Claude Crampes
University of Toulouse
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Publication
Featured researches published by Claude Crampes.
The RAND Journal of Economics | 2002
Claude Crampes; Corinne Langinier
A patent grants its owner the right to sue intruders that have been identified. The patentholder must then supervise the market and react in case of infringement. His reaction may be to go to court, to settle, or to accept entry. We investigate how intensive the monitoring effort should be and how it will influence the entry decision. In a simultaneous game, even if the penalty paid by the infringer in case of a finding of liability is high, the patentholder may prefer a settlement to a trial. The likelihood of entry may increase with the penalty. In sequential games, regardless who plays first, entry occurs comparatively less often than in the simultaneous game.
International Journal of Industrial Organization | 2001
Claude Crampes; Michel Moreaux
Abstract We propose a simple model of competition between a thermal station and a hydrostation for the production of energy. We show that, despite the static characteristics of the thermal cost function, the thermal output is determined by intertemporal considerations. This results from the scarcity of the water resource which is storable at zero operating cost. We analyze the combination of these technologies in the case of a social planner who maximizes the net total utility from electricity, in the case of private monopoly either regulated or not and, finally, in the case of duopolistic competition in quantities where each private firm operates either a hydraulic power station, or a thermal power station.
Utilities Policy | 1998
Claude Crampes; Antonio Estache
The paper discusses how conflicts between the multiple objectives of policymakers (efficiency, equity, fiscal, speed of reform, signaling...) can influence the optimal design of concessions contracts for network services in infrastructure. The discussion covers the relevance of information asymmetries of the optimal regulatory regime and processes, for the optimal design of awarding processes and for the optimal duration of the contracts. It also adresses the de sign of pricing in relation withthe universal service obligation. It concludes with an illustration of the preceding economic principles with some stylized facts from the liberalization experiment in Argentina.
Information Economics and Policy | 2005
Claude Crampes; Abraham Hollander
Abstract The paper uses a multi-product screening model to explore how pay-TV distributors allocate channel capacity to different program types and how they construct the bundles of channels that subscribers chose from. In contrast to the standard finding on second-degree discrimination, it shows that the optimal bundle composition and prices remove all consumer surplus. It also shows that the specification of the bundle targeted at the subscribers with the highest willingness to pay does not maximize their utility. Finally, it determines that a profit-maximizing firm allocates fewer channels than is optimal to a type of content preferred by the average viewer. In this regard the paper challenges the often repeated claim that for-profit television provides too little programming targeted at minority tastes.
Journal of Regulatory Economics | 1995
Claude Crampes; Abraham Hollander
Most consumers benefit from a lowering of the required amount of aurous metal which jewellers must include in products sold as “gold.” However, profits of producers of gold-plated adornments fall. The net welfare effect depends on whether the principal difference between consumers is their appreciation of the gold content, or their valuation of designation gold or gold-plate.
Economica | 1993
Claude Crampes; Abraham Hollander
An incumbent firm engages in a strategy of umbrella pricing to ward off the development of an advanced technology by a prospective entrant. As a result, the competitor enters the market with an old technology less harmful to the established firm. Both firms benefit from umbrella pricing but static as well as dynamic welfare is reduced. Copyright 1993 by The London School of Economics and Political Science. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was bo (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Archive | 2003
Claude Crampes
When designing a tariff for the transport of electricity, the main difficulty is that the transport industry apparently incurs high fixed costs and no real variable cost. In effect, when the infrastructure is installed and when the operators are at their workplace, the only input which is necessary to deliver electricity at a given withdrawal node is electricity at some injection node since electricity is flowing by itself. Consequently, at first sight the problem is just to allocate fixed costs, mainly infrastructure maintenance costs, wages and financial charges, among the different types of users of the grid.
Archive | 1998
Claude Crampes; Abraham Hollander
The first part of the paper gives an overview of the industrial structure of the biotechnology sector. It highlights the importance of partnership agreements between industrial firms and universities and examines issues of financing. The second part examines the impact of biotechnology on the two main user industries: agri-food and health. The final part investigates economic regulation, especially in the area of intellectual property protection.
European Economic Review | 1995
Claude Crampes; Abraham Hollander
Journal of Industrial Economics | 2009
Claude Crampes; Bruno Jullien