Carlos Santamaría

Reasoning About Relations: Spatial and Nonspatial Problems

Two experiments investigated the mental representation of spatial and nonspatial two-dimensional problems. The experiments were designed to contrast opposite predictions of the model theory of reasoning and the formal rules of inference theories. Half of the problems required more inferential steps but only one model, whereas the other half required fewer inferential steps but two models. According to the inference rules, theory problems that require more inferential steps should be harder, whereas the model-based theory predicts that problems that require two models should be harder. In Experiments 1a and 1b we measured the problem solving time and the percentage of errors. In Experiments 2a and 2b the problems were presented segmented in two different displays. We measured the comprehension time for each display, the question answering times, and the percentage of errors. The results of all experiments supported the model theory predictions in both spatial and nonspatial domains.

Conditionals and directionality: On the meaning of if vs. only if

The aim of this study was to test the predictions of the current theories of reasoning about the comprehension of conditional statements. We used two types of conditional statement that are logically equivalent: if p then q and p only if q. The model theory of reasoning considers that these conditional forms differ in their initial meaning, because the negative contingency is considered only in the p only if q form. Mental-rule theories maintain that the interpretation of p only if q depends on a rephrasing of the statement as: if not q then not p. Alternatively, a directional bias may explain the differences between if p then q and p only if q. We report three experiments that demonstrate the existence of a directional bias in the comprehension of the conditionals. The results were not predicted by either the mental-rules theories or the model theory; they could, however, be easily assimilated by the model theory.

Reasoning From Double Conditionals: The Effects of Logical Structure and Believability

We report three experimental studies of reasoning with double conditionals, i.e. problems based on premises of the form: If A then B. If B then C. where A, B, and C, describe everyday events. We manipulated both the logical structure of the problems, using all four possible arrangements (or “figures” of their constituents, A, B, and C, and the believability of the two salient conditional conclusions that might follow from them, i.e. If A then C, or If C then A. The experiments showed that with figures for which there was a valid conclusion, the participants more often, and more rapidly, drew the valid conclusion when it was believable than when it was unbelievable. With figures for which there were no valid conclusions, the participants tended to draw whichever of the two conclusions was believable. These results were predicted by the theory that reasoning depends on constructing mental models of the premises.

People think about what is true for conditionals, not what is false: Only true possibilities prime the comprehension of if

We report the results of two priming experiments that examine the comprehension of conditionals—for example, “if there are apples then there are oranges”—and biconditionals—for example, “if and only if there are apples then there are oranges”. The first experiment showed that participants read a biconditional faster when it was primed by a true possibility, “there were apples and there were oranges” than when it was primed by a false possibility, “there were no apples and there were oranges”; a conditional was primed equally by both possibilities. The second experiment showed that participants read the negated-antecedent conjunction faster when it was primed by a conditional than when it was primed by a biconditional; the affirmative conjunction was primed equally by both connectives. The experiments show that (a) when people understand “if A then B”, they access the true possibilities, “A and B”, and “not-A and B”, and (b) when they understand “if and only if A then B” they access “A and B”, but they do not access “not-A and B”. We discuss their implications for current theories of reasoning.

Beyond belief bias: Reasoning from conceptual structures by mental models manipulation

Mental models constitute an alternative to the rule-based systems in the explanation of human reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1983). In this paper, we claim that the concept of believability generally used to categorize content and context effects is of little use within a semantic theory. Thus, we propose the use of categories that are directly extracted from subjective relations among concepts within the reasoning problem. We demonstrate that manipulations based on this kind of categorization produce predictable patterns of responses in reasoning problems. We present two experiments to test our predictions, using conditional and syllogistic reasoning problems, and in both cases, we demonstrate the influence of conceptual knowledge not only in natural contexts, but also in experimentally created artificial contexts.

Activation of end-terms in syllogistic reasoning

We report five experiments showing that the activation of the end-terms of a syllogism is determined by their position in the composite model of the premises. We show that it is not determined by the position of the terms in the rule being applied (Ford, 1994), by the syntactic role of the terms in the premises (Polk & Newell, 1995; Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1990), by the type of conclusion (Chater & Oaksford, 1999), or by the terms from the source premise (Stenning & Yule, 1997). In our first experiment we found that after reading a categorical premise, the most active term is the last term in the premise. In Experiments 2, 3, and 4 we demonstrated that this pattern of activity is due to the position of the concepts in the model of the premises, regardless of the delay after reading the premises (150 or 2000 msec) or the quantity of the quantifiers (universal or existential). The fifth experiment showed that the pattern switches around after participants evaluate a conclusion. We propose that the last element in the model maintains a higher level of activity during the comprehension process because it is generally used to attach the incoming information. After this process, the first term becomes more active because it is the concept to which the whole representation is referred. These results are predicted by the mental model theory (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), but not by the verbal reasoning theory (Polk & Newell, 1995), the graphical methods theory (Yule & Stenning, 1992), the attachment-heuristic theory (Chater & Oaksford, 1999), or the mental rules theory (Ford, 1994).

An antidote to illusory inferences

The mental model theory predicts that reasoners normally represent what is true, but not what is false. One consequence is that reasoners should make “illusory” inferences, which are compelling but invalid. Three experiments confirmed the existence of such illusions based on disjunctions of disjunctions. They also established a successful antidote to them: Reasoners are much less likely to succumb to illusions if the inferences concern disjunctions of physical objects (alternative newspaper advertisements) rather disjunctions of the truth values of assertions. The results shed light both on the cause of the illusions and on the current controversy among different theories of reasoning.

Schizotypal people stick longer to their first choices.

Many studies have reported that schizophrenic patients show a Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence (BADE). This cognitive bias has been related to the formation and maintenance of delusion. The aim of this paper was to study whether BADE was present in healthy people displaying psychometric schizotypy, and to compare a closure task, which has been used for schizophrenia, with a new chronometric paradigm. Results with the new paradigm showed that the high-schizotypy group maintained their initial hypotheses longer than the low-schizotypy group. This finding corroborated the similarities between schizophrenic disorder and schizotypal traits, in this case with respect to the BADE. Research of this kind could facilitate the study of cognition in the schizophrenic spectrum without the difficulties of working with schizophrenic patients for some tasks and the assessment and early intervention in at-risk populations.

Mental Models in Social Interaction

ABSTRACT. In this study, the authors introduce a new way to analyze cognitive change during social interactions, based on the mental model theory of reasoning. From this approach, cognitive performance can be improved for solving problems that require multiple models when participants in a social interaction group maintain qualitatively different models of a problem. Four relational reasoning experiments are reported. In Experiment 1 with school-aged participants, the authors found better performance for the social interaction groups on a posttest. Experiment 2 with younger children, in which models had been induced, showed that when the models of participants in the social interaction group were different, there was better performance. However, these results did not generalize to the posttest. Experiments 3 and 4 provide additional support for the idea that maintaining qualitatively different models leads to better performance even when participants work alone in a self-interaction situation.

Intervención sobre la comprensión y recuerdo de textos: un programa de instrucción experimental

ResumenEn este trabajo se describe y aplica un programa breve para la instruccion en comprension de textos. El progrrama de instruccion se centra en el entrenamiento de estrategias de procesamiento activo del texto, en particular, la identificacion de ideas principales y la elaboracion de esquemas. Los resultados de la intervencion se consideran a la luz de dos metodos diferentes de analisis de losprotocolos de recuerdo libre: el de W. Kintsch y uno desarrolladopor los autores. La intervencion resultoespecialmente eficaz en las medidas macroestructurales del recuerdo. Se destaca la estrecha interaccion que media entre el tipo de medida del recuerdo utilizada y el tipo de objetivo que tiene la intervencion sobre los procesos de comprension.