Joseph T. Jockel

Dandurand Revisited: Rethinking Canada's Defence Policy in an Unstable World

The heavy sacrifices to which we agreed for the re-establishment of peace in Europe led us to reflect on what the future might hold in store. May I be permitted to add that in this association of mutual insurance against fire the risks assumed by the different states are not equal? We live in a fire-proof house, far from inflammable materials. A vast ocean separates us from Europe. Senator Raoul Dandurand

Canada and the war in Afghanistan: NATO's odd man out steps forward

At the Cold War’s close, Canada was NATO’s ‘odd man out’, contributing relatively little to western defence. Today, Canada is the third-largest contributor of combat forces to NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan. Canada got into Afghanistan partly as an alternative to getting into Iraq. But fighting the Taliban also serves the Canadian national interest in combating terrorism and has dovetailed well with recent efforts to ‘transform’ the Canadian military and use it more effectively in overseas development efforts. However, the Canadian commitment to Afghanistan beyond the current February 2009 deadline is in doubt. Public support for the combat dimension of the Afghanistan operations remains weak.

In or out? Canada, the Netherlands, and support to the invasion of Iraq

ABSTRACT How do democratic allies manage their participation in U.S.-led coalition operations? This article compares the Canadian and Dutch management of domestic and international expectations of support to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It argues that the decision whether to support coalition operations often does not amount to a simplistic “yes” or “no” answer. It entails a management process involving several strategies, as well as a wide range of mutually inclusive support options. Canadian and Dutch management of support to coalition operations reveals that similarly core U.S. allies misunderstood U.S. expectations, mismanaged their countrys stance by sending confusing signals to both their domestic and international audiences, and adopted varied trade-off strategies. The study of multinational coalition operations should thus conceptualize political and military support separately, but examine their causal interrelationships and measure them on a qualitative, case-specific continuum, in order to properly understand the variations and trade-offs involved in the allied management of support to military coalitions.

NORAD does not need saving

In the current Canadian discussion of missile defence, it is often claimed that the future of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is under threat and that it will be saved only if Canada opts in. The command does not need saving, however. Any such claim draws attention away from the real North American defence challenges that Canadians need to face in a debate about continental strategic defence: whether or not Canada needs to be protected by a missile defence system (a point that a Senate committee strongly emphasized in 2014) and what Ottawa needs to do about its own air defences that fall under NORAD.

Canada in a Twin-Pillared Alliance: The ‘Dumbbell’ May Just Have to Do

... the European Community will become even more important. We want our transatlantic cooperation to keep pace with European integration and institutional reform ... To this end, we propose ... whether in treaty or some other form, a significantly strengthened set of institutional and consultative links. Working from shared ideals and common values, we face a set of mutual challenges in economics, foreign policy, the environment, science, and a host of other fields. So it makes sense for us to seek to fashion our responses together as a matter of common course.

NORAD’S Future: St-Amand’s Revelation, Gortney’s Complaint, and Vigilant Shield 17’s Component Commander

The Trudeau government’s 2017 defence white paper promised that, “Canada will work closely with the United States to ensure NORAD is fully prepared to confront rapidly evolving threats including exploring new roles for the command, taking into account the full range of threats.” This chapter explores current trends in North American missile defence, maritime defence and air defence that could affect the future of the binational command in 2018, as the two governments observe the 60th anniversary of the NORAD accord, and in the years beyond. It suggests four possible models for the command’s future: first, an enhanced multi-domain NORAD to which responsibility has been given, in addition to its current roles, for maritime defence, or missile defence, or both—a North American Defence Command in other words; second, a NORAD that has been reduced to its original role as an air defence headquarters and moved out of Colorado Springs in the form of a combined joint task force; third, a variant of the second option in which the task force, i.e. NORAD would act as a stand-by entity; and finally, NORAD unchanged from what it is today.