C. Christine Fair

Cryopreserved embryos in the United States and their availability for research

OBJECTIVE To determine the number of embryos stored at assisted reproductive technology (ART) clinics in the United States and their current disposition. DESIGN A targeted survey instrument sent by the SART-RAND team to all medical practices providing in vitro fertilization services in the United States. RESULTS The SART-RAND team surveyed all 430 ART practices in the United States. Of these practices, 340 returned surveys for analysis. The data from these surveys were merged with data taken from the 1999 SART dataset, which contains information about practice size and success rates. Responding clinics reported a total of 396,526 embryos in storage as of April 11, 2002. The vast majority of the embryos (88.2%) were targeted for patient use. Small numbers of embryos were available for research, donation, destruction, quality assurance, or other uses. CONCLUSIONS Nearly 400,000 embryos are stored in the United States, the majority of which (88.2%) are targeted for patient use. Few are available for research (2.8%), limiting possible conversion into embryonic stem cell lines.

DIASPORA INVOLVEMENT IN INSURGENCIES: INSIGHTS FROM THE KHALISTAN AND TAMIL EELAM MOVEMENTS

This article exposits and contrasts the roles of two diasporas in ethnic conflict waged in their homelands, namely the Sikh diasporas involvement in the Punjab insurgency in north India and the Sri Lankan Tamil diasporas role in Sri Lankas Tamil insurgency. It draws out the various similarities and distinctions between the two in their use of technology, means of mobilization and identity production, and the geographical and political reach of their institutional arrangements. The article argues that the varying means by which these diasporas came into being affected the ways in which they mobilized and the positions they espoused towards homeland politics. It finds that the abilities of the two diasporas to contribute to events “back home” differed in part because of the scope of their respective institutional arrangements.

Who Supports Terrorism? Evidence from Fourteen Muslim Countries

This research note explores aspects of the demand for terrorism using data from the Pew Research Center. With these data from 7,849 adult respondents persons within 14 Muslim countries, this article explores who supports terrorism. It is shown that females, younger persons, and those who believe Islam is under threat are more likely to support terrorism. Very poor respondents and those who believe that religious leaders should play a larger role in politics are less likely to support terrorism than others. Because these affects vary throughout the countries studies, it is argued that interventions must be highly tailored, using detailed demographic and psychographic data.

Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan

Islamist militancy in Pakistan has long stood atop the international security agenda, yet there is almost no systematic evidence about why individual Pakistanis support Islamist militant organizations. An analysis of data from a nationally representative survey of urban Pakistanis refutes four influential conventional wisdoms about why Pakistanis support Islamic militancy. First, there is no clear relationship between poverty and support for militancy. If anything, support for militant organizations is increasing in terms of both subjective economic well-being and community economic performance. Second, personal religiosity and support for sharia law are poor predictors of support for Islamist militant organizations. Third, support for political goals espoused by legal Islamist parties is a weak indicator of support for militant organizations. Fourth, those who support core democratic principles or have faith in Pakistans democratic process are not less supportive of militancy. Taken together, these results suggest that commonly prescribed solutions to Islamist militancyeconomic development, democratization, and the likemay be irrelevant at best and might even be counterproductive.

Islam, Militancy and Politics in Pakistan: Insights from a National Sample

We use data from an innovative nationally representative survey of 6,000 Pakistanis in April 2009 to study beliefs about political Islam, Sharia, the legitimacy and efficacy of jihad, and attitudes towards specific militant organizations. These issues are at the forefront of U.S. policy towards Pakistan. Four results shed new light on the politics of militancy and Islamic identity in Pakistan. First, there is no relationship between measures of personal religiosity and the likelihood a respondent expresses highly sectarian sentiments. Second, militarized jihad is widely seen as legitimate in Pakistan but there are substantial regional differences in the acceptance of militarized jihad. Third, attitudes towards militant groups vary dramatically across groups, particularly when it comes to the efficacy of their actions. Fourth, while Pakistanis express massive levels of support for Sharia law, this is driven by its perceived connection with good governance, not by sympathy with the goals of militant groups claiming to implement it.

Who Are Pakistan's Militants and Their Families?

This article presents results of a survey of 141 Pakistani families of slain militants. This survey collected data about the militants and their households. While derived from a convenience sample, these data are unprecedented and offer a glimpse into the backgrounds of militants and the families who (mostly) supported their decision to join the jihad. Most militants served and died in Kashmir and seem to be “high quality” militants in that they, like their heads of household, are well educated and not predominantly coming from seminaries, as is often claimed. This analysis suggests that while the militants merit attention, so do the families that produce militants.This article presents results of a survey of 141 Pakistani families of slain militants. This survey collected data about the militants and their households. While derived from a convenience sample, these data are unprecedented and offer a glimpse into the backgrounds of militants and the families who (mostly) supported their decision to join the jihad. Most militants served and died in Kashmir and seem to be “high quality” militants in that they, like their heads of household, are well educated and not predominantly coming from seminaries, as is often claimed. This analysis suggests that while the militants merit attention, so do the families that produce militants.

Pakistan's War Within

Prior to 2001, Pakistan had limited experience countering domestic militants. Today, the Pakistani army still prefers to focus on a potential war with India rather than against sub-state actors. Nonetheless, there have been noted improvements since 2001, and throughout 2009 Islamabad has demonstrated increasing resolve to defeat militants challenging the writ of the state. Earlier operations such as Al Mizan revealed serious deficiencies in the ability to conduct cordon-and-search operations and to hold territory. In the later operations in Bajaur and Swat, however, the Frontier Corps and army forces showed an improved capability to clear territory and integrate operations with local tribes. But Pakistani doctrine remains inconsistent with recent population-centric innovations in counter-insurgency warfare. Pakistans commitment to a conventional orientation and the hardware most appropriate for fighting India has poorly equipped it to deal with the burgeoning domestic threat.

Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: A New Look at the Militancy-Madrasah Connection

Note u This presentation is drawn from a forthcoming monograph by the author that explores the connections between education and militancy in Pakistan, to be published by USIP Press in late 2007. The author is grateful to Vali Nasr, as well as to the two anonymous reviewers who provided very useful feedback on earlier versions of this draft. The views expressed here do not represent those of the United States Institute of Peace.

Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al Qaeda and Other Organizations

Despite Pakistans extensive contribution to the global war on terrorism, many questions persist about the extent to which Al Qaeda and its associated outfits are currently operating within Pakistan. This article examines this issue by posing several empirical questions: (1) What are the general contours of militancy in Pakistan? (2) What motivates individuals to join specific Pakistan-based militant outfits? (3) By what means do groups recruit specific individuals? (4) What do these findings suggest for Al Qaeda operations in Pakistan? (5) What linkages exist between Pakistan-based organizations to Al Qaeda? These issues are addressed through regional fieldwork, extensive literature reviews, and consultation with numerous highly regarded analysts to South Asia. This article concludes that Al Qaeda likely does not have an explicit and dedicated recruiting infrastructure to recruit Pakistanis for its operations. Rather, Al Qaeda relies upon a web of informal relations with groups based in Pakistan to gain access to operational collaborators and individuals to execute attacks within Pakistan.

The Militant Challenge in Pakistan

This article examines Pakistan’s use of asymmetric warfare as an instrument of foreign policy toward India since 1947 and in Afghanistan since the 1960s. Main ArgumentPakistan’s use of asymmetric warfare, or jihad, although dating back to 1947, did not aggressively expand beyond Kashmir until Islamabad acquired first a covert “existential” nuclear capability in the 1980s and later an overt nuclear capability in 1998. After laying out the complex contemporary landscape of Islamist militancy in Pakistan and the relationship between these groups and the state, as well as between religious and political organizations, this article contends that jihad is sustained by important segments of Pakistani society that endorse “militant jihad” generally and specific militant groups and operations in particular. Given Pakistan’s enduring security concerns about India’s ascent, Islamabad is unlikely to abandon militancy as a tool of policy, even while the government battles former proxies who have turned their guns — and suicide vests — on the Pakistani state and their former patrons.Policy Implications• Pakistan’s skill in recasting the historical record in its favor enables the country to extract benefits from the U.S., which seeks to prove that it is a reliable ally.• Given the varying levels of support for militancy within both the Pakistani public and the military and intelligence agencies, Islamabad likely will be unwilling to abandon militancy as a tool of foreign policy and contend with the emergent militant threat ravaging Pakistan and the region. • Washington and its partners have been unable to either fundamentally change the way Pakistan assesses its cost-benefit calculus toward India or find some means of ameliorating Pakistan’s neuralgic fears of India. Years of U.S. policies toward Pakistan based on financial allurements and conventional weaponry have done little to induce change. • Given Pakistan’s regional equities and the changing regional dynamics, the international community should abandon optimism that Pakistan can or will change course and prepare for increasing Islamist violence in the region and beyond.