Carolyn B. Bridges

Antigenic and Genetic Characteristics of Swine-Origin 2009 A(H1N1) Influenza Viruses Circulating in Humans

Generation of Swine Flu As the newly emerged influenza virus starts its journey to infect the worlds human population, the genetic secrets of the 2009 outbreak of swine influenza A(H1N1) are being revealed. In extensive phylogenetic analyses, Garten et al. (p. 197, published online 22 May) confirm that of the eight elements of the virus, the basic components encoded by the hemagglutinin, nucleoprotein, and nonstructural genes originated in birds and transferred to pigs in 1918. Subsequently, these formed a triple reassortant with the RNA polymerase PB1 that transferred from birds in 1968 to humans and then to pigs in 1998, coupled with RNA polymerases PA and PB2 that transferred from birds to pigs in 1998. The neuraminidase and matrix protein genes that complete the virus came from birds and entered pigs in 1979. The analysis offers insights into drug susceptibility and virulence, as well as raising the possibility of hitherto unknown factors determining host specificity. A significant question is, what is the potential for the H1 component of the current seasonal flu vaccine to act as a booster? Apart from the need for ongoing sequencing to monitor for the emergence of new reassortants, future pig populations need to be closely monitored for emerging influenza viruses. Evolutionary analysis suggests a triple reassortant avian-to-pig origin for the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) outbreak. Since its identification in April 2009, an A(H1N1) virus containing a unique combination of gene segments from both North American and Eurasian swine lineages has continued to circulate in humans. The lack of similarity between the 2009 A(H1N1) virus and its nearest relatives indicates that its gene segments have been circulating undetected for an extended period. Its low genetic diversity suggests that the introduction into humans was a single event or multiple events of similar viruses. Molecular markers predictive of adaptation to humans are not currently present in 2009 A(H1N1) viruses, suggesting that previously unrecognized molecular determinants could be responsible for the transmission among humans. Antigenically the viruses are homogeneous and similar to North American swine A(H1N1) viruses but distinct from seasonal human A(H1N1).

Hospitalized Patients with 2009 H1N1 Influenza in the United States, April–June 2009

BACKGROUND During the spring of 2009, a pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus emerged and spread globally. We describe the clinical characteristics of patients who were hospitalized with 2009 H1N1 influenza in the United States from April 2009 to mid-June 2009. METHODS Using medical charts, we collected data on 272 patients who were hospitalized for at least 24 hours for influenza-like illness and who tested positive for the 2009 H1N1 virus with the use of a real-time reverse-transcriptase-polymerase-chain-reaction assay. RESULTS Of the 272 patients we studied, 25% were admitted to an intensive care unit and 7% died. Forty-five percent of the patients were children under the age of 18 years, and 5% were 65 years of age or older. Seventy-three percent of the patients had at least one underlying medical condition; these conditions included asthma; diabetes; heart, lung, and neurologic diseases; and pregnancy. Of the 249 patients who underwent chest radiography on admission, 100 (40%) had findings consistent with pneumonia. Of the 268 patients for whom data were available regarding the use of antiviral drugs, such therapy was initiated in 200 patients (75%) at a median of 3 days after the onset of illness. Data suggest that the use of antiviral drugs was beneficial in hospitalized patients, especially when such therapy was initiated early. CONCLUSIONS During the evaluation period, 2009 H1N1 influenza caused severe illness requiring hospitalization, including pneumonia and death. Nearly three quarters of the patients had one or more underlying medical conditions. Few severe illnesses were reported among persons 65 years of age or older. Patients seemed to benefit from antiviral therapy.

Triple-Reassortant Swine Influenza A (H1) in Humans in the United States, 2005-2009

BACKGROUND Triple-reassortant swine influenza A (H1) viruses--containing genes from avian, human, and swine influenza viruses--emerged and became enzootic among pig herds in North America during the late 1990s. METHODS We report the clinical features of the first 11 sporadic cases of infection of humans with triple-reassortant swine influenza A (H1) viruses reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, occurring from December 2005 through February 2009, until just before the current epidemic of swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) among humans. These data were obtained from routine national influenza surveillance reports and from joint case investigations by public and animal health agencies. RESULTS The median age of the 11 patients was 10 years (range, 16 months to 48 years), and 4 had underlying health conditions. Nine of the patients had had exposure to pigs, five through direct contact and four through visits to a location where pigs were present but without contact. In another patient, human-to-human transmission was suspected. The range of the incubation period, from the last known exposure to the onset of symptoms, was 3 to 9 days. Among the 10 patients with known clinical symptoms, symptoms included fever (in 90%), cough (in 100%), headache (in 60%), and diarrhea (in 30%). Complete blood counts were available for four patients, revealing leukopenia in two, lymphopenia in one, and thrombocytopenia in another. Four patients were hospitalized, two of whom underwent invasive mechanical ventilation. Four patients received oseltamivir, and all 11 recovered from their illness. CONCLUSIONS From December 2005 until just before the current human epidemic of swine-origin influenza viruses, there was sporadic infection with triple-reassortant swine influenza A (H1) viruses in persons with exposure to pigs in the United States. Although all the patients recovered, severe illness of the lower respiratory tract and unusual influenza signs such as diarrhea were observed in some patients, including those who had been previously healthy.

Transmission of Influenza: Implications for Control in Health Care Settings

Annual influenza epidemics in the United States result in an average of >36,000 deaths and 114,000 hospitalizations. Influenza can spread rapidly to patients and health care personnel in health care settings after influenza is introduced by visitors, staff, or patients. Influenza outbreaks in health care facilities can have potentially devastating consequences, particularly for immunocompromised persons. Although vaccination of health care personnel and patients is the primary means to prevent and control outbreaks of influenza in health care settings, antiviral influenza medications and isolation precautions are important adjuncts. Although droplet transmission is thought to be the primary mode of influenza transmission, limited evidence is available to support the relative clinical importance of contact, droplet, and droplet nuclei (airborne) transmission of influenza. In this article, the results of studies on the modes of influenza transmission and their relevant isolation precautions are reviewed.

Severe community-acquired pneumonia due to Staphylococcus aureus, 2003-04 influenza season

S. aureus community-acquired pneumonia has been reported from 9 states.

Recent Resurgence of Mumps in the United States

BACKGROUND The widespread use of a second dose of mumps vaccine among U.S. schoolchildren beginning in 1990 was followed by historically low reports of mumps cases. A 2010 elimination goal was established, but in 2006 the largest mumps outbreak in two decades occurred in the United States. METHODS We examined national data on mumps cases reported during 2006, detailed case data from the most highly affected states, and vaccination-coverage data from three nationwide surveys. RESULTS A total of 6584 cases of mumps were reported in 2006, with 76% occurring between March and May. There were 85 hospitalizations, but no deaths were reported; 85% of patients lived in eight contiguous midwestern states. The national incidence of mumps was 2.2 per 100,000, with the highest incidence among persons 18 to 24 years of age (an incidence 3.7 times that of all other age groups combined). In a subgroup analysis, 83% of these patients reported current college attendance. Among patients in eight highly affected states with known vaccination status, 63% overall and 84% between the ages of 18 and 24 years had received two doses of mumps vaccine. For the 12 years preceding the outbreak, national coverage of one-dose mumps vaccination among preschoolers was 89% or more nationwide and 86% or more in highly affected states. In 2006, the national two-dose coverage among adolescents was 87%, the highest in U.S. history. CONCLUSIONS Despite a high coverage rate with two doses of mumps-containing vaccine, a large mumps outbreak occurred, characterized by two-dose vaccine failure, particularly among midwestern college-age adults who probably received the second dose as schoolchildren. A more effective mumps vaccine or changes in vaccine policy may be needed to avert future outbreaks and achieve the elimination of mumps.

Risk of influenza A (H5N1) infection among poultry workers, Hong Kong, 1997-1998

In 1997, outbreaks of highly pathogenic influenza A (H5N1) among poultry coincided with 18 documented human cases of H5N1 illness. Although exposure to live poultry was associated with human illness, no cases were documented among poultry workers (PWs). To evaluate the potential for avian-to-human transmission of H5N1, a cohort study was conducted among 293 Hong Kong government workers (GWs) who participated in a poultry culling operation and among 1525 PWs. Paired serum samples collected from GWs and single serum samples collected from PWs were considered to be anti-H5 antibody positive if they were positive by both microneutralization and Western blot testing. Among GWs, 3% were seropositive, and 1 seroconversion was documented. Among PWs, approximately 10% had anti-H5 antibody. More-intensive poultry exposure, such as butchering and exposure to ill poultry, was associated with having anti-H5 antibody. These findings suggest an increased risk for avian influenza infection from occupational exposure.

Case-control study of risk factors for avian influenza A (H5N1) disease, Hong Kong, 1997

In May 1997, a 3-year-old boy in Hong Kong died of a respiratory illness related to influenza A (H5N1) virus infection, the first known human case of disease from this virus. An additional 17 cases followed in November and December. A case-control study of 15 of these patients hospitalized for influenza A (H5N1) disease was conducted using controls matched by age, sex, and neighborhood to determine risk factors for disease. Exposure to live poultry (by visiting either a retail poultry stall or a market selling live poultry) in the week before illness began was significantly associated with H5N1 disease (64% of cases vs. 29% of controls, odds ratio, 4.5, P=.045). By contrast, travel, eating or preparing poultry products, recent exposure to persons with respiratory illness, including persons with known influenza A (H5N1) infection, were not associated with H5N1 disease.

Risk of Influenza A (H5N1) Infection among Health Care Workers Exposed to Patients with Influenza A (H5N1), Hong Kong

The first outbreak of avian influenza A (H5N1) occurred among humans in Hong Kong in 1997. To estimate the risk of person-to-person transmission, a retrospective cohort study was conducted to compare the prevalence of H5N1 antibody among health care workers (HCWs) exposed to H5N1 case-patients with the prevalence among nonexposed HCWs. Information on H5N1 case-patient and poultry exposures and blood samples for H5N1-specific antibody testing were collected. Eight (3.7%) of 217 exposed and 2 (0.7%) of 309 nonexposed HCWs were H5N1 seropositive (P=.01). The difference remained significant after controlling for poultry exposure (P=.01). This study presents the first epidemiologic evidence that H5N1 viruses were transmitted from patients to HCWs. Human-to-human transmission of avian influenza may increase the chances for the emergence of a novel influenza virus with pandemic potential.

Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices recommended immunization schedule for adults aged 19 years or older - United States, 2014.

In October 2015, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP)* approved the Recommended Immunization Schedule for Adults Aged 19 Years or Older, United States, 2016. This schedule provides a summary of ACIP recommendations for the use of vaccines routinely recommended for adults aged 19 years or older in two figures, footnotes for each vaccine, and a table that describes primary contraindications and precautions for commonly used vaccines for adults. Although the figures in the adult immunization schedule illustrate recommended vaccinations that begin at age 19 years, the footnotes contain information on vaccines that are recommended for adults that may begin at age younger than age 19 years. The footnotes also contain vaccine dosing, intervals between doses, and other important information and should be read with the figures.