Todd Hataley

Containing the Narrative: Strategy and Tactics in Countering the Storyline of Global Jihad

ABSTRACT It has long been recognised that telling a better story is an important part of countering the appeal of Global Jihad. The ‘War on Terror’ will be difficult to win if the ‘War on Ideas’ is lost. The mushrooming literature on terrorism notwithstanding, the counter‐narrative issue has been the subject of surprisingly scant academic attention. Part of the problem is that this is an issue with relatively little empirical work. Still, significant inferences for a counter‐narrative strategy can be drawn from existing research. Here we argue that counter‐narratives must be tailored to different audiences and must be designed to attack particular mechanisms of radicalisation. In contrast to the top‐down approach that has thus far been advocated to confront the claims of Global Jihad ‘head on’, what is actually needed is a bottom‐up approach that reaches vulnerable individuals early on by means of a nuanced approach that is sensitive to the multiple logics of radicalisation.

Tracking the War of Ideas: A Poll of Ottawa Muslims

A 2008 poll of 430 Ottawa Muslims found predominantly negative views of the U.S. war on terrorism, including the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan. This poll also assessed approval of Western powers (U.S., Canada, Israel, United Nations) and challengers of Western power (Al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hizballah, government of Iran). Surprisingly, attitudes of Ottawa Muslims toward militant Muslim groups were unrelated to their attitudes toward Western governments. Discussion suggests that this pattern, if confirmed in other Muslim polls, would mean that the war of ideas against radical Islam must address not one target but two: favorable opinions of militants and unfavorable opinions of the U.S. Muslims who come to like the West more may not like Muslim militants any less.

Determinants of Cross-Border Cooperation

The cities of Narva, Estonia and Ivangorod, Russia are separated physically by the Narva River—and by an imposing border regime. By contrast, prior to 1991 they were joined by a bridge and shared resources. Before the end of the Cold War and the independence of Estonia, Narva and Ivangorod functioned as one city, with a shared transit system, water and emergency resources. People moved freely across the border for work, family and social functions. Functionally, there was no border. Similarly, as consecutive American governments have sought to stem the tide of drugs, immigrants and terrorists, the cities of El Paso and Ciudad Juarez along the border between the United States and Mexico have been adversely affected by a border security regime that has imposed significant costs on communities that straddle the border: social, political and economic costs imposed by central governments far afield but borne by local communities. In some cases, communities have been successful at pushing back against such costs, in others less so. This is a Special Issue on the determinants of cooperation across borders. It introduces two novelties. The first is an empirical model to identify and measure determinants, their importance, role, and interaction effects. The second is to validate these variables using the level of community as a laboratory of experimentation to gauge opportunities that motivate cross-border cooperation. The articles in the Special Issue illustrate different dimensions of this model, and convey a preliminary appreciation for the ability to validate these variables in the way certain communities engage across specific borders. The ultimate objective is not just to introduce a working model, variables and method that can deployed more widely to measure determinants of cross-border cooperation, but eventually to work towards counteracting the prevailing effects of securitizing borders, and their deleterious consequences for local communities. While the securitzation of borders has received ample attention, little thought has been given to their de-securitzation. Our aim is to change that by developing a model and validating variables to identify opportunities for communities to push back through local engagement across borders. While that research goal may be some way off in the distance, this Special Issue and its articles are an initial foray into floating that research agenda, operationalizing it, and demonstrating its prospective value and payoff for communities and the study of borders alike. Over the last decade the securitization of international boundaries; the building of walls and barriers, increased surveillance and the use of technology to regulate flows across international borders has been figuring ever more prominently in scholarship on

Collective Efficacy Across Borders: The Case of Stanstead, Quebec and Derby Line, Vermont

ABSTRACT This article argues that cross-border communities can engage with one another to reduce the transaction costs associated with a securitized border. Using Collective Efficacy Theory to frame this argument, we propose that there are certain effectual variables that are important to successful cross-border community engagement. The paper concludes with some observations about the nature of borders, including the fragmented nature of international borders, and the role of competing values, norms, and discourse in defining the border as an institution.

Cross-border terror networks: a social network analysis of the Canada–US border

American rhetoric has repeatedly painted Canada as a conduit for terrorists to enter the USA. But what actually happens at Canadas borders? This article analyses open-source, cross-sectional data on Canadians convicted of terrorism offences between 1999 and 2011. It applies social network analysis (SNA) – investigating stochastic networks by means of the structure of human groups using pairwise links among their members – to (1) identify the drivers, nature and direction of Canada–US extremist cross-border traffic; (2) generate hypotheses from a limited data set that can be subjected to further empirical scrutiny with the aim of modelling cross-border extremist networks more generally; and (3) assess the risk they pose by measuring the extent to which such networks increase or reduce marginal costs. SNA of nine cases involving 14 subjects between 1997 and 2011 finds no systematic terrorist threat directed at the USA emanating from Canada. That finding is reinforced by the simple structure of cross-border networks. Terrorist traffic actually runs both ways, exploits countervailing transaction costs in the form of markets of opportunity on either side of the border, and much of the effort is in support of terrorist activity outside of North America. Most subjects crossed the Canada–US border legally at ports of entry, suggesting that enforcement resources are better spent on flows than controls at the actual border.

Vectors of extremism across the Canada-US border

The idea that Canadian-based terrorists pose a threat to the United States continues to resonate with Americans. We subject this hypothesis to empirical testing by analyzing terrorist-related activity across the Canada-US border. Drawing on 13 cases with 27 terrorist connections, the evidence substantiates the presence of cross-border interactions, but does not confirm common perceptions about Americas northern border: there is no consistent threat emanating from Canada. Rather, differentials in the availability of ideas and resources drive threat vectors across the border in both directions. The bulk of violent extremists exploiting these cross-border markets of opportunity do so to propagate terrorism beyond North America.