Bart Schuurman

Reintegrating jihadist extremists: evaluating a Dutch initiative, 2013–2014

In 2012, the Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism and the Dutch Probation Service launched a reintegration project for offenders on probation or parole who were (suspected to be) involved in jihadist extremism or terrorism. The initiatives primary goal was to reduce the chance of recidivism among this target group. This article presents the results of a one-year evaluation study (2013–2014) that assessed this initiatives underlying assumptions and practical implementation. A preliminary look at the projects effectiveness is also provided. The Dutch re-integration initiative was found to be based on largely realistic assumptions on how to successfully reintegrate terrorists and extremists, as reflected in an approach that encompassed both disengagement and deradicalization. Nevertheless, the programs first year saw mixed results, in part because of various obstacles encountered during its organizational implementation. These and other findings can serve as lessons learned for those interested in establishing similar programs.

Operation ‘Serval’: A Strategic Analysis of the French Intervention in Mali, 2013–2014

Abstract In 2013, France launched Operation ‘Serval’ to halt the southwards advance of Islamist insurgents in Mali. Using a Clausewitzian analytical framework, this article provides an assessment of France’s political and military aims in Mali and the degree to which they have been attained. Clear political goals, coordinated international diplomacy, an effective use of military force and blunders by the rebel forces turned ‘Serval’ into a short-term success. Strategically, however, the mission has proven unable to address the conflict’s underlying causes. Serval’s long-term effect is probably better measured by what it prevented than what it contributed.

Indicators of terrorist intent and capability: Tools for threat assessment

Behaviors or expressions can (inadvertently) communicate the intention or capability to commit a terrorist attack. Such pre-attack “indicators” can be used to improve police services’ ability to detect and interdict terrorist plots before they materialize. This article explores the concept of terrorism indicators by applying it to seven case studies of home-grown jihadist groups and individuals that occurred in three Western countries between 2004 and 2007. Two main findings are presented: a framework that conceptualizes the pre-attack process as consisting of seven distinct phases and, divided over these phases, a multitude of possible indicators of terrorist intent or capability. The run-up to a terrorist attack is found to be multipronged and chaotic rather than a neat linear progression through distinct preparatory stages. This may be characteristic of the loosely organized and relatively amateur nature of the home-grown jihadist groups and individuals studied.

Defeated by Popular Demand: Public Support and Counterterrorism in Three Western Democracies, 1963–1998

Acquiring and maintaining public support is frequently cited as an important requirement for governments fighting non-state actors. But how exactly can public support influence the course of counterterrorism campaigns and thereby contribute to an escalation or de-escalation of violence? This article argues that public support can provide a mandate for action but that it can also set boundaries for the measures governments and their non-state adversaries can legitimately use. Fluctuations in the quantity and quality of public support for either side can expand or contract these boundaries, potentially instigating marked changes in conflict-related violence levels and affecting the efficacy of government countermeasures.

Lone Actor Terrorist Attack Planning and Preparation: A Data‐Driven Analysis,

This article provides an in‐depth assessment of lone actor terrorists’ attack planning and preparation. A codebook of 198 variables related to different aspects of pre‐attack behavior is applied to a sample of 55 lone actor terrorists. Data were drawn from open‐source materials and complemented where possible with primary sources. Most lone actors are not highly lethal or surreptitious attackers. They are generally poor at maintaining operational security, leak their motivations and capabilities in numerous ways, and generally do so months and even years before an attack. Moreover, the “loneness” thought to define this type of terrorism is generally absent; most lone actors uphold social ties that are crucial to their adoption and maintenance of the motivation and capability to commit terrorist violence. The results offer concrete input for those working to detect and prevent this form of terrorism and argue for a re‐evaluation of the “lone actor” concept.

The Hofstadgroup Revisited: Questioning its Status as a “Quintessential” Homegrown Jihadist Network

Despite the Dutch Hofstadgroups status in the literature as a prime example of a homegrown Salafi-Jihadist terrorist network, the authors, using newly available primary sources, argue that this classification is to a large extent unwarranted. The lack of a rudimentary organizational structure, the existence of divergent views on the legitimacy and desirability of political violence, and the absence of collective action in pursuit of a violent goal rule out labeling the Hofstadgroup as a terrorist organization or network for the largest part of its 2002–2005 existence. A smaller subgroup of extremists did begin developing into a proto-terrorist inner circle from late 2003 onwards. In 2004, this extremist core brought forth the murderer of filmmaker Theo van Gogh. But it was only in 2005, when the remnants of the inner circle tried to resuscitate the Hofstadgroup in the wake of the arrests that had followed Van Goghs death, that these individual actions were replaced by the communal efforts necessary to warrant the “jihadist network” label often ascribed to the Hofstadgroup. Arguably the most archetypical aspect of the Hofstadgroup case is its ability to illustrate the deleterious effects of the ongoing scarcity of primary sources-based research on terrorism.

The Paradoxes of Negotiating with Terrorist and Insurgent Organisations

Negotiations are neither as straightforward nor indeed as desirable a means of conflict resolution as they may seem. This article discusses three paradoxical aspects of negotiations between states and terrorist or insurgent organisa`tions. First, negotiations may be used by the warring parties to gain time to recuperate or to prepare for a next offensive. Second, negotiations can cause splits to occur in the parties conducting them, promoting more and worse violence by hardliners. Finally, it has been demonstrated that successfully negotiated settlements are often brittle and frequently lead to a resumption of violence. In fact, military victories may offer better prospects for a lasting and stable peace.

Research on Terrorism, 2007–2016: A Review of Data, Methods, and Authorship

ABSTRACT Research on terrorism has long been criticized for its inability to overcome enduring methodological issues. These include an overreliance on secondary sources and the associated literature review methodology, a scarcity of statistical analyses, a tendency for authors to work alone rather than collaborate with colleagues, and the large number of one-time contributors to the field. However, the reviews that have brought these issues to light describe the field as it developed until 2007. This article investigates to what extent these issues have endured in the 2007–2016 period by constructing a database on all of the articles published in nine leading journals on terrorism (N = 3442). The results show that the use of primary data has increased considerably and is continuing to do so. Scholars have also begun to adapt a wider variety of data-gathering techniques, greatly diminishing the overreliance on literature reviews that was noted from the 1980s through to the early 2000s. These positive changes should not obscure enduring issues. Despite improvements, most scholars continue to work alone and most authors are one-time contributors. Overall, however, the field of terrorism studies appears to have made considerable steps towards addressing long-standing issues.

Radicalization patterns and modes of attack planning and preparation among lone-actor terrorists: an exploratory analysis

ABSTRACT This article explores the link between radicalization patterns and modes of attack planning and preparation among lone-actor terrorists. Building on theorized patterns of lone-actor radicalization, we discuss and compare their modes of pre-attack behavior, including target and weapon choice, observance of operational security measures, likeliness of engaging in leakage behavior, and the overall amount of time devoted to these activities. This exploratory study builds upon a dataset of thirty-three lone-actor terrorist cases in North-America and Europe between 1986 and 2015. The analysis suggests that specific patterns of radicalization are linked to systematic differences in modes of attack planning and preparation. The results provide insights into the heterogeneity of terrorist involvement and tentatively suggest the potential importance for law-enforcement agencies in using case-specific knowledge on radicalization patterns to inform forecasts of likely pre-attack behaviors.

Structural Influences on Involvement in European Homegrown Jihadism: A Case Study

ABSTRACT This article empirically assesses the applicability of structural-level hypotheses for involvement in terrorism within the context of European homegrown jihadism. It uses these hypotheses to study how structural factors influenced involvement in the Dutch “Hofstadgroup.” Structural factors enabled the group’s emergence and its participants’ adoption of extremist views. They also motivated involvement in political violence and a shift in some participants’ focus from joining Islamist insurgents overseas to committing terrorism in the Netherlands. Finally, structural factors precipitated an actual terrorist attack. No support is found for the frequently encountered argument that discrimination and exclusion drive involvement in European homegrown jihadism. Instead, geopolitical grievances were prime drivers of this process.