Christian Stecker

Multidimensional government-citizen congruence and satisfaction with democracy

In the first comparative study of multidimensional government-citizen policy congruence, this article shows that citizens are less satisfied with democracy when their views differ from that of the government on policy dimensions beyond the general left-right axis. Satisfaction is reduced by a government that deviates on European integration and redistribution and partly also on social lifestyle, immigration and environmental protection. Furthermore, this analysis identifies the level of political interest as central moderator of this relationship. Satisfaction of citizens with stronger interest in politics suffers more when there is a politically distant government. Combining data from the 2010 Chapel Hill Expert Survey and two waves of the European Social Survey, the analysis builds on information on citizen-government policy congruence of some 45,000 citizens and 31 governments in 15 Western and Central Eastern European countries. The article brings a multidimensional perspective to the study of policy congruence between citizens and governments in a time when the preference structure of parties and citizens has become increasingly complex.

How effects on party unity vary across votes

Our current knowledge of the causes of party unity rests heavily on the analysis of average unity scores of party groups from different countries. This study design invites two related problems: By aggregating unity scores we miss valuable variance at the level of disaggregated votes, and by comparing these aggregate scores across time and countries we might confound institutional effects with an unobserved case-specific selection bias of roll-call votes. In taking advantage of the laboratory-like conditions of the 16 sub-national parliaments of Germany and shifting the level of analysis to party unity in every single vote this article addresses both problems. Analysing 8607 unity scores, it is shown that the voting context is an important moderator of institutional effects on party unity. Specifically, it is shown that government status boosts party unity particularly within legislative important votes. Furthermore, the unity-boosting effect of slim majorities is only present for government parties and particularly strong when legislative consequential decisions are taken. Beyond that I also show that roll-call vote request, increasing ideological distances and norms of party loyalty increase party unity.

Causes of Roll-Call Votes Supply: Evidence from the German Länder

Roll-call votes are important tools for legislative studies. They serve as an empirical foundation for many insights about the causes of party unity and the dominant lines of political conflict. In light of their importance surprisingly little is known about the causes behind the varying frequency of recorded votes across parliaments. This article presents a comprehensive model explaining the different supply of recorded votes as a function of their saliency in the political competition between goal-seeking party groups. Drawing on an original dataset covering 109 electoral terms of all 16 sub-national parliaments in Germany (Landtage) the influence of different variables on the frequency of recorded votes is tested. The results show a significant impact of the electoral system, political polarisation, the presence of ‘outsider’ parties in the legislature, the margin of the governments majority and voting technology.

Assessing democratic representation in multi-level democracies

Abstract This article introduces the special issue ‘Assessing democratic representation in multi-level democracies’ from a conceptual perspective. It adapts Powell’s chain of responsiveness – as a model of the democratic process on the national level – to the context of multi-level systems and discusses conditions that might facilitate or hamper responsiveness in regional democracies. The theoretical reasoning identifies added complexity, multiple actors sharing the same label and cross-level interdependent decisions as the key challenges to multi-level democracy. Empirical illustrations focus on the first stage of the representation process. Here voters should form rational policy preferences and take informed voting decisions, and parties are expected to offer coherent policy platforms that are tailored to the specifics of the regional level. While the analysis of party manifesto data suggests that regional parties cover regional issues, and strategic incentives to focus on other levels appear limited, survey-based information illustrates the cognitive burden of multi-level democracy on voters. In combination with a synopsis of the other contributions assembled in this issue, the findings suggest that information, responsibility and accountability problems may be particular obstacles to responsiveness in multi-level systems.

Parties on the Chain of Federalism: Position-Taking and Multi-level Party Competition in Germany

Germany’s federalism imposes significant constraints on sub-national parties. They cannot enact their ambitious policy agenda as most legislative powers are concentrated at the federal level. This article demonstrates how sub-national parties use position-taking strategies to escape these constraints. By position-taking, parties try to induce regional voters and interest groups to judge them for what they stand for instead of blaming them for the policies they cannot deliver. This argument is illustrated empirically by analysing all 1,715 announcements of legislative initiatives in the Bundesrat in 562 electoral manifestos and coalition agreements that were published during all 92 regional elections since 1990 and all 1,619 Land bills from the period between 1972 and 2013. It is shown that regional parties and governments that are in opposition at the federal level announce and submit significantly more legislative initiatives that aim at changing federal policies.

The effects of federalism reform on the legislative process in Germany

ABSTRACT When the reform of German federalism was enacted in 2006, the right of the second chamber, Bundesrat, to veto large parts of national legislation had long been identified as a dysfunctional element of the federal system. The need to compromise with an often opposition-controlled Bundesrat was perceived as hurting democratic principles and worsening Germany’s policy performance. Hence, a variety of constitutional amendments was adopted in 2006 to curb the veto threat. This paper sketches how the expansion of the Bundesrat veto emerged and how the reform tried to reduce it. Covering all federal legislation between 1978 and 2016 this paper then analyses the actual effects of the reform. It is shown that the veto threat has been reduced by around 17% but that it remains unchanged at around 65% in the area of tax law.

Legislatures and Policy Uncertainty: Evidence from East Central Europe

Relying on social choice theory, this paper argues that uncertainty regarding future public policies is likely to be related to party institutionalization and legislative organization. The argument is evaluated using survey data from businesses in eight EU member states in East Central Europe. It finds that firms report lower concern over policy uncertainty in systems with higher party institutionalization. There is also some evidence, although less robust, that restrictive parliamentary agenda control leads to lower perceptions of policy uncertainty and this effect mediates the influence of party institutionalization. These results tend to hold if one controls for the effect of other national and firm-level factors.

Consensus by Default? Interaction of Government and Opposition parties in the committees of the German Bundestag

Consensus implies accommodating opposition. In the parliamentary process evidence on the interaction of opposition and governing parties is sketchy and theoretical approaches are manifold and ambivalent. Most prominently, there are contradicting hypotheses about the role of parliamentary committees in this interaction. While some authors consider committees as arenas for opposition influence and consensus others regard them as an apex of majoritarian dominance only. We argue that behavioural patterns in committees do not follow a static majoritarian or consensual pattern but a dynamic one which varies with context. This article elaborates this argument with regard to the committees of the German Bundestag. Based on novel data we show that different majority constellations in the Bundesrat induce different behavioural patterns in Bundestag committees. Under an opposition-controlled Bundesrat and consent bills decision-making in committees follows a more consensual approach.

Flexible und inklusive Mehrheiten? Eine Analyse der Gesetzgebung der Minderheitsregierung in NRW

Am 14 . Juli 2010 wählte der nordrhein-westfälische Landtag Hannelore Kraft zur Ministerpräsidentin einer rot-grünen Minderheitsregierung . Mit Stimmenthaltung sicherte die Linke die im zweiten Wahlgang notwendige einfache Mehrheit .1 Rot-Grün selbst fehlte im Düsseldorfer Fünf-Fraktionen-Parlament ein Mandat zur absoluten Mehrheit von 91 Sitzen . Vorangegangen waren zunächst vielseitige Sondierungen unter Führung der SPD, in denen sämtliche Optionen auf eine Mehrheitsregierung gescheitert waren .2 Während Kraft anschließend den Gang in die Opposition erwog, drängten die Grünen erfolgreich auf die Bildung einer rot-grünen Minderheitsregierung . Die Linke signalisierte ihre Bereitschaft zu einer bedingten Zusammenarbeit, und auch CDU und FPD ließen verlauten, keine Fundamentalopposition betreiben zu wollen . Am 12 . Juli 2010 stimmten SPD und Grüne auf Sonderparteitagen dem gemeinsamen Koalitionsvertrag zu . Mit der Wahl Krafts im Düsseldorfer Landtag zwei Tage später bildete sich die insgesamt achte Minderheitsregierung in einem Landtag direkt nach Wahlen .3 Weniger als zwei Jahre später endete diese außergewöhnliche Regierungskonstellation bereits, da die Opposition am 14 . März 2012 geschlossen einen Einzelplan des Haushaltsgesetzes für das Jahr 2012 ablehnte .4 In derselben Sitzung

The Land Election in Brandenburg 2009

This election report presents condensed information on the election campaign, the results and the coalition formation of the 2009 Land election in Brandenburg. The SPD with its hugely popular Prime Minister Matthias Platzeck emerged as strongest party, leaving the Left Party in second and the CDU in third place. The stark difference between the CDUs and SPDs result in the Land election and the national election that was held on the same day underlines that Brandenburg is still both a stronghold of the SPD and a wasteland for the CDU. Coalition negotiations led to a – for many surprising – end of the ten year long SPD/CDU coalition and to the formation of the first ‘red–red’ government between SPD and Left Party in Brandenburg. Accompanied by heated debates about the Left Partys past and the position of the SPD towards it, Matthias Platzeck was re-elected as Prime Minister of Brandenburg.