Richard M. Wenzlaff

The Role of Thought Suppression in Depressive Rumination

Previous research has shown that thought suppression can ironically enhance the accessibility of negative thoughts when mental control is disabled by competing cognitive demands. This study provided a longitudinal test of the prediction that the combination of thought suppression and stress can promote depressive rumination. An initial assessment identified high and low suppressors who had low levels of rumination and depression. Approximately 10 weeks later, high suppressors—who had experienced relatively high levels of stress—reported significant increases in rumination and dysphoria that exceeded those of any other group. The findings support the idea that when stress undermines mental control, thought suppression efforts can ironically fuel depressive rumination.

Negative processing biases predict subsequent depressive symptoms

This study investigated the possible relationship between negative processing biases and subsequent depression. The Scrambled Sentences Test (SST), a measure of processing bias, was administered to a large sample of undergraduates. Participants also completed self-report measures of thought suppression tendencies, current level of depression, and lifetime worst-depression symptoms. High scores on the SST, reflecting a negative processing bias, predicted depression symptoms measured 4 to 6 weeks later, even after controlling for concurrent and past depression. The SST was administered both with and without cognitive load to all participants. The SST with load predicted subsequent depression for both men and women. The SST without load predicted depression for women only. The SST difference score, a measure of the change in scores between the no-load and load conditions, was a significant predictor of subsequent depression for men but not women. Among men, the combination of high thought suppression with either high SST-load scores or high SST difference scores proved to be a particularly strong indicator of vulnerability to subsequent depression.

Depression and the search for negative evaluations: more evidence of the role of self-verification strivings.

Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, and Pelham (1992) suggested that depressed and dysphoric persons verify their self-conceptions by seeking rather negative appraisals. Hooley and Richters (1992) and Alloy and Lipman (1992) have worried that (a) idiosyncratic features of Swann et al.s participants and design may have produced their effects and (b) Swann et al. presented no evidence that self-verification strivings are motivated. We address these issues empirically. Study 1 showed that 20 dysphoric participants preferred interacting with a person who appraised them unfavorably over participating in another study, in comparison with 30 nondysphorics. Study 2 revealed that 26 dysphoric persons responded to feedback that challenged their negative self-view by working to reaffirm their low self-esteem, in comparison with 47 nondysphorics. These findings support the notion that at some level depressed and dysphoric persons want rather negative appraisals.

Beneath the veil of thought suppression: Attentional bias and depression risk

Although cognitive theory predicts that depression-prone individuals possess negative information-processing biases, the reliable detection of this type of cognitive vulnerability has proved difficult. The present study tested the idea that depression-relevant, cognitive biases are often elusive because at-risk individuals actively try to suppress depressive thinking. The study employed a novel measure of information processing that involves the identification of words imbedded in a letter grid. A cognitive load - designed to disrupt thought suppression - caused a negative attentional shift among individuals at risk for depression (because of a previous episode), leading them to identify negative words at a rate equivalent to currently dysphoric participants. The hypothesised role of mental control was further supported by the fact that the load-related, attentional shift was strongly associated with chronic thought suppression.

The Relative Efficacy of Concentration and Suppression Strategies of Mental Control

Mental control research has found that attempts to suppress unwanted thoughts can backfire when cognitive demands arise or intentional control subsides. The present research examined the relative efficacy of an alternative form of mental control that involves concentrating on desirable thoughts instead of trying to suppress unwanted material. Using a novel cognitive measure that addresses some of the methodological issues associated with previous suppression research, a series of three studies indicates that a concentration strategy of mental control circumvents the problems associated with thought suppression. The findings are consistent with ironic process theory, which maintains that suppression invokes a monitoring process that is exclusively focused on goal-antithetical thoughts, whereas a concentration strategy involves a broader range of monitored thoughts that is less likely to undermine mental control.

Cognitive vulnerability to depression: The role of thought suppression and attitude certainty.

Previous research indicates that dysfunctional attitudes wax and wane with shifts in mood, suggesting that they are more likely the result than the cause of depression. The present research examined the possibility that attitudinal precursors to depression exist but are difficult to detect because at-risk individuals are trying to suppress dysfunctional thinking. However, the lingering maladaptive beliefs should be reflected in attitude uncertainty. To test this idea, participants completed a measure of chronic thought suppression and the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale that was amended to include certainty ratings. Participants also reported current and past experiences with depression. The results indicated that although formerly depressed individuals—who are at high risk for relapse—reported relatively adaptive attitudes, they were more uncertain about those beliefs than were their never-depressed counterparts. Moreover, this greater uncertainty was associated with high levels of thought suppression that, in turn, were related to previous depression.

Mental control after dysphoria: Evidence of a suppressed, depressive bias

Previous research has generally failed to find persistent negative thinking following a depressive episode, suggesting that negative thoughts may simply be by-products of the emotional disturbance. The present research examined the idea that a persistent depressive bias does exist, but it is obscured by thought suppression. Mental control theory suggests that suppressed thoughts can be detected by assessing cognition before the effortful process of distraction is implemented. To test this prediction, formerly dysphoric, chronically dysphoric, and nondysphoric control groups interpreted audio recordings of words—some of which included homophones with emotional alternatives relevant to depression (e.g., weak/week). Participants wrote down each word either immediately or after a 10-sec delay. Although formerly dysphoric individuals did not display a depressive bias in the delayed condition, their immediate responses revealed a depressive bias. As predicted, the emergence of a negative bias was associated with high levels of chronic thought suppression.

Thought suppression and memory biases during and after depressive moods

Previous research indicates that formerly depressed individuals engage in high levels of thought suppression that can mask depressive cognitions. However, suppression may also ironically foster a vigilance for unwanted thoughts that promotes uncertainty about ambiguous information and distorts memory. The present study tested this possibility. Formerly dysphoric, currently dysphoric, and never-dysphoric participants listened to a series of statements describing life events that were positive, negative, or ambiguous. In a subsequent recognition phase, participants reviewed a series of statements and rated each for the likelihood that it had been presented earlier. The recognition list included positive and negative disambiguated versions of the original items. Compared to the never-dysphoric group, formerly dysphoric individuals were more likely to endorse negative disambiguations. As predicted, this bias was associated with higher levels of thought suppression and greater uncertainty about the meaning of ambiguous situations, suggesting an ongoing conflict between positive and negative thoughts.

The Emotional Impact of Chosen and Imposed Thoughts

Two studies tested the idea that perceptions of choice can alter the self-relevance and emotional impact of thoughts. Participants who were initially in either a positive or negative mood engaged in a thought exercise that involved either positive or negative thinking. Half of the participants received information stressing the optional nature of the task, thereby fostering a sense of choice and personal determination. The results indicate that under high-choice, mood-incongruent thinking was especially self-relevant, memorable, and produced the most mood change. The findings raise new considerations for self-perception and cognitive dissonance theories and offer insights into the relationship between cognition and emotion.