at that moment in the study of argumentation. These volumes are intended to be a service to the discipline by presenting a selection of representative specimens of the state of the art to researchers and students of argumentation theory. As a rule the essays included in these volumes are based on papers presented at the preceding ISSA Conference. Among the earlier volumes are Argumentation Illuminated (van Eemeren et al. 1992), Logic and Argumentation (van Benthem et al. 1996), Anyone Who Has a View (van Eemeren et al. 2003), Argumentation in Practice (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2005), Controversy and Confrontation (van Eemeren and Garssen 2008), Pondering on Problems of Argumentation (van Eemeren and Garssen 2009). Topical Themes in Argumentation Theory fits into this tradition – as does, by the way, Exploring Argumentative Contexts (van Eemeren and Garssen 2011a, b).

Effectiveness Through Reasonableness: A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective

According to van Eemeren (Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse. Extending the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. John Benjamins, Amsterdam, 2010), the participants in argumentative discourse are in the predicament of having to reach the results that are the most advantageous from their points of view while remaining within the boundaries of reasonableness. This is why they have to maneuver strategically to reconcile their pursuit of effectiveness with the maintenance of reasonableness (p. 40). In pragma-dialectical terms, this means that in their strategic maneuvering they try to be convincing by combining artful rhetorical operating systematically with complying fully with the dialectical rules for critical discussion.