Caroline de la Porte

Social Benchmarking, Policy Making and New Governance in the Eu

The European Union has established an ‘open method of coordination’ (OMC) among the member states as a means of pursuing economic and employment growth coupled with greater social cohesion. The paper analyses the assumptions underlying this strategy, the manner of its operation and its implications for policy learning and for governance. It argues that the OMC has in substantial measure been inspired by the experience of EMU, but that this is a perilous paradigm on which to base social benchmarking and the OMC. Second, it argues that the dynamic development of the OMC will depend crucially on the extent of public involvement in scrutinizing the policy areas which political leaders choose for benchmarking, the best practices which they identify in other member states, and the efforts which they then make to improve national performance. The conclusion is that the OMC is likely to have substantial implications for domestic and European governance, but that these could vary depending on the manner of its implementation. Finally, the paper considers the implications of the analysis for the broader theoretical literature.

Is the Open Method of Coordination Appropriate for Organising Activities at European Level in Sensitive Policy Areas

This article addresses the question of the relevance of the most recent soft policy instrument of the EU, the open method of coordination (OMC), for organising actions at European level in politically sensitive areas. In addition to describing its origins and operational principles, we will compare its application to the areas of employment and social inclusion. Two hypotheses make up the structure of the text. The first is that the discourses produced in the framework of OMC in the areas of employment and social inclusion are broad enough to cater to the different welfare models, but that the changes to be made by the Member States to be in line with the European discourses differ considerably, depending on their welfare state family and their initial situation. The second is that the form of OMC is variable, depending on policy area. Our conclusions confirm both of these hypotheses.

Why and how (still) study the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC)?

The European Employment Strategy (EES) and Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) in social policy (social inclusion, pensions, healthcare and care for the elderly) were developed to support welfare reform through multi-lateral exchange among Member State bureaucrats and stakeholders, facilitated by the EU level. These social OMCs1 were seen as a promising alternative – or step towards legislation – in areas where Community competences were weak, but where policy challenges were comparable in the wake of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) that constrains manoeuvre in fiscal policy. For each area where the OMC is applied, the policy cycle is iterative, though its frequency varies. First, policy objectives (in some cases accompanied by quantitative benchmarks) are proposed by the European Commission. Then, Member State representatives, first in Council formations and then at the yearly meetings of the Spring European Council, decide upon which objectives the Member States will pursue. Next, efforts to meet the objectives agreed for any given OMC process are reported by Member States, after which they are reviewed by peer Member States and by the EU level (Commission-Council) with assessments of performance, but no hard recommendations in the case of non-compliance. From its inception, there has been much ado about the OMC. It has attracted the interest of academics, in particular political scientists and sociologists, who have analysed policy learning in the OMC, and lawyers, who have characterised the OMC as a new form of soft law. Most economists, meanwhile, have been very critical, judging the OMC tools too soft to address structural changes in labour markets and welfare state systems. What can we learn from the multitude of publications written on this topic? This article takes stock of the intellectual progress that has been made in the study of the social OMCs but does not aspire to be exhaustive. It analyses the literature from three theoretical perspectives: European integration, new modes of governance and Europeanisation. The first highlights the process of decision-making and institutional change of the OMC, while the second analyses the features of the OMC, comparing it with other forms of regulation and governance in the EU. The third perspective on Europeanisation focuses on 433629 ESP22310.1177/0958928711433629Porte and PochetJournal of European Social Policy 2012

Altered Europeanisation of Pension Reform in the Context of the Great Recession: Denmark and Italy Compared

This article analyses the Europeanisation of national pension systems in Denmark and Italy. Through the analytical framework of a ‘two-level’ game, it analyses pension reforms in the two countries, which, in the wake of the crisis, breached EU budgetary requirements, and shortly after reformed their pension systems. The EU affects pension reform in both cases, but in distinct ways. When Denmark’s economy was financially vulnerable, the EU’s excessive deficit procedure affected the decision to reform pensions indirectly, by triggering a rapid political decision to speed up a pension reform. By contrast, the Italian economy’s critical vulnerability and the consequent risk for the whole Eurozone led to a situation whereby the European actors entered the domestic political scene and thereafter more forcefully induced reforms. The findings from the two cases show that the EU’s role in pension reform has been significant during crises, but through interaction with domestic actors. Furthermore, from a theoretical perspective, the intervening variables – domestic and EMU vulnerability as well as EU and domestic politics – are crucial to understanding the reform decisions through two-level games.

Principal-Agent Theory and the Open Method of Co-ordination: The case of the European Employment Strategy

This paper adapts and then uses principal–agent (PA) theory to conceptualize and thereafter to analyse the EU-level development of the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC), a crucial component of the Lisbon Strategy as a ‘governance architecture’. The PA model theorizes the continuous interaction and power struggle between the Commission (‘agent’) and the member states (‘principal’) in the emergence and institutionalization of the OMC. It is innovative for several reasons: first, it acknowledges that the member states and Commission interact in a PA logic prior to a contractual agreement; second, it recognizes that the ‘principal’ does not only control and monitor the ‘agent’, but also (re-)defines features of the OMC via political initiatives; third, it underlines the importance of the ideational action of the ‘agent’. On the basis of the model, two hypotheses are formulated: first, that the ‘agent’ will be more influential in defining the OMC when it is nascent; and second, that the ‘principal’ will be mo...This paper adapts and then uses principal–agent (PA) theory to conceptualize and thereafter to analyse the EU-level development of the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC), a crucial component of the Lisbon Strategy as a ‘governance architecture’. The PA model theorizes the continuous interaction and power struggle between the Commission (‘agent’) and the member states (‘principal’) in the emergence and institutionalization of the OMC. It is innovative for several reasons: first, it acknowledges that the member states and Commission interact in a PA logic prior to a contractual agreement; second, it recognizes that the ‘principal’ does not only control and monitor the ‘agent’, but also (re-)defines features of the OMC via political initiatives; third, it underlines the importance of the ideational action of the ‘agent’. On the basis of the model, two hypotheses are formulated: first, that the ‘agent’ will be more influential in defining the OMC when it is nascent; and second, that the ‘principal’ will be more influential in the reconfiguration of the OMC. The model is tested and the hypotheses are confirmed via a longitudinal analysis (1992 to 2005) of the OMC in employment policy.

Boundaries of Welfare between the EU and Member States during the ‘Great Recession’

Abstract This paper focuses on the changing boundaries of welfare between EU and national levels by developing a dynamic and actor-centred approach, where different groups of actors compete to influence the social and economic dimensions of EU social policy. The success of ideas and policies around welfare-state reform changes over time in line with socio-economic conditions as well as shifting political-party governmental coalitions in the Council. We argue that in particular the economically oriented actors, including the European Central Bank, have been successful in the context of the Great Recession. More recently, social priorities around notions such as social investment are becoming more central in the EU debate on economic and social policy.

The Sovereign Debt Crisis, the EU and Welfare State Reform

In this concluding chapter the key findings of the volume are summarized and an outlook on the prospective development of the social dimension in the Eurozone are given. As the various country case studies in this book have shown, the EU has been unprecedentedly involved in national welfare state affairs, particularly in those countries that had to seek official financial assistance from the European Union (EU) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as in the wider Eurozone. Nevertheless, the contributors to this book pointed to important differences in the level of intrusiveness depending on country context or policy area. Regarding welfare societies in European more widely following the Great Recession, it can be concluded that all have become less secure and more unequal. Looking at pensions, economic stabilization has been reached for the time being, but adequacy remains a challenge. Regarding unemployment benefits and labour market policies we find that these have become characterised by less generosity and more flexibility. In the context of a still fragile economic recovery and a rejection of the prescribed austerity measures by many electorates in the crisis countries, the European Commission now emphasises more upfront that social fairness considerations have to be taken into account when implementing measures that aim at stabilizing the European economies. Important debates have been initiated recently as to how not only to make the Eurozone more crisis-resilient but also to strengthen the political union and the social dimension.

Agents of institutional change in EU policy: the social investment moment

ABSTRACT The contribution addresses – through actor-centred historical institutionalism – why and how social investment (SI) emerged at the European Union (EU) level. SI policies built on the institutional basis of the policy co-ordination processes in employment and social inclusion, which originated in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The pre-existent processes represented the necessary but not sufficient condition for the EU SIP to materialise. The decisive factor was the activity of three types of entrepreneurs – intellectual, bureaucratic and political – that enabled the crystallization of the EU Social Investment package (SIP) through issue-framing, institutional alignment and consensus-building. Despite this, the SIP of 2013 ended as a ‘social investment moment’ that rapidly lost momentum because no additional measures such as indicators or funds were integrated with SIP. Furthermore, the Commission’s political priorities changed and the key entrepreneurs that had been active for the materialisation of the SIP were no longer centre stage. The continued presence of former influential entrepreneurs in the EU policy arena, although in different roles, may enable integration of EU SI into new EU social policy initiatives.

Europeanization of national public spheres? Cross-national media debates about the European Union's socio-economic strategy

ABSTRACT This paper studies the Europeanization of media coverage of the European Unions (EU) socio-economic strategy, which is a crucial building block for developing a European Public Sphere. As the EU level increasingly influences public policy in member states, there should correspondingly be a more intense and visible media debate with attention for EU-level and cross-national policies and developments. On the basis of a content analysis (2000–2010) in Denmark, France, Poland and the UK, we find that media attention for the EUs growth and jobs strategy is limited, that it does not increase over time and that it is mainly driven by the EU agenda. There are cross-national similarities in thematic focus and EU-level actors are omnipresent in reporting on the strategy. Finally, we find that coverage of the strategy has a transnational dimension in all four cases, with reference to peer countries in terms of benchmarking and reporting on criticism and advice to member states. This criticism is more often diffuse than aimed at specific member states. Therefore, we conclude that media coverage of the EUs socio-economic strategy is Europeanized, but that it remains a debate by and for EU-interested actors.ABSTRACTThis paper studies the Europeanization of media coverage of the European Unions (EU) socio-economic strategy, which is a crucial building block for developing a European Public Sphere. As the EU level increasingly influences public policy in member states, there should correspondingly be a more intense and visible media debate with attention for EU-level and cross-national policies and developments. On the basis of a content analysis (2000–2010) in Denmark, France, Poland and the UK, we find that media attention for the EUs growth and jobs strategy is limited, that it does not increase over time and that it is mainly driven by the EU agenda. There are cross-national similarities in thematic focus and EU-level actors are omnipresent in reporting on the strategy. Finally, we find that coverage of the strategy has a transnational dimension in all four cases, with reference to peer countries in terms of benchmarking and reporting on criticism and advice to member states. This criticism is more often...

European Briefing Digest

Despite some critical views among civil society and other actors, European social initiatives have flourished since the low point of 2005 (in the context of the revision of the Lisbon Strategy): the summer months of 2008 have been unusually fruitful in the area of employment and social policy. The renewed social agenda was launched, following the consultation begun in 2007 (Digest, JESP, 18.2.1). However, the most striking development this summer was that the stalemate that has reigned for several years around more sensitive issues – working time and temporary agency work – was finally resolved, following an agreement on temporary workers concluded in May between the most obstinate blockers of the initiative, the British social partners. The Portuguese EU Presidency had not managed, during the EPSCO (Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs) Council in December 2007, to have a political agreement adopted on these measures and in the absence of agreement, the Commission had been on the point of withdrawing both texts. After the agreement of the June Council (Council of the European Union, 2008a), the Council’s common position on the draft working time Directive establishes minimum requirements for the organisation of working time, in particular daily and weekly rest periods, maximum weekly working time, annual leave and certain aspects of night work, shift work and working patterns (Council of the European Union, 2008b). Some issues deriving from case-law have been clarified, notably with regard to on-call time, where a distinction is drawn between inactive on-call time, requiring only the presence of the worker at the workplace, and active on-call time that is considered working time, in accordance with the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. The standard limit to working time is still 48 hours per week, including any overtime and active on-call time. In the 2003 Directive, there was a clause whereby a worker (in countries that subscribed to the clause, such as the UK) could ‘opt-out’ of those conditions. In the 2008 amendment, opting-out qualifies as a ‘derogation’ and when opting-out is chosen there are specific requirements which the employer must meet,