Daniel Marston

The Indian Army and the end of the Raj

Introduction 1. The bedrock of the Raj: the Indian Army before 1939 2. The performance of the Indian army in the Second World War 3. Question of loyalty? The Indian National Army and the Royal Indian Navy mutiny 4. The Indian Army in French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies 1945-6 5. 1946, the year of difficulty: internal security and the rise of communal violence 6. Demobilisation, nationalisation and division of the army in the midst of chaos 7. 1947: the year of reckoning and the end of the Raj Conclusion: the end of the British Indian Army Bibliography Index.

The Indian Army, Partition, and the Punjab Boundary Force, 1945—1947

How effective was the Indian Army in serving as aid to the civil power in the chaotic period leading up to the independence and partition of India in 1947? This article attempts to shed fresh light, by examining recent scholarship and newly available archival materials, on the performance of the Indian Army, as embodied in the Punjab Boundary Force, in countering and containing the communal violence that rocked India during the momentous events of 1947. The Indian Army’s challenges and achievements during this testing period provide valuable lessons for every army faced with political upheaval and communal violence.

Lessons for Iraq and Afghanistan

Robert O’Neill did not take part in the Iraq or Afghan wars. Yet he has had an abiding influence over how the United States and the West have approached the past 15 years of war. His experiences, books (Vietnam Task and General Giap), and most importantly, his teaching guided a cadre of scholar-practitioners involved in the Iraq and Afghan wars. His teachings lay at the root of many of the reforms that took place. Without him, the United States and the West would have been far less able to meet the challenges of the recent wars. Through six decades, O’Neill has been a father of strategic thinking on insurgency, carefully teaching and guiding from behind.

War, Strategy and History: Essays in Honour of Professor Robert O’Neill

Like the citizens of many nations around the world, Australians are marking the centenary of the Great War of 1914–1918. With rather less fanfare, Australians are also marking the centenary of the start of a tradition of official war histories, which have had a fundamental role in shaping the way that Australians have thought about the nation’s involvement in war since 1914. Robert O’Neill’s contribution to that tradition was a major turning point in the development of that tradition, in at least two important respects.

Book Review: Steven Wilkinson, Army and Nation

Steven Wilkinson, Army and Nation, Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2014, p. 295.

The War in Burma, 1942-1945: The 7/10th Baluch Experience

This chapter considers the reform of the larger army through the experiences of one battalion - the 7/10th Baluch Regiment of the 17th Indian Division - during the Burma Campaign and its efforts at reform throughout the war. The 7/10th Baluchs experience in the Second World War was representative of that of the larger Indian Army. The Indian and British units that arrived along the Arakan and Assam fronts in late 1943 and early 1944 were a different force to that which the Japanese had encountered previously. The 7/10th Baluch began the retraining process in earnest in mid-July 1944, when it was put into reserve and ordered to Imphal. In mid-December 1944, the 17th Indian Division received orders to proceed to Imphal. The 7/10th Baluch was part of the 63rd Indian Brigade. The battalion had been successful in deploying ambush parties ahead of the main advance towards Meiktila during late February. Keywords:7/10th Baluch experience; battalion; Burma; Indian Army; Meiktila; Second World War