Charles-Philippe David

Introduction: The (Re)Building of the Wall in International Relations

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the emergence of a new international landscape ushered in an era of globalization in which states appeared irrevocably condemned to obsolescence, a world without borders. The advent of an international system in which the state was relegated to secondary importance in international relations, coupled with the disappearance of physical borders, left little reason to expect a return of the wall. However, borders, walls and barriers, symbols that were thought to have perished with decolonization and the disappearance of the bipolar world, made a comeback in the aftermath of 9/11. The wall as object embraces a heterogeneous range of structures built with diverse motivations on a variety of borders. Meanwhile, the wall as phenomenon has proliferated over the past 10 years, encircling both democratic and authoritarian states, failed states and healthy ones. This special issue investigates both the empirical and symbolic facets of the erection of structures designed to keep away (and keep away from) the Other, from the “near abroad.”

Does Peacebuilding Build Peace

Peacebuilding is one of the popular concepts underpinning United Nations (UN) missions today. Like other notions that have emerged since the end of the Cold War, particularly in coimection with UN peace operations, ‘peacebuilding’ has become common currency. Peacebuilding is an ambitious concept that enjoys wide support. In general terms the concept pertains to the rehabilitation of regions and countries ravaged by armed conflicts in order to prevent the resumption of hostilities and to establish lasting peace. In 1997 four UN missions and one NATO mission pursued objectives related to peacebuilding (International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997, pp. 274–284): in Angola, Haiti, Eastern Slovenia (Croatia),1 and two complementary missions in Bosnia.2 Since the end of the Cold War and with the expanding need for international peacekeeping forces, over a dozen UN missions have included peacebuilding functions, ranging from security tasks (disarmament, demobilisation, monitoring compliance with peace agreements, police training) to political assignments (supervision of elections, administration of justice, rebuilding the political system) and socio-economic missions (repatriation of refugees, bank reform, rebuilding roads, reviving agriculture).

Alice in Wonderland meets Frankenstein: Constructivism, realism and peacebuilding in Bosnia

Studies in peacebuilding generally adopt either a conceptual or an empirical approach, but rarely both at the same time. However, there is much to be gained from combining theory with case studies. In presenting an overview and an assessment of peacebuilding in Bosnia, this article seeks to bring theoretical understanding to bear on empirical analysis. We believe that to gain a better understanding of this peacebuilding mission, which has been under way for more than four years, we should examine the different visions underpinning the efforts to bring the conflict to a definite end and assist in rebuilding the country. Those visions and the way they shape peacebuilding missions have a significant impact on the prospects for success and on the decisions of a variety of actors who have committed considerable human and financial resources to building peace in Bosnia. They provide a useful guide for gauging the ability to bring about lasting peace in a region devastated, as Bosnia is, by an armed conflict with grave implications. This article seeks to come to grips with the following questions: is it possible to rebuild Bosnia and create conditions conducive to lasting peace? Can Bosnia ever return to a state of stability, interethnic harmony and economic progress? And if so, by what means: the integration or separation of ethnic groups? Can Bosnia survive without ongoing foreign intervention (military and civil)? Are the international community’s laudable efforts likely to succeed in building peace or are they doomed to failure and a resumption of hostilities? To these difficult questions there are no simple answers. However, two analytical frameworks, constructivist and realist, are useful for examining the appropriateness of the peacebuilding mission in Bosnia and its likelihood of success. Depending on the set of lenses through which we examine the peacebuilding efforts on the ground, Bosnia after Dayton may appear to be on the right track (this is the ‘Alice in Wonderland’

‘At least 2001’: US security policy and exit strategy in Bosnia

This article describes and analyzes the United States’ security conduct in Bosnia since the Dayton Accords of November 1995, and its involvement in the multilateral conflict resolution and peacebuilding effort. From this analysis, the conclusion is that it will be difficult for the US to exit from its engagement in Bosnia. Various explanations are offered for the formulation of American policy: norms and values, alliance politics and the role of NATO, bureaucratic and congressional influence, as well as presidential leadership. The most important factor remains affirmation of US leadership to make the peacebuilding mission in Bosnia a successful one.

Good Fences for Good Neighbours? States, Couples and Walls

Since the Great Wall of China, King Gudfred of Denmark’s Danevirke, the Mede Wall built by Nebuchadnezzar II, the Antonine Wall and Hadrian’s Wall built by the Romans in Scotland, the Limes Germaniae and the Limes Rhetiae, the wall has been a central feature of international relations (Quetel, 2012). Indeed, one wall was emblematic of the international system of the second half of the 20th century, and when the Berlin Wall fell 20 years ago, observers thought that the world had been forever transformed; today, it appears that history is merely repeating itself (Paasi, 2009, p. 216). It was believed that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reconfiguration of international relations (Badie, 1999) would open up an age of globalization in which states would become obsolete, ushering in a world without borders (Galli, 2001; Zolo, 2004; Schroer, 2006; Brunet Jailly, 2005), a world that would have to be reconceptualized outside the territorial trap (Agnew, 1994). In the wake of 9/11, however, borders came back with a vengeance and new borders were created (Weber, 2008, p. 48). With them came border barriers and walls, symbols that were thought to have disappeared with the collapse of the bipolar international system.

How Not to do Post-invasion: Lessons Learned from US Decision-making in Iraq (2002–2008)

The common wisdom that the United States wanted to conquer Iraq in order to get its hands on oil fields, redraw the geopolitical map of the Middle East, and turn Iraq into a vassal of American interests, suffers from a fundamental contradiction: if the US Administration were so strategically savvy, how could it have been so ignorant of the difficulties that lay in wait? On the other hand, if the US Administration had indeed realized the folly of the Iraqi adventure, would it still have been eager to overthrow Saddam Hussein? Perhaps the US was blinded by its imperialist appetite, whetted by oil dependency? In this case, things simply did not work out as the President and his advisors had hoped. But why then did they persist, against all contrary indications, long after the catastrophic nature of their course had become clear? How can a conspiratorial interpretation account for these facts? The answer – and this may seem disappointing – is that the US invasion of Iraq, and its failure five years down the line, stemmed not from a diabolical plan spurred by thirst for power, but were instead the result of a monumental blunder produced by a specific set of historic conditions and a fatally flawed decision-making process.Themistake that led the US into Iraq sprang from a combination of circumstances, pressures and ruinous stubbornness rather than a considered decision. It grew out of an idea more than interest, and was, as many observers of US foreign policy have tirelessly repeated, a “choice,” not a “necessity.” Defense & Security Analysis Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 31–63,March 2010

The Clash of Historical Analogies and Their Influence on Decision-Making: The Case of Iraqi Reconstruction Under George W. Bush

ABSTRACT Contrary to the conventional wisdom in the literature on United States foreign policy, there was no consensus within the George W. Bush Administration on the parallel between the reconstruction of Iraq and that of post-Second World War Germany and Japan. Systematic analysis of available sources shows that the decision-makers drew a large number of different historical analogies—73 in all. This analysis takes a fresh look at the use of analogies regarding Iraqi reconstruction. We divide the period of April 2003 to June 2008 into four phases, in each of which a different analogy predominates—Afghanistan, Germany and Japan, the Cold War, and Vietnam. Analysis of the analogies embraced by five distinct groups within the Administration’s decision-making team—nationalist hawks, neoconservatives, administrators of Iraq, realist internationalists and the president—clarifies the affinities and tensions amongst them.