Joel J. Sokolsky

Suspenders and a belt: Perimeter and border security in Canada‐us relations

In the spring of 2005, Canada, the United States, and Mexico negotiated a Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP), an agreement meant to bolster continental security while preserving a free flow of goods and people across national borders. After the SPP was announced, influential groups in all three countries argued that the new agreement should lead to the erection of a continental security perimeter. This paper argues that proponents of a continental perimeter overlook the mutual self‐interest Canada and the United States see in focusing security cooperation on the border in a bilateral cooperative, rather than continentally integrative, measures. Although their motives differ, both countries recognize that the protections offered by borders (belts) take precedence over those provided by a perimeter (suspenders).

A Seat at the Table: Canada and Its Alliances

Canadas alliance relationships, NATO and NORAD, constitute nearly the sum total of Canadian defense policy. In addition to providing national security through collective Western defense, these alliances have been viewed in Canada as affording Ottawa a seat at the table, where important issues of international security and U.S.Soviet relations are discussed. While enjoying this access, Canada has, nonetheless, been concerned about the overwhelming U.S. influence over its defense policy. For the Canadian military, the problem has been obtaining adequate funding for the Allied commitments made by the government. The 1987 White Paper on defense promised sufficient resources, but recent budget cuts have cast serious doubt on Canadas future role in its alliances and on Ottawas ability to make use of its seat in Allied councils.

Dandurand Revisited: Rethinking Canada's Defence Policy in an Unstable World

The heavy sacrifices to which we agreed for the re-establishment of peace in Europe led us to reflect on what the future might hold in store. May I be permitted to add that in this association of mutual insurance against fire the risks assumed by the different states are not equal? We live in a fire-proof house, far from inflammable materials. A vast ocean separates us from Europe. Senator Raoul Dandurand

Changing Strategies, Technologies and Organization: The Continuing Debate on NORAD and the Strategic Defense Initiative

The renewal of the Canada-US North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) agreement in March 1986 will not end the debate on the relationship between NORAD and trends in American strategy, including the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). This article reviews and explains the various strains of that debate. It points out why some in Canada argue that participation in NORAD will inevitably lead to Canadian involvement in the ballistic missile defence objective of the SDI. It also notes, however, why the military and other observers are concerned that strategic and technological trends in the US may make it difficult for Canada to remain active in North American aerospace defence, and indeed, even to provide for its own air sovereignty.

Defense Policy “Walmart Style” Canadian Lessons in “not-so-grand” Grand Strategy

As the government of Canada cuts back on defense spending after years of significant increases, critics lament the supposed lack of a “grand strategy” when it comes to military expenditures. But the current reductions are actually a return to traditional Canadian grand strategy, albeit one that is not that “grand.” Put in retail shopping terms, Canada has tended to follow an economizing Walmart approach to defense spending as opposed to a more upscale Saks Fifth Avenue style. Though often criticized as nothing more than “free riding,” this approach may be more accurately described as “easy riding.” It is one that was deliberately and carefully chosen by successive Canadian policy makers, acting in accordance with “realism Canadian style.” It allowed the country to achieve security at home and to use the justifiably highly regarded Canadian Armed Forces to participate in a limited, yet effective and internationally appreciated manner in overseas military engagements as a stalwart Western ally without endangering the economy and social programs by spending more on defense than was absolutely necessary. While the Walmart approach can be taken too far, in these times of fiscal austerity when national budgets are difficult to balance without cutting defense spending and when interventionist exhaustion is afflicting many Western governments, including the United States, the lessons from the Canadian experience should resonate with policy makers and analysts well beyond Canada.

Canada and the war in Afghanistan: NATO's odd man out steps forward

At the Cold War’s close, Canada was NATO’s ‘odd man out’, contributing relatively little to western defence. Today, Canada is the third-largest contributor of combat forces to NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan. Canada got into Afghanistan partly as an alternative to getting into Iraq. But fighting the Taliban also serves the Canadian national interest in combating terrorism and has dovetailed well with recent efforts to ‘transform’ the Canadian military and use it more effectively in overseas development efforts. However, the Canadian commitment to Afghanistan beyond the current February 2009 deadline is in doubt. Public support for the combat dimension of the Afghanistan operations remains weak.

Trends in United States Strategy and the 1987 White Paper on Defence

to drop the reinforcement role in Norway and the pledges to strengthen Canadas contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (nato) in Germany and at sea, the government hopes to begin closing the gap between military commitments and capabilities which has steadily increased over the past twenty years.2 Modernization of the forces dedicated to the North American Aerospace Defence (norad) Command, begun in the early 1980s, will also help close this gap. Looking to the future, the government intends to support research in spacebased air surveillance and, most dramatically, to acquire a fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines (ssns) to fulfil a number of roles including the protection of sovereignty under the Arctic ice.

NORAD does not need saving

In the current Canadian discussion of missile defence, it is often claimed that the future of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is under threat and that it will be saved only if Canada opts in. The command does not need saving, however. Any such claim draws attention away from the real North American defence challenges that Canadians need to face in a debate about continental strategic defence: whether or not Canada needs to be protected by a missile defence system (a point that a Senate committee strongly emphasized in 2014) and what Ottawa needs to do about its own air defences that fall under NORAD.

Introduction: We Have the Watch

Over the years, there have only been a handful of books on North American continental security. In this volume U.S., Canadian, and Mexican scholars broach key issues, challenges, and uncertainties that confront the strategic defense of North America in the 21st century and weigh possible trajectories for the future in light of developments that are anticipated to shape the global security environment. The cases, contexts, and analyses in this volume jettison monolithic conceptions of ‘security’ and ‘strategic defense’ in favor of a robust and dynamic engagement with issues facing North American continental security: from defense procurement challenges and Canada’s ongoing involvement with NORAD, to the effect of the perceptions and reality of U.S. policy and international partners. The volume is split into four parts: North American strategic defense from global, U.S., and Canadian perspectives, and an assessment of the nature, structure, and future of North American strategic defense and NORAD’s role.

The Strategic Defense of North America in the 21st Century

As we approach the end of the second decade of the 21st century, the uncertainty of the threat environment highlights the continuing importance of security and sovereignty in general, and the future of North American strategic defense in particular. Advances in Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile and nuclear arms technologies by countries such as North Korea and, eventually, Iran; advances in cruise missile, submarine-launched, and hypersonic warhead delivery capabilities by Russia as well as China; and the proliferation of a wide range of non-traditional threats to democracy, social harmony, and prosperity in North America and beyond have fundamentally altered the continental security environment. Thus, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of NORAD, implications for force posture, command structures, binational defense cooperation between Canada and the U.S., and the prospect of greater security collaboration with Mexico are anything but clear, especially under volatile domestic and international political conditions.