Edward R. Morrison

Bankruptcy Decision Making: An Empirical Study of Continuation Bias in Small‐Business Bankruptcies

Many small businesses attempt to reorganize under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, but most are ultimately liquidated instead. Little is known about this shutdown decision. It is widely suspected that the bankruptcy process exhibits a continuation bias, allowing failing businesses to linger under the protection of the court, which resists liquidation even when it is optimal. This paper examines the shutdown decision in a sample of Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases filed in a typical bankruptcy court over the course of a year. The presence of continuation bias is tested along several dimensions—the extent of managerial control over the bankruptcy process, the accuracy and speed with which viable and nonviable businesses are distinguished, and the characteristics of the hazard of shutdown compared with the predictions of a formal model. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the paper finds that continuation bias is either absent or empirically unimportant.

Bargaining around Bankruptcy: Small Business Workouts and State Law

Federal bankruptcy law is rarely used by distressed small businesses. For every 100 that suspend operations, at most 20 file for bankruptcy. The rest use state law procedures to liquidate or reorganize. This paper documents the importance of these procedures and the conditions under which they are chosen using firm‐level data on Chicago‐area small businesses. I show that business owners bargain with senior lenders over the resolution of financial distress. Federal bankruptcy law is invoked only when bargaining fails. This tends to occur when there is more than one senior lender or when the debtor has defaulted on senior debt (harming trust‐based relationships with lenders). These findings raise questions about the design of and need for federal bankruptcy law.

Bankruptcy's Rarity: An Essay on Small Business Bankruptcy in the United States

Most nations have enacted statutes governing business liquidation and reorganization. These statutes are the primary focus when policymakers and scholars discuss ways to improve laws governing business failure. This focus is misplaced, at least for distressed small businesses in the United States. Evidence from a major credit bureau shows that over eighty percent of these businesses liquidate or reorganize without invoking the formal Bankruptcy Code. The businesses instead invoke procedures derived from the laws of contracts, secured lending, and trusts. These procedures can be cheaper and speedier than a formal bankruptcy filing, but they typically require unanimous consent of senior, secured lenders. This essay identifies the conditions under which a business owner is able to obtain lender consent. The empirical findings point to an important balance between a nations formal insolvency statutes and alternative modes of liquidation and reorganization. This balance, the essay argues, should play a central role in any discussion of insolvency-law reform.

Cancer Diagnoses and Household Debt Overhang

This paper explores the role of capital structure in determining how households respond to unanticipated shocks. We draw on a novel dataset linking individual cancer records to high-quality administrative data on personal mortgages, bankruptcies, foreclosures, and credit reports. We find that cancer diagnoses induce a substantial increase in various measures of financial stress regardless of whether the patient carries health insurance. Foreclosure rates, for example, increase 65 percent during the five years following diagnosis. The effect, however, is concentrated among patients with low levels of housing equity. Highly leveraged households default, undergo foreclosure, or file for bankruptcy; less-levered households cope with health shocks by drawing on home equity and other sources of liquidity. These results point to the critical role of capital structure in determining how households respond to severe shocks. They also suggest that household leverage may merit as much policy attention as health insurance.

Race and Bankruptcy

AbstractAfrican American bankruptcy filers select Chapter 13 far more often than other debtors, who opt instead for Chapter 7, which has higher success rates and lower attorneys’ fees. Prior schola...

Consumer Bankruptcy Pathologies

This paper questions several long-standing descriptions of consumer bankruptcy in the United States. We focus on Chapter 13, which discharges debts after consumers pay disposable income to creditors for up to five years. Many studies document pathologies, including high failure rates, racial disparities, low creditor recoveries, and attorney biases. We observe the same patterns in new data drawn from Cook County, Illinois, but show that these pathologies are central tendencies that ignore substantial heterogeneity across consumers. Several pathologies are driven by subsets of consumers; some disappear once we take account of consumer heterogeneity. We present new evidence that some pathologies reflect biases in nonbankruptcy law, not in the bankruptcy process itself.

Economics of Bankruptcy

This timely book surveys seminal contributions to the economics of bankruptcy. It offers a comprehensive compilation of work by both legal scholars and economists working in the fields of corporate and consumer finance. An original introduction, written by the editor, provides a commentary on the featured papers and also points to questions that merit further study. This collection is an indispensable source of reference for anyone interested in the economics of bankruptcy.