James Dobbins

War with China

China could become the most powerful adversary the United States has ever faced. How might a war with China begin, how might it proceed, how might it end, and how might it be prevented?

Europe's Role in Nation Building

Despite continuing difficulties, European institutions for the management of civil–military operations have developed to the stage where more than brief, tentative experiments can be embarked upon with some confidence. The greatest challenges faced by the EU are not in the efficacious employment of armed force, but rather in formulating and applying the broader political-military strategy which must underlie it. Outside of Europe, the most efficient way for European governments to contribute to international peace operations will be to assign national contingents directly to UN peacekeeping missions. It is, thus, time for European governments, militaries and populations to get over the trauma of Srebrenica and related UN failures in the Balkans in the early 1990s, take on board the subsequent improvement in the UNs performance, and begin once again to do their share in manning, as they are already doing in paying for, these efforts.

Iraq: Winning the Unwinnable War

THE RECENT American presidential campaign has had the per verse effect of postponing any serious national debate on the future U.S. course in Iraq. Electoral considerations placed a premium on consistency at the expense of common sense, with both candidates insisting that even with perfect hindsight they would have acted just as they did two years ago: going to war or voting to authorize doing so. The campaign also revealed the paucity of good options now before the United States. Keeping U.S. troops in Iraq will only provoke fiercer and more widespread resistance, but withdrawing them too soon could spark a civil war. The second administration of George W. Bush seems to be left with the choice between making things worse slowly or quickly. The beginning of wisdom is to recognize that the ongoing war in Iraq is not one that the United States can win. As a result of its initial miscalculations, misdirected planning, and inadequate pre paration, Washington has lost the Iraqi peoples confidence and consent, and it is unlikely to win them back. Every day that Amer icans shell Iraqi cities they lose ftirther ground on the central front of Iraqi opinion. The war can still be won-but only by moderate Iraqis and only if they concentrate their efforts on gaining the cooperation of neighboring

Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform? U.S. Internal Security Assistance to Repressive and Transitioning Regimes

Abstract : This report examines U.S. government assistance to the police and internal security agencies of repressive and transitioning states. Throughout its history, the United States has provided assistance to a number of countries that have not shared its political ideals. Their security forces were not accountable to the public, and their practices and approaches were not transparent. The decision to provide assistance to repressive and autocratic states (and states that are, to varying extents, seeking to transition away from repression) raises a number of questions, the answers to which have significant policy implications. Can U.S. assistance improve the effectiveness of internal security agencies in countering security threats? Has U.S. assistance improved the accountability and human rights records of these agencies? What is the relationship between improving security and improving accountability and human rights?

New directions for transatlantic security cooperation

Western armies are masters of the conventional battlefield, but continue to have difficulty prevailing in unconventional conflict. Yet unconventional missions, including peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism, are the only kind that NATO or EU forces are likely to be collectively assigned for the foreseeable future. These, then, should be the focus for NATO and EU planning, training and equipping. While the UN is the cheapest, most generally acceptable and often most effective instrument for managing international military interventions, there is an effective ceiling beyond which the UN will not suffice. The UN does not do forced entries, and has never fielded more than about 20,000 troops in any single operation. Where these thresholds must be surpassed, NATO, the EU or an ad hoc coalition will be needed. Afghanistan is the next test for Western collective defence efforts. Success there will require greater EU as well as NATO engagement.

Coping with a Nuclearising Iran

The West has focused on how to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons, or what to do after it does. What we lack is a framework for dealing with Iran before, while and after it crosses the threshold.

The UN's role in nation-building: From the Belgian Congo to Iraq

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and the United Nations have both been heavily engaged in nation-building and have developed their own distinct approaches to the conduct of such missions. In the aftermath of its early and widely publicised failures in Somalia and Yugoslavia, the UNs reputation for competent nationbuilding was seriously damaged, and demand for its services fell off noticeably. More recently, the US reputation for competence in the field has suffered as a result of setbacks in Afghanistan and Iraq. A new study by the RAND corporation indicates that UN-led operations tended to be smaller, shorter, less expensive and, on average, more successful than those led by the United States. This divergence in performance can be explained in part by the greater inherent difficulty of some of the US-led operations, but is also a product of the UNs greater success in learning from experience.

Coping with a Nuclearizing Iran

Abstract : Although Iran poses one of the most-significant foreign policy challenges to U.S. interests in the Middle East, there are surprisingly few analyses of Iran that integrate the different facets of this challenge and formulate a comprehensive strategy toward this critical country. Although a plethora of studies have examined the nuclear issue or a particular policy instrument for dealing with it (e.g., engagement, sanctions, deterrence, or a military strike),1 other aspects of the Iranian challenge, as well as the broader regional context, are often ignored. Comprehensive studies of Iran exist, including several by RAND authors, but none offers an integrative strategy that considers critical trade-offs and necessary sequencing. Moreover, many studies on the subject are either long term, assuming a world with a nuclear-armed Iran,2 or extremely short term, focusing almost exclusively on how to stop Iran from acquiring such weapons.3 Thus, a real gap exists in formulating a comprehensive U.S. strategy toward Iran in the medium term that is, over the next five to ten years one that does not begin or end when Iran acquires a nuclear weapon capability, that seeks to advance all the main U.S. interests, and seeks to harness all possible regional and global forces in its support.

Preparing for nation-building

Preparation for nation-building requires that responsible political leaders consult both with regional and functional experts, those who know why the society in question descended into conflict and those who know from experience elsewhere how to put such societies back together. Goals must be established which transcend the most immediate and normally negative purposes of the inter vention, e.g. halting conflict, stopping genocide or turning back aggression. These positive goals must be commensurate with the scale of military manpower and economic assistance likely to be committed. The larger the social transformation envisaged, the greater the resistance likely to be encountered. The most common cause for the failure of nation-building endeavours is a mismatch between objectives and commitments.

Occupying Iraq: A Short History of the CPA

It is unlikely that American officials will again face decisions exactly like those required of the Coalition Provisional Authority in spring 2003. Formal occupations had largely fallen out of favour by the second half of the twentieth century, and the CPA experience is not likely to be replicated. But it is certain that the international community will again find itself assisting societies emerging from conflict to build an enduring peace and establish a representative government. Learning how to best prepare for such a challenge is the key to more-successful future operations. In this regard, the occupation of Iraq provides an object lesson of the costs and consequences of attempting nation building without adequate preparation.