Edwin Bakker

Reintegrating jihadist extremists: evaluating a Dutch initiative, 2013–2014

In 2012, the Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism and the Dutch Probation Service launched a reintegration project for offenders on probation or parole who were (suspected to be) involved in jihadist extremism or terrorism. The initiatives primary goal was to reduce the chance of recidivism among this target group. This article presents the results of a one-year evaluation study (2013–2014) that assessed this initiatives underlying assumptions and practical implementation. A preliminary look at the projects effectiveness is also provided. The Dutch re-integration initiative was found to be based on largely realistic assumptions on how to successfully reintegrate terrorists and extremists, as reflected in an approach that encompassed both disengagement and deradicalization. Nevertheless, the programs first year saw mixed results, in part because of various obstacles encountered during its organizational implementation. These and other findings can serve as lessons learned for those interested in establishing similar programs.

EU Counter-radicalization Policies: A Comprehensive and Consistent Approach?

The challenge of violent radicalization is an important part of (the Prevent pillar) of the 2005 EU Counter-terrorism Strategy and is specifically dealt with in the 2005 EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism. This article assesses the EU counter-radicalization approach by comparing the above mentioned strategies and other policy documents to theoretical notions on radicalization and counter radicalization. It focuses on the comprehensiveness, implementation and consistency of the EU policies that aim to prevent individuals from turning to violence, while halting the emergence of the next generation of terrorists.

Lone Actor Terrorist Attack Planning and Preparation: A Data‐Driven Analysis,

This article provides an in‐depth assessment of lone actor terrorists’ attack planning and preparation. A codebook of 198 variables related to different aspects of pre‐attack behavior is applied to a sample of 55 lone actor terrorists. Data were drawn from open‐source materials and complemented where possible with primary sources. Most lone actors are not highly lethal or surreptitious attackers. They are generally poor at maintaining operational security, leak their motivations and capabilities in numerous ways, and generally do so months and even years before an attack. Moreover, the “loneness” thought to define this type of terrorism is generally absent; most lone actors uphold social ties that are crucial to their adoption and maintenance of the motivation and capability to commit terrorist violence. The results offer concrete input for those working to detect and prevent this form of terrorism and argue for a re‐evaluation of the “lone actor” concept.

Belgian and Dutch Jihadist Foreign Fighters (2012–2015) : Characteristics, Motivations, and Roles in the War in Syria and Iraq

Abstract In recent years, Belgium and the Netherlands have been confronted with relatively many citizens or residents who have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join and fight with jihadist groups — 388 Belgian and 220 Dutch as estimated by the respective authorities. This article provides an overview of the phenomenon of jihadist foreign fighters in the Low Countries, analyzing their characteristics, motivations, and roles in the war in Syria and Iraq. It compares the Belgian and Dutch cases, focusing on key aspects, such as age, sex, and geographical and socioeconomic background.

The Hofstadgroup Revisited: Questioning its Status as a “Quintessential” Homegrown Jihadist Network

Despite the Dutch Hofstadgroups status in the literature as a prime example of a homegrown Salafi-Jihadist terrorist network, the authors, using newly available primary sources, argue that this classification is to a large extent unwarranted. The lack of a rudimentary organizational structure, the existence of divergent views on the legitimacy and desirability of political violence, and the absence of collective action in pursuit of a violent goal rule out labeling the Hofstadgroup as a terrorist organization or network for the largest part of its 2002–2005 existence. A smaller subgroup of extremists did begin developing into a proto-terrorist inner circle from late 2003 onwards. In 2004, this extremist core brought forth the murderer of filmmaker Theo van Gogh. But it was only in 2005, when the remnants of the inner circle tried to resuscitate the Hofstadgroup in the wake of the arrests that had followed Van Goghs death, that these individual actions were replaced by the communal efforts necessary to warrant the “jihadist network” label often ascribed to the Hofstadgroup. Arguably the most archetypical aspect of the Hofstadgroup case is its ability to illustrate the deleterious effects of the ongoing scarcity of primary sources-based research on terrorism.

European Lone Actor Terrorists Versus “Common” Homicide Offenders: An Empirical Analysis

The term “Lone Actor” has been applied to a variety of violent individuals who are thought to act out of ideological motivations using terrorist tactics. So far, much of the research is U.S.-based. There is an empirical vacuum of Lone Actor violence in Europe and a conceptual gap in how these acts may be understood as a variation of homicidal behavior. We examine and compare characteristics of European Lone Actors to European “common” homicide offenders. Lone Actor terrorists constitute a heterogeneous group that is similar to homicide offenders but differs in terms of substance use, weapon use, and target. These findings may be understood in the context of instrumental versus expressive aims.

Returning Jihadist Foreign Fighters: Challenges Pertaining to Threat Assessment and Governance of this Pan-European Problem

Since the first reports detailing the presence of foreigner participating in the Syrian civil war in September 2011, the number of foreign fighters has increased exponentially. Especially European policymakers are worried about the potential threat posed by the presence of hundreds of European foreign fighters in Syria and the possibility that some of them could return to stage an attack. This article examines the challenges European policymakers face when addressing the foreign fighter phenomenon in general, and that of returnees in particular. The article first discusses the complexity of the (potential) threat posed by those that return from the fight in Syria. Next, it outlines the need for and challenge of providing an accurate threat assessment. The authors then present a number of recent ideas and proposals on how to deal with the phenomenon of foreign fighters in Europe. These proposals highlight the need for a mixed or comprehensive approach, which is sensible given the complexity as well as the multidimensional and international nature of the threat. However, it also poses an additional challenge to policymakers pertaining to the implementation of such an approach. This governance challenge is discussed by investigating the possible roles of various actors when dealing with returnees. Based on these findings, the concluding part presents a number of policy recommendations.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe

The Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East has always attracted widely divergent attention. Scholars have regarded it both as the source of terrorism, and, more recently as the potential harbinger of democratization. The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe has attracted far less attention. But heavily influenced by its ambiguous reputation in the Middle East it has led to widespread speculation about its character. Its critics regard the European organizations as part of a suspicious, secretive, centrally led world-wide organization that enhances the alienation of Muslims in Europe. Its sympathizers, on the other hand, regard the Brotherhood as a moderate movement that has been Europeanized and promotes integration. This volume brings together experts on the European Muslim Brotherhood who address some of the main issues on which the debate has concentrated. After an introduction dealing with the European debate in the press, the first section shows that Brotherhood consists primarily of a network of informal ties, which have developed a host of localized practices and contradictory trends. The second part deals with the Brotherhood organizations in different European countries and traces their highly specific trajectories and relations with the local non-Muslim press and authorities. The third section concentrates on the ideological developments of the movement in the Middle East and Europe.

Structural Influences on Involvement in European Homegrown Jihadism: A Case Study

ABSTRACT This article empirically assesses the applicability of structural-level hypotheses for involvement in terrorism within the context of European homegrown jihadism. It uses these hypotheses to study how structural factors influenced involvement in the Dutch “Hofstadgroup.” Structural factors enabled the group’s emergence and its participants’ adoption of extremist views. They also motivated involvement in political violence and a shift in some participants’ focus from joining Islamist insurgents overseas to committing terrorism in the Netherlands. Finally, structural factors precipitated an actual terrorist attack. No support is found for the frequently encountered argument that discrimination and exclusion drive involvement in European homegrown jihadism. Instead, geopolitical grievances were prime drivers of this process.

President Obama’s ‘Dirty Hands’: Assessing the Morality of the Targeted Killing of Anwar Al-Awlaki

Targeted killings in the fight against terrorism are controversially discussed from a political and legal angle. In this article we assess the moral dimension of the targeted killing of Islamist cleric Anwar al-Awlaki in 2011. An analysis of the case concludes that the episode was based on a Dirty Hands judgement by President Obama. The ‘Problem of Dirty Hands’ entails that, for a political actor, sometimes it is right to do what is wrong. Established by Michael Walzer in 1973, the problem was applied to the policy of the targeted killing of terrorist associates by political philosopher Stephen de Wijze. It is believed to provide a viable agent-centric framework to assess intractable moral conflicts while neither allowing for ruthless amoralism nor ignoring the nature of the political office. The conditions outlined by de Wijze are holistically fulfilled and, thus, it is concluded that, from a Dirty Hands’ perspective, the targeted killing of al-Awlaki was a justified breach of important moral standards.