Brett W. Pelham

From Self-Conceptions to Self-Worth: On the Sources and Structure of Global Self-Esteem

Three factors were identified that uniquely contribute to peoples global self-esteem: (a) peoples tendencies to experience positive and negative affective states, (b) peoples specific self-views (i.e., their conceptions of their strengths and weaknesses), and (c) the way people frame their self-views. Framing factors included the relative certainty and importance of peoples positive versus negative self-views and the discrepancy between peoples actual and ideal self-views. The contribution of importance to peoples self-esteem, however, was qualified in 2 ways. First, importance contributed only to the self-esteem of those who perceived that they had relatively few talents. Second, individuals who saw their positive self-views as important were especially likely to be high in self-esteem when they were also highly certain of these positive self-views. The theoretical and therapeutic implications of these findings are discussed.

On confidence and consequence: the certainty and importance of self-knowledge.

Belief certainty and belief importance represent 2 relatively independent forms of investment in the self-concept. Three studies suggested that whereas certainty is associated with epistemic (i.e., rational or informational) factors, importance is more closely associated with emotive (i.e., emotional and motivational) factors. A 4th study explored the implications of certainty and importance for the temporal stability of peoples self-views and revealed that whereas belief certainty was associated with the stability of both positive and negative beliefs, belief importance was associated with the stability of positive beliefs only. The implications of belief investment for the verification-enhancement debate and for the structure and measurement of the self-concept are discussed.

The easy path from many to much: The numerosity heuristic.

Abstract People are especially sensitive to numerosity as a cue for judging quantity or probability. That is, people sometimes judge amount or likelihood on the basis of the number of units into which a stimulus is divided without fully considering other important variables (e.g., the size of the units). People appear to be especially likely to make use of this numerosity heuristic when their cognitive resources are taxed. Consistent with this idea, five experiments showed that people are especially likely to overinfer quantity or probability from numerosity (a) when they are asked to make inherently difficult judgments, (b) when they are asked to render judgments while performing a concurrent task, and (c) when they are forced to make especially rapid judgments. In addition to their implications for the numerosity heuristic, the broad implications of these findings for the study of judgment are discussed.

Who Wants Out When the Going Gets Good? Psychological Investment and Preference for Self-Verifying College Roommates

The results of a field investigation indicate that people who are highly invested in their self-views (confidently held or personally important) are especially inclined to display a preference for verification of their self-views. Specifically, only those participants who were certain of their self-views or perceived them as important preferred roommates who confirmed their self-views. Such preferences were some-what stronger when the self-views were relatively negative. This is the first demonstration of self-verification in a field setting in which relationship partners were randomly assigned to one another.

The idiographic nature of human personality: examples of the idiographic self-concept.

Arguments are made for the practical and theoretical merits of idiographic approaches to personality. In addition, it is argued that idiographic approaches to personality afford levels of prediction that cannot be provided by nomothetic analyses, and 2 studies of the role of self-investment in interpersonal perception are presented in support of this position. Finally, in contrast to previous arguments for idiographic approaches, it is suggested that idiographic approaches to personality can provide special insight into universal patterns of human personality.

Different Partners, Different Selves: Strategic Verification of Circumscribed Identities

It is proposed that people negotiate and receive verification for highly positive, relationship-specific selves. Study 1 indicated that although people wanted evaluations that were roughly consistent with their self-views on most dimensions, on a dimension that was crucial to a specific relationship (physical attractiveness in dating relationships) they wanted evaluations that far exceeded their self-views. Studies 2 and 3 showed that participants recognized that their desired evaluations exceeded their self-views but they expected to—and actually did—evoke exalted appraisals of their attractiveness from dating partners. Study 4 suggested that the desire to receive exceptionally positive appraisals on relationship-relevant dimensions generalized to other self-views and same-sex, nonromantic relationship partners. The authors conclude that people find ways of circumventing the conflict between their desires to be valued yet understood.

The Juncture of Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Knowledge: Self-Certainty and Interpersonal Congruence

It is proposed that when targets are especially certain of their self-views, their interaction partners will be especially likely to develop impressions of them that are consistent with these self-views. Two studies supported this prediction by demonstrating that, for self-views about which targets were highly certain, targets received self-consistent interpersonal appraisals. In contrast, in areas in which the same targets were relatively uncertain of their self-views, the appraisals they received were only weakly related to their self-views. This difference held for judgments of both valenced and nonvalenced traits and for judgments made by both poorly and well-acquainted raters. Potential mediators of interpersonal congruence are discussed, along with the implications of these findings for the accuracy of social perception and for the role of belief investment in self-concept maintenance.

On the benefits of misery : self-serving biases in the depressive self-concept

Two survey studies suggested that depressed people react to their acute distress by engaging in self-serving biases and striving to develop positive self-views. Study 1 revealed that whereas most of the specific self-views of depressed persons were relatively negative, their best (most favorable) self-views were just as favorable as the best self-views of nondepressed persons. Moreover, depressed participants reported that they were highly confident of their best self-views and considered these beliefs extremely important. Analyses equating depressed and nondepressed persons for global self-esteem provided even stronger evidence of self-serving biases among the depressed. Specifically, such analyses revealed that depressed persons best self-views were even more positive than the best self-views of the nondepressed. A 2nd study replicated these effects and provided tentative evidence that downward comparison processes play a role in the development of depressed persons positive self-views. The theoretical and therapeutic implications of these findings are discussed.

On the Highly Positive Thoughts of the Highly Depressed

Most contemporary theories of the self-concept emphasize the self- defeating nature of low self-regard. Along these lines, most researchers would probably agree that one of the most serious drawbacks of low self-esteem is its close connection to clinical disorders such as depression. Consider the story of Ron, a typical student suffering from low self-esteem. After receiving a low score on an exam, Ron became mildly depressed. As suggested by research on the specific beliefs of people low in self-esteem (e.g., see Pelham & Swann, 1989), Ron had always harbored doubts about his abilities. Under the influence of his negative mood, these doubts were transformed into highly negative beliefs, and these negative beliefs eventually increased Ron’s emotional distress, which contributed still further to his negative beliefs (see Beck, 1967, 1976, for a relevant discussion). Consistent with work on depression and attributional style, Ron then began to make self-blaming attributions for his growing list of failures, and these self-blaming attributions further intensified his misery (e.g., see Metalsky, Seligman, Semmel, & Peterson, 1982).

Further evidence for a Jamesian model of self-worth : reply to Marsh (1995)

A critical analysis is offered of H. W. Marshs (1993, 1995) and B. W. Pelhams (1995) recent studies of global self-esteem. It is concluded that a strong empirical case has now been made for the validity of W. Jamess (1890) hypothesis about self-investment and self-esteem. The personal importance people place on their specific strengths and weaknesses is an important predictor of global self-esteem.