Brian R. Urlacher

Evolving Beyond Self-Interest? Some Experimental Findings From Simulated International Negotiations

Negotiation is a process of exchange intellectually, socially, and in terms of the items (tangible or not) that provide the focal point for negotiations. In recent years, the English School has discussed international institutions from a normative point of view that emphasizes the development of shared norms and values. Actors are affected by their institutional surroundings and hence learn by doing and come to identify with the norms of the system. Primary institutions have developed over time and the international system is still evolving toward being more intertwined and toward the convergence realm on the spectrum, which ranges from power politics to coexistence to cooperation and then convergence. Thus far, most work in the English School tradition has tended to be normative and historical in approach. This article examines positive empirical evidence to support the theory of institutional development and social interaction. Using data from the GlobalEd project (www.globaled.uconn.edu), this article will examine how shared norms and practices become embedded in the operation of actors participating in international, simulated negotiations. Analysis of messages from these negotiations will show that participants adapt to the rules and the norms of the interaction environment. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the norms of the community become part of actors’ behavior and influence, positively, future interactions. Our conclusions indicate that increased interaction leads to positive spillover effects in terms of cooperation and international agreements.

Experimenting with global governance: understanding the potential for generational change

The appropriate role for the United Nations in international dispute resolution is a matter of high profile discussion and controversy. This paper begins with this ambivalence about the appropriate role for the United Nations in the world and examines several sets of issues that relate to the future of support for the UN within the US and the prospects for global governance more generally. First, we briefly review two thematic strands in previous and contemporary scholarship:(1) arguments for increased global governance in contemporary world affairs, driven by perceptions of the changing nature of the political, social, economic and military challenges in the contemporary world system. This debate is also put in the context of the relevance of public support for global governance institutions; and (2) why it is valuable to study how the current generation of adolescents perceive issues of global governance and the impact that their views may have on that nexus in the coming years. We then move to an analysis of data generated from an experimental study of American adolescents and their attitudes toward global governance.

Political Constraints and Civil War Conflict Resolution

This article explores the effect of political and institutional constraints on negotiations that seek to end civil wars. Two aspects of negotiations are statistically examined. Greater political constraints on the leaders of states appear to have no effect on the likelihood of negotiations taking place, but greater political constraints do reduce the likelihood of negotiations succeeding. The results of this analysis demonstrate that political constraints are a powerful factor driving the likelihood of negotiation success. The article concludes with a discussion of why political constraints do not produce a similar reduction in the likelihood of negotiations.

Cantankerous Cooperation: Democracies, Authoritarian Regimes, and the Prisoner's Dilemma

One of the most important debates in the field of international relations is over the effect of regime type on militarized conflict. This debate, however, has rarely extended to how regime type influences other aspects of foreign policy. Using a computer simulated intergroup prisoners dilemma, we investigate whether democratic decisionmaking groups are more cooperative than authoritarian decisionmaking groups. We argue that differences between cooperation tendencies of groups can be explained by the structure of the decision process. Repeated simulations show that democracies tend to be more consistent in their decisions in comparison to authoritarian groups. Implications for international relations theory and policy are discussed.

Walking out of two-level social traps (with a little help from my friends)

Studies of iterated prisoners dilemmas (IPD) have shown that agents can escape the social trap of mutual defection by focusing on future gains or by learning from prior experiences. This terrain has been well charted. Yet only recently has attention turned to how groups of agents engage in an IPD scenario against other groups, a scenario that the author dubs “two-level social traps.” This article investigates the impact of group size on the performance of groups in a two-group IPD based on Michael W. Macys STOCHASTIC LEARNING MODEL OF SOCIAL EXCHANGE. The findings of the study suggest that when a democratic (majoritarian) decision rule is used, larger groups perform better in moving from an uncooperative equilibrium to a cooperative equilibrium. The proposed explanation for this is that larger groups reduce uncertainty in the random processes of strategy selection.

Negotiating with Insurgents: Changing Perceptions or Changing Politics?

Abstract High costs have long been seen as motivating conflict participants to seek peace. This article discusses two types of deviations from the “hurting-stalemate” logic: negotiations in the absence of high costs and non-negotiation in the face of high costs. Two prominent explanations for these deviations are discussed and evaluated, initially through a statistical analysis of peace overtures in intrastate conflicts and then through a case study of the Indian civil war in Kashmir. The results suggest that theoretical explanations focusing on the preferences and political strength of leaders have traction at all levels of violence. Variables associated with shifts in perception, such as leadership change or political shocks, seem to have different effects as the level of violence in a conflict changes.