Benjamin Kienzle

The role of ideas in EU responses to international crises: Comparing the cases of Iraq and Iran

This article examines how cognitive and normative ideas influence the ability of the European Union (EU) to formulate common policies in response to international crises such as the 2002–2003 Iraq crisis and the Iranian nuclear crisis (since 2002). It argues that in crisis situations, i.e. in highly uncertain circumstances, ideas often become the principal guide for policy-makers. More specifically, ideas foster interpretations of a crisis along several core themes: above all, how the crisis issue is perceived, which means are deemed to be legitimate and/or effective and, depending on the particular crisis, how other relevant themes are seen, e.g. the appropriate relationship with the United States. Thus, the formulation of common EU crisis response depends on the convergence of these interpretations in Member States – as in the Iran crisis. On the contrary, if Member States’ interpretations diverge beyond a common ‘ideational space’ – as in the case of Iraq – dissonance will be the probable outcome.

The exception to the rule? The EU and India's challenge to the non-proliferation norm

Norm challenge is a continuous feature of international norms. However, the dynamics of such a challenge are still not properly understood. Therefore, this article examines in-depth the key processes involved in a major, but still underexplored challenge in the case of the nuclear non-proliferation regime: the recent accommodation of India in the regime, even though it developed nuclear weapons in violation of the regimes fundamental non-proliferation norm. More specifically, it will focus on how certain states came about to support such a norm challenge. In this regard, the European Union and its member states played a crucial role, as they included both very supportive and very reluctant states that all had the opportunity to block Indias accommodation in the regime. In contrast to the traditional focus on persuasion and argumentation in the norm-based literature, this article argues that it was the peculiar interplay of persuasion and argumentation with material incentives, pressure, and bargaining that created the support for norm challenge in the early stages, in particular in the case of the states that remained highly sceptical of the challenge.

European security and defence in the shadow of Brexit

The British referendum on EU membership on 23 June 2016 has marked a watershed in European affairs. The purpose of this forum is to examine the implications of the outcome of the referendum in one of the areas where the UK is one of the most decisive players on the European stage: security and defence policy. Without recourse to the kinds of hyperbole and speculation that has prevailed in some parts of the media and wider commentary on Brexit, the forum sets Brexit within a wider context, one that establishes pre-existing trends and dynamics in European security and defence affairs. So, each forum author is able to offer judgements and observations grounded in deep understanding of pre-Brexit developments in their respective area of expertise. They look specifically at the two major security and defence actors in the EU, namely France and Germany, and their cooperation in the area of defence procurement. Moreover, they examine Brexit from the perspective of Europe’s main partners (and rivals) in the wider world, in particular Russia and the United States in the context of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The New Face of EU Security Policies? Analysing the Normative Patterns of EU Non-Proliferation Policies in the Southern Mediterranean

In recent years, the European Union has substantially intensified its non-proliferation policies in the southern Mediterranean. Although the analysis of these policies shows that the Union comes close to what the literature suggests is an ideal type normative power, this interpretation in itself is at odds with other security policies in the southern Mediterranean and with non-proliferation policies outside the region, most notably in Iran. Therefore, this article examines the causes and implications of this inconsistency, and argues that it can be problematic to characterize the EU as a normative power in a geographically and thematically limited issue area.

The Irony of History: European Responses to the Contested Evolution of the Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Regime

Over the last few decades, nation states have established a complex but largely stable nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Yet, during the last 15 years, the regime’s hegemonic structure has come under increasing pressure. This chapter argues that the European Union’s particular consensus regarding the non-proliferation and disarmament regime has conditioned different European responses to each challenge. First, it has deliberately accommodated the institutional challenge by the United States to create informal institutions outside the established regime framework. Second, it has undeliberately accommodated the power challenge by India, which seeks increasing recognition as a nuclear weapon state by the regime members. Third, it entrenches whenever it is confronted with an ideational challenge by countries in the Global South to prioritise nuclear disarmament over nuclear non-proliferation.

European Union Non-Proliferation Policies Before and After the 2003 Strategy: Continuity and Change

At its December 2003 summit, the European Council adopted its first ‘Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)’. This document (for its text see Appendix II of this volume) was released only six months after the European Security Strategy (ESS), also the first of its kind in the history of the EU. Until then, nuclear non-proliferation had been slowly making its way into the EU’s agenda: the EU had taken some steps to combat the spread of nuclear weapons within its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), focusing mainly the universalisation of treaties, transparency in export controls and promoting some regional initiatives. However, these efforts remained dispersed and low-profile and had never been integrated in a co-ordinated strategy. Why did the EU become active in nuclear non-proliferation, and why did it choose to do so at that particular point in time? Most importantly, did the release of a formal strategy introduce a significant upgrade to EU non-proliferation policies?