D. Gene Witmer

Functionalism and Causal Exclusion

: Recent work by Jaegwon Kim and others suggest that functionalism leaves mental properties causally inefficacious in some sense. I examine three lines of argument for this conclusion. The first appeals to Occams Razor; the second appeals to a ban on overdetermination; and the third charges that the kind of response I favor to these arguments forces me to give up “the homogeneity of mental and physical causation”. I show how each argument fails. While I concede that a positive theory of mental causation is desirable, there is no reason to think that functionalism renders such a theory unattainable.

A Simple Theory of Intrinsicality

This simple formula is normally adequate to convey the notion intended by classifying a property as “intrinsic.” In this paper I offer a theory of intrinsicality meant to match the simplicity of this initial characterization. More precisely, the theory will make its link to the above formula evident; if correct, it explains why that formula is normally adequate to convey the notion in question. It will also explain why other characterizations frequently used for the same purpose are suited for doing so, though the theory’s connection to the above formula will be the most obvious.

Dupré's Anti–Essentialist Objection to Reductionism

In his ‘The Disorder of Things’ John Dupre presents an objection to reductionism which I call the ‘anti–essentialist objection’: it is that reductionism requires essentialism, and essentialism is false. I unpack the objection and assess its cogency. Once the objection is clearly in view, it is likely to appeal to those who think conceptual analysis a bankrupt project. I offer on behalf of the reductionist two strategies for responding, one which seeks to rehabilitate conceptual analysis and one (more concessive) which avoids commitment to any such analysis.