Christopher Paul

The Russian "Firehose of Falsehood" Propaganda Model: Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It

S ince its 2008 incursion into Georgia (if not before), there has been a remarkable evolution in Russia’s approach to propaganda. This new approach was on full display during the country’s 2014 annexation of the Crimean peninsula. It continues to be demonstrated in support of ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Syria and in pursuit of nefarious and long-term goals in Russia’s “near abroad” and against NATO allies. In some ways, the current Russian approach to propaganda builds on Soviet Cold War–era techniques, with an emphasis on obfuscation and on getting targets to act in the interests of the propagandist without realizing that they have done so.1 In other ways, it is completely new and driven by the characteristics of the contemporary information environment. Russia has taken advantage of technology and available media in ways that would have been inconceivable during the Cold War. Its tools and channels now include the Internet, social media, and the evolving landscape of professional and amateur journalism and media outlets. We characterize the contemporary Russian model for propaganda as “the firehose of falsehood” because of two of its distinctive features: high numbers of channels and messages and a shameless willingness to disseminate partial truths or outright fictions. In the words of one observer, “[N]ew Russian propaganda entertains, confuses and overwhelms the audience.”2 Contemporary Russian propaganda has at least two other distinctive features. It is also rapid, continuous, and repetitive, and it lacks commitment to consistency. Interestingly, several of these features run directly counter to the conventional wisdom on effective influence and communication from government or defense sources, which traditionally emphasize the importance of truth, credibility, and the avoidance of contradiction.3 Despite ignoring these traditional principles, Russia seems to have enjoyed some success under its contemporary propaganda model, either through more direct persuasion and The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model

Lessons from Others for Future U.S. Army Operations in and Through the Information Environment

• What information-related practices or capabilities have U.S. allies employed effectively, and which could the U.S. Army adopt? • What information-related practices or capabilities have adversaries or potential adversaries used effectively, and which of these could the Army adopt? • What are adversaries or potential adversaries doing in the information environment that the Army cannot consider doing because of ethical or legal constraints, and which of these should it be most prepared to counter?

The Language of Inform, Influence, and Persuade: Assessment Lexicon and Usage Guide for U.S. European Command Efforts

W ords matter. Many of the terms used to discuss assessment in the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) mean different things to different staff sections, offices, organizations, and individuals. Sometimes, the same office or individual uses the same term to denote multiple dissimilar things. This leads to confusion, miscommunication, and, occasionally, the appearance of agreement or disagreement when the opposite is true. The objective of this lexicon and usage guide is to promote common understanding and reliable shared usage of terms and concepts related to assessment across intraand interorganizational stakeholders and to ensure that discourse related to assessment is unambiguous, clear, consistent, grounded in doctrine, and shareable. The main term in this lexicon is assessment, but it also covers terms and concepts related to assessment, confused with assessment, or used in discussions of assessment, including estimate, evaluation, measures, indicators, objective, target, and theory of change. This lexicon was developed in consultation with personnel involved in conducting and presenting assessments, as well as those who are responsible for making decisions GUIDING PRINCIPLES Report