Quirine Eijkman

Indicators of terrorist intent and capability: Tools for threat assessment

Behaviors or expressions can (inadvertently) communicate the intention or capability to commit a terrorist attack. Such pre-attack “indicators” can be used to improve police services’ ability to detect and interdict terrorist plots before they materialize. This article explores the concept of terrorism indicators by applying it to seven case studies of home-grown jihadist groups and individuals that occurred in three Western countries between 2004 and 2007. Two main findings are presented: a framework that conceptualizes the pre-attack process as consisting of seven distinct phases and, divided over these phases, a multitude of possible indicators of terrorist intent or capability. The run-up to a terrorist attack is found to be multipronged and chaotic rather than a neat linear progression through distinct preparatory stages. This may be characteristic of the loosely organized and relatively amateur nature of the home-grown jihadist groups and individuals studied.

Open source intelligence and privacy dilemmas: is it time to reassess state accountability?

This article argues that the gathering of open source intelligence, such as through messages on social networking sites, weblogs, blogs or apps, demands proper checks and balances. Abstract Open source intelligence (OSINT) is increasingly used for security and safety purposes. Even though security - and intelligence agencies and the police are using messages on social networking sites, weblogs, blogs or apps, state accountability mechanisms found it difficult to adapt to the online culture. Consider for instance the dilemma that open source information (OSINF) is frequently collected, processed, minded and stored by private companies. From a human right perspective, this gathering of OSINT demands proper checks and balances. Even though laws, regulations and policies may recognise this, it is important to review whether the gathering of OSINF online leads to new dilemmas. We conclude that state accountability should at least entail that the actual process and outcome of data collection, processing, mining and sharing is subjected to review and/or sanctions. Furthermore, it should become transparent which entity or who carries responsibility for the use of OSINT.

Visual surveillance and the prevention of terrorism: What about the checks and balances?

Visual surveillance has become a key technological tool in the prevention of terrorism and other serious crimes. From a human rights perspective, however, its use requires proper checks and balances, especially because there is a risk that – quoting Mathiesen on Foucault – panoptic surveillance, where the few view the many, develops. Furthermore, when public authorities use visual surveillance in an excessive or arbitrary fashion, they alienate citizens and reduce opportunities for effective co-operation. Henceforth, the need for proper checks and balances for visual surveillance is maintained in this article, which focuses on the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, as both countries have experience with preventing ‘home grown’ terrorism and with visual surveillance in public spaces.

Recognising the Local Perspective: Transitional Justice and Post-Conflict Reparations

The importance of the local perspective on transitional justice processes in post-conflict societies is discussed in this article. By focusing not only on reparations as transitional justice institutions, but also on the perception of ordinary people of their legitimacy, it analyses how these kinds of efforts potentially contribute to a sense of justice, reconciliation, social reconstruction at the community level and lasting peace. It thereby relies on socio-legal research conducted in the former Yugoslavia and, to a lesser extent, in Africa, Latin America and Asia. This article concludes with the observation that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to post-conflict reparations in transitional societies, but that there are some general lessons to be learned from the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Structural Influences on Involvement in European Homegrown Jihadism: A Case Study

ABSTRACT This article empirically assesses the applicability of structural-level hypotheses for involvement in terrorism within the context of European homegrown jihadism. It uses these hypotheses to study how structural factors influenced involvement in the Dutch “Hofstadgroup.” Structural factors enabled the group’s emergence and its participants’ adoption of extremist views. They also motivated involvement in political violence and a shift in some participants’ focus from joining Islamist insurgents overseas to committing terrorism in the Netherlands. Finally, structural factors precipitated an actual terrorist attack. No support is found for the frequently encountered argument that discrimination and exclusion drive involvement in European homegrown jihadism. Instead, geopolitical grievances were prime drivers of this process.

Access to Justice 4 Known or Potential Extremists? : Local Professionals on Legal Remedies Against Person-Specific Interventions

This article discusses, from the local professional perspective, access to justice for person-specific interventions to prevent or counter (violent) extremism in Europe. Using a Dutch case study it focusses on legal protection for hand-tailored interferences that are part of a wider-ranging counter-terrorism policy. While the so-called person-specific interventions, carried out by professionals, target designated high-risk individuals and groups, it is primarily the municipal authority that coordinates these criminal –, administrative – or social based measures. Furthermore, although researchers and human rights advocates have repeatedly sounded the alarm over access to justice for those affected, little research has been done into how those responsible for implementation perceive the necessity of legal protection. Also, the potential side-effects such as executive arbitrariness are modestly reflected in the literature. Henceforth, by reviewing policy documents and conducting semi-structured interviews, this exploratory study concludes that as far as legal protection for hand-tailored interferences are concerned, local professionals have faith in the checks and balances of the criminal justice system. Yet from their perspective this was less self-evident in cases of administrative – or social measures. Therefore, one may wonder if legal protections for person-specific interventions that deal with (potential) extremists are sufficient in practice.

Security versus privacy: What is Europe heading for?

European states increasingly rely on digital personal data to manage security — and safety risks. Information and communication technology facilitates the collection and processing of digital personal data for risk profiling purposes. Based on the outcome of the analysis, people are categorized according to their predefined levels of potential threat. Thus financial and traveler’s data or online behavior are becoming a valuable asset of risk management. Human rights, such as the right to privacy, are widely assumed to be affected by these changes. These developments inspired the University of Amsterdam to organize the Amsterdam Privacy Conference in 2012. During this interdisciplinary academic gathering several ‘privacy and security’ panels were organized. The articles in this special issue ‘Security versus Privacy: What is Europe heading for?’, were discussed in these panels. Some were part of a debate on increased surveillance and information security in Europe, whereas others focused on data protection, identification and strategy. International organizations including the Organization for the Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) have for decades raised awareness and set standards on security and privacy. The OSCE regularly emphasizes the need for privacy and data protection in the context of, for example, a comprehensive approach to cyber security or the freedom of the internet. Whereas the European Union (EU), is currently drastically revising its data protection legislation to protect online privacy in order to set international renowned standards for the processing and movement of personal data. For the OSCE the issue of privacy and security remains crucial, because it is one of the most thought-provoking dilemmas of our digital time. Data mining, for instance, enables public and private authorities to provide for safety and security in a more sophisticated manner. This, however, provokes questions about human rights compliance. What are, for example, the (side) effects of monitoring social media for the right to privacy? A key question in the European context is: What are the new risks and challenges for privacy and data protection emerging from changing security technologies and practices? Moreover, how are these risks checked and balanced by accountability mechanisms? Should there be a difference between accountability for public and private authorities? In this special issue these questions are addressed by focusing on accountability, safety and security concerns in relation to the practices of open source information collection and the introduction of smart surveillance systems