Charlotte Ku

The Dynamics of International Law: The Interaction of Normative and Operating Systems

This article describes the basic components of the operating and normative systems as a conceptual framework for analyzing and understanding international law. There are many theoretical questions that follow from the framework that embodies a normative and operating system. We briefly outline one of those in this article, namely how the operating system changes. In doing so, we seek to address the puzzle of why operating system changes do not always respond to alterations in the normative sphere. A general theoretical argument focuses on four conditions. We argue that the operating system only responds to normative changes when response is “necessary” (stemming from incompatibility, ineffectiveness, or insufficiency) for giving the norm effect, and when the change is roughly coterminous with a dramatic change in the political environment (that is, “political shock”). We also argue, however, that opposition from leading states and domestic political factors might serve to block or limit such operating system change. These arguments are illustrated by reference to three areas of the operating system as they concern the norm against genocide.

Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law

List of figures List of tables Notes on contributors Preface List of abbreviations Part I. Introduction: 1. Broaching the issues Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobson Part II. The Domestic and International Context: 2. The interface of national constitutional systems with international law and institutions on using military forces: changing trends in executive and legislative powers Lori F. Damrosch 3. Domestic political factors and decisions to use military forces Karen A. Mingst 4. Collective security, peacekeeping, and ad hoc multilateralism Edwin M. Smith 5. The legal responsibility of military personnel Robert C. R. Siekmann Part III. Traditional Contributors to International Military Operations: 6. Canada: committed contributor of ideas and forces, but with growing doubts and problems Fen Osler Hampson 7. Norway: political consensus and the problem of accountability Knut G. Nustad and Henrik Thune 8. India: democratic, poor, internationalist Ramesh Thakur and Dipankar Banerjee Part IV. Newcomers to International Military Operations: 9. Japan: moderate commitment within legal strictures Akiho Shibata 10. Germany: ensuring political legitimacy for the use of military forces by requiring constitutional accountability Georg Nolte Part V. Permanent Members of the UN Security Council: 11. Russian Federation: the pendulum of powers and accountability Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov 12. France: Security Council legitimacy and executive primacy Yves Boyer, Serge Sur and Olivier Fleurence 13. The United Kingdom: increasing commitment requires greater parliamentary involvement Nigel D. White 14. The United States: democracy, hegemony, and accountability Michael J. Glennon Part VI. Conclusion: 15. Towards a mixed system of democratic accountability Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobson Appendix A: uses of military forces under the auspices of the UN and NATO Appendix B: country participation in international operations, 1945-2000 References Index.

Exploring International Law: Opportunities and Challenges for Political Science Research

Four political scientists and one legal scholar explore questions concerning the place of international law in political science research. Paul Diehl identifies a “warm bodies problem” that has resulted from academic skepticism about the relevance of international law to international relations, creating a dearth of political scientists trained to conduct research in international law. Beth Simmons refutes Diehls proposition that the warm bodies problem makes credible work difficult. Dorinda Dallmeyer notes how communication between lawyers and political scientists is complicated when a word like “norm” can mean completely different things to the two groups. She highlights an open mind and good listening skills as keys to success. Harold Jacobson uses an autobiographical approach to illustrate the influence of realism and its effects on international law as a field in political science, but draws from his collaborations with lawyers to demonstrate the rewards such efforts can provide.

Primary Effects of Secondary Rules: Institutions and Multi-Level Governance

Ku and Diehl’s chapter broadens the traditional conception of secondary rules, defining the international legal system as composed of operating and normative subsystems respectively. Three sets of mechanisms by which secondary rules influence primary rules are examined: (1) configuring institutional frameworks, (2) enhancing the credible commitment of new primary rules, and (3) institutions directly or indirectly making normative law. The conclusions are that secondary rules play important roles in each of these areas. A consistent theme is that the operating system can reduce uncertainty and fill gaps in the existing governance structures. There, secondary rules promote efficiency and coherence in the law. There are, however, instances in which such rules complicate matters, as in several cases lawmaking might be stifled and governance not promoted.

Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law: The domestic and international context

List of figures List of tables Notes on contributors Preface List of abbreviations Part I. Introduction: 1. Broaching the issues Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobson Part II. The Domestic and International Context: 2. The interface of national constitutional systems with international law and institutions on using military forces: changing trends in executive and legislative powers Lori F. Damrosch 3. Domestic political factors and decisions to use military forces Karen A. Mingst 4. Collective security, peacekeeping, and ad hoc multilateralism Edwin M. Smith 5. The legal responsibility of military personnel Robert C. R. Siekmann Part III. Traditional Contributors to International Military Operations: 6. Canada: committed contributor of ideas and forces, but with growing doubts and problems Fen Osler Hampson 7. Norway: political consensus and the problem of accountability Knut G. Nustad and Henrik Thune 8. India: democratic, poor, internationalist Ramesh Thakur and Dipankar Banerjee Part IV. Newcomers to International Military Operations: 9. Japan: moderate commitment within legal strictures Akiho Shibata 10. Germany: ensuring political legitimacy for the use of military forces by requiring constitutional accountability Georg Nolte Part V. Permanent Members of the UN Security Council: 11. Russian Federation: the pendulum of powers and accountability Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov 12. France: Security Council legitimacy and executive primacy Yves Boyer, Serge Sur and Olivier Fleurence 13. The United Kingdom: increasing commitment requires greater parliamentary involvement Nigel D. White 14. The United States: democracy, hegemony, and accountability Michael J. Glennon Part VI. Conclusion: 15. Towards a mixed system of democratic accountability Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobson Appendix A: uses of military forces under the auspices of the UN and NATO Appendix B: country participation in international operations, 1945-2000 References Index.

Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law: Introduction

List of figures List of tables Notes on contributors Preface List of abbreviations Part I. Introduction: 1. Broaching the issues Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobson Part II. The Domestic and International Context: 2. The interface of national constitutional systems with international law and institutions on using military forces: changing trends in executive and legislative powers Lori F. Damrosch 3. Domestic political factors and decisions to use military forces Karen A. Mingst 4. Collective security, peacekeeping, and ad hoc multilateralism Edwin M. Smith 5. The legal responsibility of military personnel Robert C. R. Siekmann Part III. Traditional Contributors to International Military Operations: 6. Canada: committed contributor of ideas and forces, but with growing doubts and problems Fen Osler Hampson 7. Norway: political consensus and the problem of accountability Knut G. Nustad and Henrik Thune 8. India: democratic, poor, internationalist Ramesh Thakur and Dipankar Banerjee Part IV. Newcomers to International Military Operations: 9. Japan: moderate commitment within legal strictures Akiho Shibata 10. Germany: ensuring political legitimacy for the use of military forces by requiring constitutional accountability Georg Nolte Part V. Permanent Members of the UN Security Council: 11. Russian Federation: the pendulum of powers and accountability Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov 12. France: Security Council legitimacy and executive primacy Yves Boyer, Serge Sur and Olivier Fleurence 13. The United Kingdom: increasing commitment requires greater parliamentary involvement Nigel D. White 14. The United States: democracy, hegemony, and accountability Michael J. Glennon Part VI. Conclusion: 15. Towards a mixed system of democratic accountability Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobson Appendix A: uses of military forces under the auspices of the UN and NATO Appendix B: country participation in international operations, 1945-2000 References Index.

Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law: Index

List of figures List of tables Notes on contributors Preface List of abbreviations Part I. Introduction: 1. Broaching the issues Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobson Part II. The Domestic and International Context: 2. The interface of national constitutional systems with international law and institutions on using military forces: changing trends in executive and legislative powers Lori F. Damrosch 3. Domestic political factors and decisions to use military forces Karen A. Mingst 4. Collective security, peacekeeping, and ad hoc multilateralism Edwin M. Smith 5. The legal responsibility of military personnel Robert C. R. Siekmann Part III. Traditional Contributors to International Military Operations: 6. Canada: committed contributor of ideas and forces, but with growing doubts and problems Fen Osler Hampson 7. Norway: political consensus and the problem of accountability Knut G. Nustad and Henrik Thune 8. India: democratic, poor, internationalist Ramesh Thakur and Dipankar Banerjee Part IV. Newcomers to International Military Operations: 9. Japan: moderate commitment within legal strictures Akiho Shibata 10. Germany: ensuring political legitimacy for the use of military forces by requiring constitutional accountability Georg Nolte Part V. Permanent Members of the UN Security Council: 11. Russian Federation: the pendulum of powers and accountability Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov 12. France: Security Council legitimacy and executive primacy Yves Boyer, Serge Sur and Olivier Fleurence 13. The United Kingdom: increasing commitment requires greater parliamentary involvement Nigel D. White 14. The United States: democracy, hegemony, and accountability Michael J. Glennon Part VI. Conclusion: 15. Towards a mixed system of democratic accountability Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobson Appendix A: uses of military forces under the auspices of the UN and NATO Appendix B: country participation in international operations, 1945-2000 References Index.

Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law: Newcomers to international military operations

List of figures List of tables Notes on contributors Preface List of abbreviations Part I. Introduction: 1. Broaching the issues Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobson Part II. The Domestic and International Context: 2. The interface of national constitutional systems with international law and institutions on using military forces: changing trends in executive and legislative powers Lori F. Damrosch 3. Domestic political factors and decisions to use military forces Karen A. Mingst 4. Collective security, peacekeeping, and ad hoc multilateralism Edwin M. Smith 5. The legal responsibility of military personnel Robert C. R. Siekmann Part III. Traditional Contributors to International Military Operations: 6. Canada: committed contributor of ideas and forces, but with growing doubts and problems Fen Osler Hampson 7. Norway: political consensus and the problem of accountability Knut G. Nustad and Henrik Thune 8. India: democratic, poor, internationalist Ramesh Thakur and Dipankar Banerjee Part IV. Newcomers to International Military Operations: 9. Japan: moderate commitment within legal strictures Akiho Shibata 10. Germany: ensuring political legitimacy for the use of military forces by requiring constitutional accountability Georg Nolte Part V. Permanent Members of the UN Security Council: 11. Russian Federation: the pendulum of powers and accountability Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov 12. France: Security Council legitimacy and executive primacy Yves Boyer, Serge Sur and Olivier Fleurence 13. The United Kingdom: increasing commitment requires greater parliamentary involvement Nigel D. White 14. The United States: democracy, hegemony, and accountability Michael J. Glennon Part VI. Conclusion: 15. Towards a mixed system of democratic accountability Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobson Appendix A: uses of military forces under the auspices of the UN and NATO Appendix B: country participation in international operations, 1945-2000 References Index.

Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law: Frontmatter

List of figures List of tables Notes on contributors Preface List of abbreviations Part I. Introduction: 1. Broaching the issues Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobson Part II. The Domestic and International Context: 2. The interface of national constitutional systems with international law and institutions on using military forces: changing trends in executive and legislative powers Lori F. Damrosch 3. Domestic political factors and decisions to use military forces Karen A. Mingst 4. Collective security, peacekeeping, and ad hoc multilateralism Edwin M. Smith 5. The legal responsibility of military personnel Robert C. R. Siekmann Part III. Traditional Contributors to International Military Operations: 6. Canada: committed contributor of ideas and forces, but with growing doubts and problems Fen Osler Hampson 7. Norway: political consensus and the problem of accountability Knut G. Nustad and Henrik Thune 8. India: democratic, poor, internationalist Ramesh Thakur and Dipankar Banerjee Part IV. Newcomers to International Military Operations: 9. Japan: moderate commitment within legal strictures Akiho Shibata 10. Germany: ensuring political legitimacy for the use of military forces by requiring constitutional accountability Georg Nolte Part V. Permanent Members of the UN Security Council: 11. Russian Federation: the pendulum of powers and accountability Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov 12. France: Security Council legitimacy and executive primacy Yves Boyer, Serge Sur and Olivier Fleurence 13. The United Kingdom: increasing commitment requires greater parliamentary involvement Nigel D. White 14. The United States: democracy, hegemony, and accountability Michael J. Glennon Part VI. Conclusion: 15. Towards a mixed system of democratic accountability Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobson Appendix A: uses of military forces under the auspices of the UN and NATO Appendix B: country participation in international operations, 1945-2000 References Index.

Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law: Notes on contributors

List of figures List of tables Notes on contributors Preface List of abbreviations Part I. Introduction: 1. Broaching the issues Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobson Part II. The Domestic and International Context: 2. The interface of national constitutional systems with international law and institutions on using military forces: changing trends in executive and legislative powers Lori F. Damrosch 3. Domestic political factors and decisions to use military forces Karen A. Mingst 4. Collective security, peacekeeping, and ad hoc multilateralism Edwin M. Smith 5. The legal responsibility of military personnel Robert C. R. Siekmann Part III. Traditional Contributors to International Military Operations: 6. Canada: committed contributor of ideas and forces, but with growing doubts and problems Fen Osler Hampson 7. Norway: political consensus and the problem of accountability Knut G. Nustad and Henrik Thune 8. India: democratic, poor, internationalist Ramesh Thakur and Dipankar Banerjee Part IV. Newcomers to International Military Operations: 9. Japan: moderate commitment within legal strictures Akiho Shibata 10. Germany: ensuring political legitimacy for the use of military forces by requiring constitutional accountability Georg Nolte Part V. Permanent Members of the UN Security Council: 11. Russian Federation: the pendulum of powers and accountability Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov 12. France: Security Council legitimacy and executive primacy Yves Boyer, Serge Sur and Olivier Fleurence 13. The United Kingdom: increasing commitment requires greater parliamentary involvement Nigel D. White 14. The United States: democracy, hegemony, and accountability Michael J. Glennon Part VI. Conclusion: 15. Towards a mixed system of democratic accountability Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobson Appendix A: uses of military forces under the auspices of the UN and NATO Appendix B: country participation in international operations, 1945-2000 References Index.