Blair Saunders

Error-related electromyographic activity over the corrugator supercilii is associated with neural performance monitoring

Emerging research in social and affective neuroscience has implicated a role for affect and motivation in performance monitoring and cognitive control. No study, however, has investigated whether facial electromyography (EMG) over the corrugator supercilii-a measure associated with negative affect and the exertion of effort-is related to neural performance monitoring. Here, we explored these potential relationships by simultaneously measuring the error-related negativity, error positivity (Pe), and facial EMG over the corrugator supercilii muscle during a punished, inhibitory control task. We found evidence for increased facial EMG activity over the corrugator immediately following error responses, and this activity was related to the Pe for both between- and within-subject analyses. These results are consistent with the idea that early, avoidance-motivated processes are associated with performance monitoring, and that such processes may also be related to orienting toward errors, the emergence of error awareness, or both.

False external feedback modulates posterror slowing and the f-P300: implications for theories of posterror adjustment.

People tend to slow down after mistakes. This posterror slowing (PES) has commonly been explained by a change to a more conservative response threshold to avoid future errors. Alternatively, the attention-orienting account posits that all infrequent, surprising events (including errors) elicit an orienting response followed by a time-consuming process of task reorientation, explaining PES without increased response caution. In the present study, we employed both behavioral and electrophysiological measures to compare the predictions of these accounts using a flanker paradigm in which accurate or false external response feedback was provided. Participants demonstrated typical posterror adjustments, responding more slowly and accurately in posterror than in postcorrect trials. This finding provides initial evidence suggesting that posterror adjustments are motivated by the avoidance of subsequent mistakes. Most importantly, PES and an event-related potential relating to the attentional processing of feedback, the feedback-related P300 (f-P300), were modulated by feedback type. More specifically, the f-P300 was larger after false than after accurate feedback, suggesting that participants oriented their attention toward (i.e., were surprised by) inaccurate feedback signals. Interestingly, false feedback differentially modulated reaction times: Participants were slower after correct responses when feedback falsely informed of an error rather than confirmed the correct response. In contrast, faster responses were made after errors when feedback falsely indicated correct rather than incorrect performance. When these patterns of results are regarded together, they are best explained by theories of cognitive control in which posterror adjustments in choice reaction time tasks are assumed to reflect control processes leading to more conservative performance after error signals.

What does cognitive control feel like? Effective and ineffective cognitive control is associated with divergent phenomenology

Cognitive control is accompanied by observable negative affect. But how is this negative affect experienced subjectively, and are these feelings related to variation in cognitive control? To address these questions, 42 participants performed a punished inhibitory control task while periodically reporting their subjective experience. We found that within-subject variation in subjective experience predicted control implementation, but not neural monitoring (i.e., the error-related negativity, ERN). Specifically, anxiety and frustration predicted increased and decreased response caution, respectively, while hopelessness accompanied reduced inhibitory control, and subjective effort coincided with the increased ability to inhibit prepotent responses. Clarifying the nature of these phenomenological results, the effects of frustration, effort, and hopelessness-but not anxiety-were statistically independent from the punishment manipulation. Conversely, while the ERN was increased by punishment, the lack of association between this component and phenomenology suggests that early monitoring signals might precede the development of control-related subjective experience. Our results indicate that the types of feelings experienced during cognitively demanding tasks are related to different aspects of controlled performance, critically suggesting that the relationship between emotion and cognitive control extends beyond the dimension of valence.

Reactive and proactive control adjustments under increased depressive symptoms: Insights from the classic and emotional-face Stroop task

The current research investigated differences in reactive and proactive cognitive control as a function of depressive symptomatology. Three participant groups with varying symptom levels (Beck Depression Inventory–II, BDI–II score) completed both the classic and an emotional-face Stroop task separately under speed and accuracy instructions. All groups made equivalent speed–accuracy trade-offs independent of task, suggesting that proactive adjustments are unaffected by depressive symptoms. Additionally, groups made equivalent reactive control adjustments (Stroop effects, congruency sequence effects) in the classic Stroop task, suggesting that these reactive control adjustments are spared across a wide range of BDI–II scorers. In contrast, the high BDI–II group displayed a selective impairment in the resolution of conflict in the emotional-face Stroop task. Thus, while proactive control and many aspects of reactive control were unaffected by the level of depressive symptoms, specific impairments occurred when current task demands required the trial-to-trial regulation of emotional processing.

Mindful awareness of feelings increases neural performance monitoring

Mindfulness has been associated with enhanced performance monitoring; however, little is known about the processes driving this apparent neurocognitive benefit. Here, we tested whether focusing present-moment awareness toward the nonjudgmental experience of emotion facilitates rapid neural responses to negative performance outcomes (i.e., mistakes). In particular, we compared whether directing present-moment awareness toward emotions or thoughts would enhance the neurophysiological correlates of performance monitoring: the error-related negativity (ERN) and the error positivity (Pe). Participants were randomly assigned to either a thought-focused or an emotion-focused group, and first they completed a preinduction go/no-go task. Subsequently, the groups followed inductions that promoted mindful attention toward either thoughts or emotions, before completing a final postinduction go/no-go session. The results indicated that emotion-focused participants demonstrated higher neural sensitivity to errors in the time course of the ERN, whereas focusing on thoughts had no effect on performance monitoring. In contrast, neither induction procedure altered the amplitude of the later Pe component. Although our manipulations also induced changes in behavior, the ERN effects remained significant after controlling for performance. Thus, our results suggest that mindfulness meditation boosts early neural performance monitoring (ERN amplitude), specifically through meditation’s influence on affective processing.

Variation in Cognitive Control as Emotion Regulation

Few fields in psychological science are growing as quickly as emotion regulation. Undoubtedly hastened by the introduction of the process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998), researchers have identified a broad array of emotion regulatory tactics, each serving to alter the intensity, duration, or quality of the unfolding emotional response. In addition to being a buoyant research area in its own right, concepts from emotion regulation have permeated multiple subdisciplines of psychology, including biological, cognitive, clinical, developmental, personality, and social approaches, to name a few. Given this rapid expansion, the time is ripe not only to take stock of recent advancements but also to formulate new ideas about the mechanisms that govern emotion regulation. In this light, we welcome the synthesis and conceptual development provided by the extended process model of emotion regulation (Gross, this issue). However, we also believe that the targets of emotion regulation might range further than is typically acknowledged by existing models. Here, extending contemporary accounts of emotion regulation, we explore the idea that the implementation of cognitive control—one other emergent feature of the mind—can also be viewed as a form of emotion regulation, initiated to reduce the unpleasant experience of challenges to goal-directed behavior. In broad terms, cognitive control underlies intentional action, calibrating attentional, cognitive, and action systems to better attain performance goals, particularly in novel or challenging situations (Banich, 2009). Control is distinguished from automatic processing, where responses are implemented in a habitual and spontaneous manner. Of importance, rather than reflecting the execution of a unitary psychological process, cybernetic approaches decompose control into (at least) three core subsystems, including goal setting, control implementation, and monitoring (Carver & Sheier, 1990; Inzlicht, Legault, & Teper, 2014). First, goal setting represents current performance intentions (e.g., name ink color, eat healthily), and implementation systems calibrate ongoing information processing toward the fulfillment of these goals. Crucially, a continual monitoring process detects events that conflict with current objectives (e.g., errors or unwanted impulses), providing feedback to the implementation systems about the fluctuating need to increase or relax levels of control (Botvinick et al., 2001; Carver & Scheier, 1990). Several existing models have identified ways in which controlled processes can regulate automatic emotional impulses (Etkin, Egner, Peraza, Kandel, & Hirsch, 2006; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Teper, Segal, & Inzlicht, 2013). Here, rather than further specifying how control processes might serve the regulation of prototypical affective material (e.g., negative imagery, distressing life events), we consider how the process of regulating emotional experiences might apply to the calibration of cognitive control, even for tasks that are not explicitly emotional in nature. In this regard, we suggest that emotional processing is inherently involved in goal-directed behavior. For example, in addition to coldly representing the requirements of the task at hand, our performance goals represent the value of successful performance; goal attainment is particularly valuable when goals align with overarching values and beliefs (Deci & Ryan, 1985), are externally incentivized (Chiew & Braver, 2011), or when a represented objective is personally meaningful (Proulx, Inzlicht & HarmonJones, 2012). Consequently, we suggest that situations requiring the use of control (e.g., conflict, errors, temptations) are particularly salient when goals are valued, triggering a transient negative affective state that (a) can be characterized as a type of emotion episode and (b) initiates regulatory action (Inzlicht & Legault, 2014; Saunders & Inzlicht, in press). In this commentary, rather than directly critiquing the extended process model (Gross, this issue), we note the generative nature of this model for understanding established cognitive control phenomena. First, we present evidence that situations requiring

Stability and reliability of error-related electromyography over the corrugator supercilii with increasing trials

Electromyographic activity over the corrugator supercilii (cEMG), the primary facial muscle involved in negative emotions, is increased during the commission of errors on speeded reaction-time tasks. In the present paper, data from two previously published studies were reanalyzed to investigate the reliability and stability of error-related, correct-related, and difference cEMG across increasing numbers of trials. For a modified go/no-go and a flanker task, we found that error-related cEMG was highly stable and reliable in 14 trials, and correct-related cEMG between 56 and 82 trials, respectively. Given the typical number of trials used in studies of cognitive control, these findings suggest that many investigations of error monitoring are already sufficient to obtain acceptable error- and correct-related cEMG signals. Error-related cEMG activity is relatively easy to measure and, as such, it shows great promise for future research investigating the cognitive and affective mechanisms of error monitoring.

No Evidence That Gratitude Enhances Neural Performance Monitoring or Conflict-Driven Control

It has recently been suggested that gratitude can benefit self-regulation by reducing impulsivity during economic decision making. We tested if comparable benefits of gratitude are observed for neural performance monitoring and conflict-driven self-control. In a pre-post design, 61 participants were randomly assigned to either a gratitude or happiness condition, and then performed a pre-induction flanker task. Subsequently, participants recalled an autobiographical event where they had felt grateful or happy, followed by a post-induction flanker task. Despite closely following existing protocols, participants in the gratitude condition did not report elevated gratefulness compared to the happy group. In regard to self-control, we found no association between gratitude—operationalized by experimental condition or as a continuous predictor—and any control metric, including flanker interference, post-error adjustments, or neural monitoring (the error-related negativity, ERN). Thus, while gratitude might increase economic patience, such benefits may not generalize to conflict-driven control processes.

Interpersonal touch enhances cognitive control: A neurophysiological investigation

Touch is central to mammalian communication, socialization, and wellbeing. Despite this prominence, interpersonal touch is relatively understudied. In this preregistered investigation, we assessed the influence of interpersonal touch on the subjective, neural, and behavioral correlates of cognitive control. Forty-five romantic couples were recruited (N = 90; dating >6 months), and one partner performed an inhibitory control task while electroencephalography was recorded to assess neural performance monitoring. Interpersonal touch was provided by the second partner and was manipulated between experimental blocks. A within-subject repeated-measures design was used to maximize statistical power, with our sample size providing 80% power for even small effect sizes (ds > .25). Results indicated that participants were not only happier when receiving touch, but also showed increased neural processing of mistakes. Further exploratory cognitive modeling using indirect effects tests and drift diffusion models of decision making revealed that touch was indirectly associated with both improved inhibitory control and increased rates of evidence accumulation (drift rate) through its influence on neural monitoring. Thus, beyond regulating emotion and stress, interpersonal touch appears to enhance the neurocognitive processes underling flexible goal-directed behavior.

Midfrontal theta and pupil dilation parametrically track subjective conflict (but also surprise) during intertemporal choice

&NA; Many everyday choices are based on personal, subjective preferences. When choosing between two options, we often feel conflicted, especially when trading off costs and benefits occurring at different times (e.g., saving for later versus spending now). Although previous work has investigated the neurophysiological basis of conflict during inhibitory control tasks, less is known about subjective conflict resulting from competing subjective preferences. In this pre‐registered study, we investigated subjective conflict during intertemporal choice, whereby participants chose between smaller immediate versus larger delayed rewards (e.g.,