Chaim Kaufmann

Out of the Lab and into the Archives: A Method for Testing Psychological Explanations of Political Decision Making

International relations scholars have long debated the usefulness of two main competing models of the foreign policy decision making process, the rational and the psychological. However, there have been few efforts at direct empirical testing in historical cases, largely because both models are so underpredictive that the question has been thought methodologically intractable. In consequence, most work in the field has relied on one or the other of these models, usually ignoring the other. This pessimism is misplaced; although certain hurdles must be overcome, successful competitive testing of decision making theories is possible. This article constructs a method capable of distinguishing the two models in historical cases, and uses it to test for psychological effects on German foreign policy decision making in the Moroccan Crisis of 1905-1906. The findings in this case support the psychological theories, although much wider testing is needed to establish the relative validity of the competing approaches.

Correspondence: Taking Offense at Offense-Defense Theory

I n his article ”Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War,”’ Stephen Van Evera claims that ”offense-defense theory” is ”important,” has “wide explanatory range. . . . wide realworld applicability. . . . large prescriptive utility. . . . [and] is quite satisfying” (p. 41). Van Evera’s conclusions are, however, unwarranted. First, his reformulation of influential arguments made prominent by Robert Jervis stretches the meaning of key concepts such that interesting avenues of empirical inquiry are closed off rather than opened. Second, the hypotheses--or “prime predictions”-Van Evera derives from the theory are themselves products of faulty deductive logic. Furthermore, they are nontestable, presumably nonscientific in Van Evera’s understanding of the term.’ Van Evera’s results are thus of little use to the social scientist who is interested in understanding the myriad causes of war and conditions facilitative of peace. In his classic article, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” Jervis argued that the security dilemma is more virulent and the international system less stable when offense enjoys an advantage over defense. By contrast, when defense is more potent, status quo powers find it easier to adopt compatible security policies, and the pernicious effects of international anarchy are greatly d imin i~hed .~ Although the operation-

Correspondence: Selling the Market Short? The Marketplace of Ideas and the Iraq War

Chaim Kaufmann’s recent article on the selling of the Iraq war makes a valuable contribution both to the debate over the origins of that war and to scholarship on threat inoation.1 I agree with much of his argument: George W. Bush’s administration misled the public on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability; its control over information helped skew the public debate; and the media were insufaciently critical of its claims. I take issue, however, with Kaufmann’s contention that the White House enjoys unparalleled authority in foreign policy matters and that this mainly accounts for the administration’s success. In contrast, I suggest an alternative explanation rooted in the transformative impact of the September 11 attacks on political contest in the United States.

Why Nuclear Proliferation is Getting Easier

Despite the enormous energy that the current U.S. administration has invested in counterproliferation, the underlying trend is that nuclear proliferation is becoming easier, not harder. The main reason for this is that the technology of choice, uranium enrichment using gas centrifuges, is now only moderately difficult to obtain, easy to operate given a few years of experience, and relatively easy to hide. The other scientific and engineering requirements are less challenging and are well understood by international experts. The economic requirements are also moderate, costing, at most, several billion dollars over several years. Building nuclear weapons is now within the capacity of every highor middle-income country in the world, as well as of some poor countries, if they are willing to invest enough effort.