Cristian Saborido

An organizational account of biological functions

In this paper, we develop an organizational account that defines biological functions as causal relations subject to closure in living systems, interpreted as the most typical example of organizationally closed and differentiated self-maintaining systems. We argue that this account adequately grounds the teleological and normative dimensions of functions in the current organization of a system, insofar as it provides an explanation for the existence of the function bearer and, at the same time, identifies in a non-arbitrary way the norms that functions are supposed to obey. Accordingly, we suggest that the organizational account combines the etiological and dispositional perspectives in an integrated theoretical framework. 1. Introduction2. Dispositional Approaches3. Etiological Theories4. Biological Self-maintenance 4.1. Closure, teleology, and normativity4.2. Organizational differentiation5. Functions 5.1. C1: Contributing to the maintenance of the organization5.2. C2: Producing the functional trait6. Implications and Objections 6.1. Functional versus useful6.2. Dysfunctions, side effects, and accidental contributions6.3. Proper functions and selected effects6.4. Reproduction6.5. Relation with other ‘unitarian’ approaches7. Conclusions Introduction Dispositional Approaches Etiological Theories Biological Self-maintenance 4.1. Closure, teleology, and normativity4.2. Organizational differentiation Closure, teleology, and normativity Organizational differentiation Functions 5.1. C1: Contributing to the maintenance of the organization5.2. C2: Producing the functional trait C1: Contributing to the maintenance of the organization C2: Producing the functional trait Implications and Objections 6.1. Functional versus useful6.2. Dysfunctions, side effects, and accidental contributions6.3. Proper functions and selected effects6.4. Reproduction6.5. Relation with other ‘unitarian’ approaches Functional versus useful Dysfunctions, side effects, and accidental contributions Proper functions and selected effects Reproduction Relation with other ‘unitarian’ approaches Conclusions

Biological organization and cross-generation functions

The organizational account of biological functions interprets functions as contributions of a trait to the maintenance of the organization that, in turn, maintains the trait. As has been recently argued, however, the account seems unable to provide a unified grounding for both intra- and cross-generation functions, since the latter do not contribute to the maintenance of the same organization which produces them. To face this ‘ontological problem’, a splitting account has been proposed, according to which the two kinds of functions require distinct organizational definitions. In this article, we propose a solution for the ontological problem, by arguing that intra- and cross-generation functions can be said to contribute in the same way to the maintenance of the biological organization, characterized in terms of organizational self-maintenance. As a consequence, we suggest maintaining a unified organizational account of biological functions. 1 Introduction 2 Self-reproduction of Traits: Proposals and Criticism   2.1 Schlosser’s and McLaughlin’s accounts   2.2 Delancey’s ‘splitting account’ 3 Self-maintenance of Systems   3.1 Functions and organizational closure   3.2 Second order self-maintaining systems?   3.3 A solution to the ontological problem 4 Conclusions 1 Introduction 2 Self-reproduction of Traits: Proposals and Criticism   2.1 Schlosser’s and McLaughlin’s accounts   2.2 Delancey’s ‘splitting account’   2.1 Schlosser’s and McLaughlin’s accounts   2.2 Delancey’s ‘splitting account’ 3 Self-maintenance of Systems   3.1 Functions and organizational closure   3.2 Second order self-maintaining systems?   3.3 A solution to the ontological problem   3.1 Functions and organizational closure   3.2 Second order self-maintaining systems?   3.3 A solution to the ontological problem 4 Conclusions