Christopher S. Hill

New perspectives on type identity : the mental and the physical

Introduction Simone Gozzano and Christopher S. Hill 1. Acquaintance and the mind-body problem Katalin Balog 2. Identity, reduction, and conserved mechanisms: perspectives from circadian rhythm research William Bechtel 3. Property identity and reductive explanation Ansgar Beckermann 4. A brief history of neurosciences actual influences on mind-brain reductionism John Bickle 5. Type-identity conditions for phenomenal properties Simone Gozzano 6. Locating qualia: do they reside in the brain or in the body and the world? Christopher S. Hill 7. In defense of the identity theory Mark I Frank Jackson 8. The very idea of token physicalism Jaegwon Kim 9. About face: philosophical naturalism, the heuristic identity theory, and recent findings about prosopagnosia Robert McCauley 10. On justifying neurobiologicalism for consciousness Brian McLaughlin 11. The causal contribution of mental events Alyssa Ney 12. Return of the zombies? John Perry 13. Identity, variability, and multiple realization in the special sciences Lawrence Shapiro and Thomas Polger Bibliography Index.

Introspective awareness of sensations

My goal is to formulate a theory of introspection that can be integrated with a strongly reductionist account of sensations that I have defended elsewhere. In pursuit of this goal, I offer a skeletal explanation of themetaphysical nature of introspection and I attempt to resolve several of the main questions about theepistemological status of introspective beliefs.

Supervenience and materialism

The concept of supervenience supervenience and token identity supervenience and reduction supervenience and psychological laws supervenience and explanation.

The Marriage of Heaven and Hell: Reconciling Deflationary Semantics with Correspondence Intuitions

This paper has three main concerns. First, it proposes a deflationary theory of the concept of truth, arguing thatthe concept can be explicitly defined in terms of substitutionalquantification. Second, it attempts to describe and explainthe intuitions that have traditionally been thought tofavor correspondence theories of truth over deflationarytheories. And third, it argues that these intuitions areultimately compatible with deflationism, maintaining,among other things, that the relation of semantic correspondence can itself be characterized in terms ofsubstitutional quantification.

Can Carey answer Quine

In order to defend her claim that the concept object is biologically determined, Carey must answer Quines gavagai argument, which purports to show that mastery of any concept with determinate reference presupposes a substantial repertoire of logical concepts. I maintain that the gavagai argument withstands the experimental data that Carey provides, but that it yields to an a priori argument.

Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism.

Preface Part I. Introduction: 1. Topics and themes Part II. The Mind-Body Problem: 2. The failings of dualism and the double-aspect theory 3. The failings of functionalism 4. In defense of type materialism Part III. Introspection: 5. Introspective awareness of sensations 6. Introspection and the skeptic Part IV. Sensory Concepts: 7. Concepts of bodily sensations: Their semantic properties 8. Concepts of visual sensations: Their content and their deployment Part V. Other Minds: 9. Knowledge of other minds 10. Unity of consciousness, other minds, and phenomenal space Index.