Christian Leuprecht

Containing the Narrative: Strategy and Tactics in Countering the Storyline of Global Jihad

ABSTRACT It has long been recognised that telling a better story is an important part of countering the appeal of Global Jihad. The ‘War on Terror’ will be difficult to win if the ‘War on Ideas’ is lost. The mushrooming literature on terrorism notwithstanding, the counter‐narrative issue has been the subject of surprisingly scant academic attention. Part of the problem is that this is an issue with relatively little empirical work. Still, significant inferences for a counter‐narrative strategy can be drawn from existing research. Here we argue that counter‐narratives must be tailored to different audiences and must be designed to attack particular mechanisms of radicalisation. In contrast to the top‐down approach that has thus far been advocated to confront the claims of Global Jihad ‘head on’, what is actually needed is a bottom‐up approach that reaches vulnerable individuals early on by means of a nuanced approach that is sensitive to the multiple logics of radicalisation.

The Tory Fragment in Canada: Endangered Species?

Decades after Gad Horowitzs seminal article first appeared in 1966 in the Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, fragment theorys capacity to make sense of phenomena for which it might otherwise be difficult to account, still appears relevant. Support for the Reform party/Canadian Alliance is most robust in provinces marked by immigration from the western United States. By contrast, provinces where United Empire Loyalists settled have proven most resistant to incursions by Reform. Using fragment theory to formulate a possible hypothesis to explain this puzzle has two incidental benefits. It probes the failure of new federal parties to emerge from Maritime Canada, and it allows speculation about the simultaneous demise of the Conservative and New Democratic parties.

Networks as strategic repertoires: Functional differentiation among Al-Shabaab terror cells

This article explains variation across the characteristics and structure of Al-Shabaab (AS) networks as a function of strategic repertoires. From a comparison of domestic and transnational AS recruitment and fundraising networks in the United States, the article generates hypotheses about the characteristics and structure of networks and how traits such as brokers, centrality characteristics of nodes, international linkages and use of funds are related to a networks purpose. The implications of these observations are twofold: The nature of a terror organisations network is indicative of the organisations strategy; conversely, the organisations strategy will affect the nature of the network. On the one hand, knowing the function of the network makes it possible to counter it by detecting and debilitating the nodes. On the other hand, knowing the structure of a network makes it possible to surmise its purpose. The article concludes that, from a network perspective, terrorist recruitment and fundraising are distinct problems that require differentiated law-enforcement and security-intelligence approaches.

Beyond the Castle Model of cyber-risk and cyber-security

Abstract The predominant metaphor for secure computing today is modeled on ever higher, ever better layers of walls. This article explains why that approach is as outmoded for cyber security today as it became for physical security centuries ago. Three forces are undermining the Castle Model as a practical security solution. First, organizations themselves tear down their walls and make their gateways more porous because it pays off in terms of better agility and responsiveness – they can do more, faster and better. Second, technological developments increasingly destroy walls from the outside as computation becomes cheaper for attackers, and the implementation of cyberwalls and gateways becomes more complex, and so contains more vulnerabilities to be exploited by the clever and unscrupulous. Third, changes in the way humans and technology interact, exemplified (but not limited to) the Millennial generation, blur and dissolve the concepts of inside and outside, so that distinctions become invisible, or even unwanted, and boundaries become annoyances to be circumvented. A new approach to cyber security is needed: Organizations and individuals need to get used to operating in compromised environments. The articles conclusion hints at more nuanced forms of computation in environments that must be assumed to be potentially compromised.

Tracking the War of Ideas: A Poll of Ottawa Muslims

A 2008 poll of 430 Ottawa Muslims found predominantly negative views of the U.S. war on terrorism, including the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan. This poll also assessed approval of Western powers (U.S., Canada, Israel, United Nations) and challengers of Western power (Al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hizballah, government of Iran). Surprisingly, attitudes of Ottawa Muslims toward militant Muslim groups were unrelated to their attitudes toward Western governments. Discussion suggests that this pattern, if confirmed in other Muslim polls, would mean that the war of ideas against radical Islam must address not one target but two: favorable opinions of militants and unfavorable opinions of the U.S. Muslims who come to like the West more may not like Muslim militants any less.

Defense Policy “Walmart Style” Canadian Lessons in “not-so-grand” Grand Strategy

As the government of Canada cuts back on defense spending after years of significant increases, critics lament the supposed lack of a “grand strategy” when it comes to military expenditures. But the current reductions are actually a return to traditional Canadian grand strategy, albeit one that is not that “grand.” Put in retail shopping terms, Canada has tended to follow an economizing Walmart approach to defense spending as opposed to a more upscale Saks Fifth Avenue style. Though often criticized as nothing more than “free riding,” this approach may be more accurately described as “easy riding.” It is one that was deliberately and carefully chosen by successive Canadian policy makers, acting in accordance with “realism Canadian style.” It allowed the country to achieve security at home and to use the justifiably highly regarded Canadian Armed Forces to participate in a limited, yet effective and internationally appreciated manner in overseas military engagements as a stalwart Western ally without endangering the economy and social programs by spending more on defense than was absolutely necessary. While the Walmart approach can be taken too far, in these times of fiscal austerity when national budgets are difficult to balance without cutting defense spending and when interventionist exhaustion is afflicting many Western governments, including the United States, the lessons from the Canadian experience should resonate with policy makers and analysts well beyond Canada.

Hezbollah’s global tentacles: A relational approach to convergence with transnational organised crime

ABSTRACT That terrorists, criminals, and their facilitators exploit the global marketplace is well known. While the global movement of illicit goods is well documented, robust empirical evidence linking terrorism and organized crime remains elusive. This article posits Network Science as a means of making these links more apparent. As a critical case study, Hezbollah is quite possibly the most mature globalized terrorist organization, although it thinks of itself as the “Party of God.” However, the means seem to justify the ends: this article shows that Hezbollah’s holy men have no qualms about resorting to pornography, contraband cigarettes, immigration fraud, and credit card fraud to raise funds. Beyond establishing links, Social Network Analysis reveals other important characteristics, such as the relative autonomy from Hezbollah headquarters that local fundraising networks enjoy. That finding implies a paradigm shift: Hezbollah is no less a terrorist organization than an organized crime syndicate. This is apparent in a network’s structure. Transnational Organized Crime is typically about nodes being connected to many others in the network. Yet, Hezbollah fundraising networks allow such connectivity because of the group’s typically high levels of mutual trust and familial relationships. This creates a vulnerability that can be exploited by law enforcement and intelligence organizations.

The Puzzle of Nonviolence in Western Sahara

ABSTRACT Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony that has been controlled by Morocco since 1975, has seen virtually no violent resistance by the indigenous Sahrawi people since the conclusion of a 1975–1991 war between Morocco and the pro-independence Polisario Front. That lack of political violence is puzzling in light of several factors, including broad support for independence, socio-economic disparities between Moroccan and Sahrawi inhabitants and Morocco’s repression of Sahrawi culture, resistance, and expressions of pro-independence sentiment. This article examines the absence of violence and draws lessons from Western Sahara: why some populations resort to violent resistance and others do not, and how best to frame and to study politically charged subjects such as insurgency, terrorism, and sovereignty. In addition to advancing theories of nonviolence, this article makes a methodological contribution to the study of resistance movements and improves our understanding of the conflict through fieldwork that included approximately 60 interviews with Sahrawi activists conducted in Morocco and Western Sahara. Western Sahara is difficult to study for a number of reasons, including its remoteness, relative international obscurity, and Moroccan suppression of dissenting research.

Fixed Election Cycles: A Genuine Alternative to Responsible and Responsive Government?

Canadas federal government and several provinces have recently moved to fixed election cycles on the assumption that the ability to pick the election date endogenously (1) gives the incumbent government an unfair advantage and (2) curbs the discretionary powers of the Governor General. Electoral opportunism is posited as a problem that fixed election cycles will remedy by virtue of ensuring greater turnover among governments. This article subjects these claims to empirical scrutiny. It examines why Canada did not follow the American example in the first place. It surveys some of the unintended consequences of fixing election cycles. And it ponders some of the complications that might arise when trying to reconcile a key constitutional principle of the Westminster parliamentary system, responsible government, with fixed election cycles. Evidence for the apparent democratic merits of a fixed election cycle is found to be less conclusive than its proponents acknowledge. The article concludes by speculating about the motivations behind Canadas new-found passion for electoral reform.

Improving the language of influence

We show that the language used by U.S. presidential candidates over the past twenty years has an underlying temporal structure associated with electoral success, with the most influential language used by incumbents in their second campaign and the least by losers in a first-cycle open campaign. Influential language is characterized by increased positivity, complete absence of negativity, increased abstraction, and lack of reference to the opposing candidate(s). The way in which language use changes suggests that it is the result of changing self-perception rather than a deliberate strategy. This has implications for the language of influence as deployed by violent extremist groups, suggesting that both success at convincing an audience to participate in violent extremism and the presence of competing groups trying to make similar arguments improve the quality of the influencing language they use.