Patricia Garcia-Duran

Why TTIP is an unprecedented geopolitical game-changer, but not a Polanyian moment

ABSTRACT This contribution argues that the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is unprecedented, not because it constitutes a Polanyian moment, but rather because it offers an alternative to multilateralism through the World Trade Organization (WTO). Never before has bilateralism offered such a ‘best alternative to no agreement’ (BATNA) to members of the core decision-making body of the WTO negotiating arm, making TTIP an unprecedented geopolitical game-changer. The anti-TTIP campaign, however, has not been driven by concerns with either geopolitics or trade liberalization, but rather fears about the European Union’s (EU’s) bargaining power. By strategically focusing on the potential impact on public policy and safety standards, normative arguments promulgated by opponents reflect concerns with perceived threats to the status quo and a willingness to preserve the same. The United States is presented (implicitly) as more powerful than the EU, and therefore perceived as able to impose its preferences, which are considered too neoliberal.

EU trade policy reaction to the BIC: from accommodation to entrenchment

The authors offer an analysis of the EU’s response to the transformation of the international trade regime that became patently clear at the 2003 Cancun Summit of the World Trade Organisation, where emerging powers challenged an EU–US pre-agreement on agriculture. The failure of Cancun marked the end of a governance system dominated by Western powers and highlighted the emergence of Brazil, India and China (the so-called BIC) as trade powers. On the bases of the analytical framework of the volume, the chapter explores the EU trade policy reaction to this context of growing multipolarity in terms of accommodation and entrenchment and puts forward an interpretation of the results.

Efficient multilateralism or bilateralism? The TTIP from an EU Trade Policy perspective

The EU bilateral trade strategy since 2006, including the TTIP, has been justified by the European Commission on the bases that deep and comprehensive trade agreements are compatible with efficient multilateralism. The Commission argument is the following: in a context marked by international supply-chains, preferential agreements that allow for progress on what has been achieved at the multilateral level (topics WTO +) and in areas not already covered by the WTO (items WTO- X) may be considered as a stepping stone, not a stumbling block for multilateral liberalization. In other words, EU recent bilateral negotiations and agreements should be seen at worst as complementary to multilateral negotiations and at best as promoters.This paper challenges this argument by pointing out that the multilateralization potential of a bilateral agreement may not be a sufficient condition for compatibility between the bilateral and multilateral approaches. Their complementarity may also be influenced by what is happening at the multilateral level. Content analysis of a primary source of information - the Bridges Weekly reports - shows that there has been a change in EU actions in the Doha Round towards Brazil, India and China since 2009. Though the EU did not preclude the inclusion of these emerging powers in the high table of negotiations at any time and was in favour of the Bali agreement of 2013, its willingness to respond to their demands reached a plateau in 2008. That may signal a change in the nature of its bilateral strategy. Indeed, from 2006 until 2009 the EU may have sought bilateral partners among new important trade players (India, ASEAN and South Korea) to complement or even facilitate a multilateral agreement. Since then, however, the EU may have focused on reaching agreements with even more important trade partners: the old Quad members (Canada, Japan and the USA) as a way to ensure the market access opportunities that it cannot longer expect to obtain from the Doha Round. Following this analysis, the TTIP should be read, at least in the short time, as an example of efficient bilateralism.