Christopher J. Mayer

Assessing High House Prices: Bubbles, Fundamentals, and Misperceptions

We construct measures of the annual cost of single-family housing for 46 metropolitan areas in the United States over the last 25 years and compare them with local rents and incomes as a way of judging the level of housing prices. Conventional metrics like the growth rate of house prices, the price-to-rent ratio, and the price-to-income ratio can be misleading because they fail to account both for the time series pattern of real long-term interest rates and predictable differences in the long-run growth rates of house prices across local markets. These factors are especially important in recent years because house prices are theoretically more sensitive to interest rates when rates are already low, and more sensitive still in those cities where the long-run rate of house price growth is high. During the 1980s, our measures show that houses looked most overvalued in many of the same cities that subsequently experienced the largest house price declines. We find that from the trough of 1995 to 2004, the cost of owning rose somewhat relative to the cost of renting, but not, in most cities, to levels that made houses look overvalued.

Land use regulation and new construction

Abstract This paper describes the relationship between land use regulation and residential construction. We characterize regulations as either adding explicit costs, uncertainty, or delays to the development process. The theoretical framework suggests that the effects on new construction vary by the type of regulation. Using quarterly data from a panel of 44 U.S. metropolitan areas between 1985 and 1996, we find that land use regulation lowers the level of the steady-state of new construction. Our estimates suggest that metropolitan areas with more extensive regulation can have up to 45 percent fewer starts and price elasticities that are more than 20 percent lower than those in less-regulated markets. One implication of regulations that lengthen the development process is that the short- and long-run effects of demand shocks will vary relative to conditions in markets without such delays. We find support for this observation in the data. As well, we find other differences by type of regulation: development or impact fees have relatively little impact on new construction, but regulations that lengthen the development process or otherwise constrain new development have larger and more significant effects.

Housing price dynamics within a metropolitan area

This paper analyzes the pattern of house price appreciation in the Boston area from 1982 to 1994. The empirical results are consistent with the predictions of a standard urban model in which towns have a fixed set of amenities. The evidence suggests that changes in the cross-sectional pattern of house prices are related to differences in manufacturing employment, demographics, new construction, proximity to the downtown, and to aggregate school enrollments. These findings support the view that town amenities are not easily replicated or quickly adaptable to shifts in demand, even within a metropolitan area.

Irreversible investment, real options, and competition: Evidence from real estate development

We examine the extent to which uncertainty delays investment, and the effect of competition on this relationship, using a sample of 1214 condominium developments in Vancouver, Canada built from 1979-1998. We find that increases in both idiosyncratic and systematic risk lead developers to delay new real estate investments. Empirically, a one-standard deviation increase in the return volatility reduces the probability of investment by 13 percent, equivalent to a 9 percent decline in real prices. Increases in the number of potential competitors located near a project negate the negative relationship between idiosyncratic risk and development. These results support models in which competition erodes option values and provide clear evidence for the real options framework over alternatives such as simple risk aversion.

Regulation and Capitalization of Environmental Amenities: Evidence from the Toxic Release Inventory in Massachusetts

Environmental regulation in the United States has undergone a slow evolution from command and control strategies towards market-based regulations. One such innovation is the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), a regulation that requires polluting firms to publicly disclose information about their toxic emissions. The basic tenet of this regulation is that it corrects for informational asymmetries between polluters and households, allowing communities to pressure polluters to decrease their emissions. Policy-makers have judged the TRI a tremendous success, as national releases declined by 43 between 1988 and 1999. Yet many of the fundamental problems which are known to lead to the classic failure of the Coase theorem (such as high transaction costs and difficulties in organizing) cast doubt on the effectiveness of disclosure rules, alone, to lead to an efficient outcome in the case of pollution. We use an event study methodology with high-quality data on house prices and other local attributes to assess the extent to which the public values changes in toxic releases and thus the success of TRI. Our major findings include: (1) declines in toxic releases appear unrelated to any political economy variables that might lead to public activism; (2) initial information released under TRI had no significant effect on the distribution of house prices; and (3) house prices show no significant impact of declines in reported toxic releases over time. Standard errors are small enough that we can reject the hypothesis that large declines in toxic releases lead to more than a 0.5 increase in house prices. These results also hold when we control for differences in the availability of information on TRI and the possible effect of expectations. Our findings cast doubt on the ability of the public to process complex information on hazardous emissions and support the Coase theorem in that right-to-know laws such as TRI may not be the most effective form of environmental regulation.

Property tax limits, local fiscal behavior, and property values: evidence from Massachusetts under Proposition

Abstract This paper examines the impact of a specific property tax limit, Proposition 2 1 2 in Massachusetts, on the fiscal behavior of cities and towns in Massachusetts and the capitalization of that behavior into property values. Proposition 2 1 2 places a cap on the effective property tax rate at 2.5% and limits nominal annual growth in property tax revenues to 2.5%, unless residents pass a referendum allowing a greater increase. The study analyzes the 1990–1994 period, a time when Massachusetts municipalities faced significant fiscal stress because of a 30% cut in real state aid and a demographically driven increase in school enrollments. The findings include the following: (1) Proposition 2 1 2 significantly constrained local spending in some communities, with most of its impact on school spending; (2) constrained communities realized gains in property values to the degree that they were able to increase school spending despite the limitation; and (3) changes in non-school spending had little impact on property values.

Reverse Mortgages and the Liquidity of Housing Wealth

The article is organized as follows: Section I briefly describes the features of various types of reverse mortgages offered in the private and public sectors. Section II surveys the ~elevant literature that has focused on the savings patterns of the elderly and their demand for reverse mortgage products. Section III describes the sample of the elderly drawn from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Section IV analyzes the potential demand for reverse mortgages on the basis of age, fertility history, income, housing wealth, liquid wealth, and debt. Section V discusses the difficulties in developing an established market for reverse mortgages, including legal and regulatory barriers, as well as issues of appropriate pricing and risk. Section VI concludes the paper.

Assessing the Performance of Real Estate Auctions

This paper investigates the performance of real estate auctions in selling real estate relative to the more traditional method of negotiated sale. Estimates from auctions in Los Angeles during the boom of the mid 1980s show a discount that ranges between 0 and 9 percent, while similar sales in Dallas during the real estate bust of the late 1980s obtained discounts in the 9 to 21 percent range. This evidence is censistent with a theory that predicts larger percentage discounts in down markets. Although these results differ from previous studies of U.S. auctions that find much larger discounts, a comparison of methodologies suggests that previous papers that use a hedonic equation suffer from a selection bias problem, pushing auction coefficients towards finding larger discounts. Another interesting finding is that publishing a reserve price does not affect the estimated auction prices. Finally, the study notes that scattered-site auctions sell at a larger discount than the more homogeneous sales of single-site condominiums and finds no evidence of price declines over the course of an auction. The paper concludes that despite the discounts, auctions are still a viable sales strategy, especially for large sellers that face high holding costs and long average sales times, and for developers of single-site condominium complexes.

The Mortgage Market Meltdown and House Prices

Abstract This paper argues that the U.S. mortgage debacle must be analyzed in the broader setting of global real estate markets. Recent U.S. home price growth closely tracked increases in other developed economies. The analysis distinguishes among market regions in terms of supply elasticity and localized transactions-costs. A series of user-cost models are presented which imply that interest rate fluctuations must figure prominently in any explanation of movements in price/rent ratios. National factors such as the expansion of subprime credit must also be accounted for. The paper concludes with policy prescriptions addressing rapid price declines and elevated interest-rate spreads. We argue that the federal government should play a leading role in helping to reduce interest rates on new mortgages and cushion against underwriting losses on the existing balance sheets of lenders.

Subprime Mortgage Pricing: The Impact of Race, Ethnicity, and Gender on the Cost of Borrowing

Some observers have argued that minority borrowers and neighborhoods were targeted for expensive credit in 2004-06, the peak period for subprime lending. To investigate this claim, we take advantage of a new data set that merges demographic information on subprime borrowers with information on the mortgages they took out. In a sample of more than 75,000 adjustable-rate mortgages, we find no evidence of adverse pricing by race, ethnicity, or gender in either the initial rate or the reset margin. Indeed, if any pricing differential exists, minority borrowers appear to pay slightly lower rates, as do those borrowers in Zip codes with a larger percentage of black or Hispanic residents or a higher unemployment rate. Mortgage rates are also lower in locations that previously had higher rates of house price appreciation. These results suggest some economies of scale in subprime lending. Yet there are important caveats: we are unable to measure points and fees at loan origination, and the data do not indicate whether borrowers might have qualified for less expensive conforming mortgages.