Michael Wesley

It's time to scrap the NPT

Abstract Due to persisting demand-side factors and crumbling supply-side controls, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will probably be unable to prevent a likely proliferation rate of one or two additional nuclear weapons states per decade into the foreseeable future. Beyond being ineffective, I argue that the NPT will make this proliferation much more dangerous. The NPT is a major cause of opaque proliferation, which is both highly destabilising and makes use of transnational smuggling networks which are much more likely than states to pass nuclear components to terrorists. However, abandoning the NPT in favour of a more realistic regime governing the possession of nuclear weapons would help put transnational nuclear smuggling networks out of business and stabilise the inevitable spread of nuclear weapons.

The politics of exclusion: Australia, Turkey and definitions of regionalism

Abstract The regions of the world that coalesce into blocs are rarely self‐defining or obvious. This article argues that the definitions of regional bloc membership ‐ be they economic interdependence, geographic contiguity or cultural affinity ‐ are used by their advocates to advance definite agendas of national and regional activism, and that the criteria of membership or exclusion are determined by competing political visions for the region. To demonstrate this, the present relationship of exclusion between Turkey and the EU is compared with the possibility of a similar relationship emerging between Australia and an emerging East Asian bloc. The article concludes by suggesting that a new development may be emerging alongside exclusive regional blocs ‐ tiered regionalism ‐ which creates associations with aspirant states without giving them access to the core bloc decision‐making procedures.

The strategic effects of preferential trade agreements

Most analysts agree that the recent proliferation of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) is largely the result of exasperation with multilateral trade liberalisation through the World Trade Organisation and a defensive response to the large-scale adoption of PTAs by major economies. The spread of PTAs, however, suggests that there are motivations other than economic that are inspiring these trade deals. It is becoming increasingly obvious that the use of PTAs to gain or reinforce strategic benefits, or to forestall strategic disadvantage, has been a major but largely unacknowledged driver of the recent trend towards PTAs. Three profound shifts in the international system over the past 15 years have led to the declining utility of traditional security institutions and thus the search for new forms of strategic deal-making: an enduring crisis of security institutions; the rise of new great powers; and the arrival of non-state security threats. In response, both large and small powers have resorted to a range of instruments, including strategically-driven PTAs.

Trade agreements and strategic rivalry in Asia

The Asia Pacific is currently beset by two contradictory trends: growing economic interdependence and deepening strategic rivalry. Amidst these trends, new sets of regional trade agreements are being negotiated, primarily the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). This article argues that these proposals represent a third phase of competitive regionalism in the Asia Pacific, which will be more complex than the previous two rounds. This complexity is driven by two factors: this time, rivalry is not over scope or leadership but regional order; and this time there is a greater number of leading players in the rivalry.

Asia-Pacific institutions

As Asias great powers – China, India, Japan, Russia and perhaps Iran – assert their prerogatives over the next decades, they will reshape the global order in their interactions with each other and with the United States. Whether this next evolution in the polarity of the international system can be mediated within existing institutions is a key question. Global institutions such as the United Nations (UN) helped to mediate transitions from wartime multipolarity to Cold War bipolarity and then to post-Cold War unipolarity, but at a cost of declining relevance as councils in which the great powers resolved their conflicts or found common ground on the compelling issues of the day. The multilateral era, dating from the end of the Second World War, holds two key and countervailing lessons for thinking about the polarity mediation capacities of international institutions. Over the course of half a century of polarity transitions, it has proved extraordinarily difficult to reform the decision-making systems of major institutions to reflect power shifts. But this has not affected the endurance of these institutions, which by and large have persisted despite the declining relevance of their representational structures. The continued construction of multilateral fora, both regional and global, partly reflects calculations that it is easier to set up new bodies than to reform or scrap existing ones. But this is not a perennial solution, because as the international stage becomes increasingly cluttered with institutions, there is less and less room for new inventions.

Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the challenges of globalisation

This article critically examines the argument that the forces of globalisation will see the end of the foreign ministry in the context of Australias Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). It suggests that globalisation is affecting the subject matter of foreign policy-making through four processes: diffusion, enmeshment, contradiction, and transformation. It then looks at three prominent challenges these processes have made to the work of DFAT: politicisation; the volume and contestation of information; and resource-cutting. It concludes that rather than being eroded by globalisation, DFAT has been forced to play a more assertive and diversified role, and that it has responded to these challenges in a highly creative way.

Human Security in the Western Pacific: The Asian Economic Crisis and Beyond 1

This paper examines the human security implications of the Asian economic crisis for the Western Pacific. It will be shown that the regional insecurity was not caused by great power military intervention or by the escalation of territorial disputes, or subversion from revolutionary ideologies. Rather the insecurity was transmitted through the unregulated operation of the global market, on which the countries of East Asia had based their national and regional development strategies. It is likely that the regional approach to security will change forever after 1998. It is argued that if the countries of the Western Pacific are to successfully ameliorate the effects of the Asian economic crisis as well as optimally position themselves to resolve future challenges then a regional security regime that revolves around humanitarian concerns must be developed.

The Cambodian Waltz: The Khmer Rouge and United Nations intervention

Approaching the 1989–93 Cambodian peace process from the Khmer Rouge point of view, this article explores how the groups nature, history and ideology conditioned its unco‐operative response and tactics towards United Nations intervention. It observes that the Khmer Rouge, once it realized it could not manipulate the structures of the peace process to the benefit of its own aspirations, adopted a two‐track policy. It remained outside the peace process, awaiting the withdrawal of the UN, preserving its military potential to take power afterwards. At the same time, it attempted to retain its international and domestic support despite its non‐co‐operation, by accusing UNTAC of subverting the Peace Agreements. Finally, the article explores how UNTAC was able to salvage the peace process despite the best efforts of the Khmer Rouge.

Asian States in Crisis

Abstract Problems common to many Asian states suggest a pattern of crisis in Asia. The evidence suggests that the root cause is the similarity in the patterns of political development of postcolonial states. In Asia such states have attempted to reconcile state strength and internal diversity by constructing a triangular balance between identity construction, hegemonic governance and economic development. Unfortunately, this fragile balance eroded as state structures matured and economies grew, which increasingly exposed countries to escalating crises of legitimacy and instability. By highlighting changes in the postcolonial state compact within the region, this article seeks to advance both the understanding among theorists of political developments in the region and the understanding among those who govern of the roots of the current crisis.

Between Virtue and Power: The Persistent Moral Dilemma of US Foreign Policy (Book review)

President-elect Obama’s Chief of Staff to-be, Rahm Emmanuel, unkindly described the contemporary crop of American international relations scholars as ‘hacks and wonks’. By implication he believes they lack the magisterial, and, for policy makers, were useful for debating purposes only. After a political career that involved heavy engagement in the Australian national security debate, I can attest that I found the Australian academic community more useful. In particular, our academics have been influential in sharpening and deepening the debate on the modalities of Australian global and regional engagement and in comprehending our national security task and the impact of our alliance responsibilities. Gyngell and Wesley in the first edition of Making Australian Foreign Policy, published in 2003, produced an excellent compendium on these processes for university teachers and foreign policy practitioners alike. It became an important text in most relevant courses in most universities, my own included. This was in part because of the authors’ efforts to bridge the divide between the practical, outcome-driven, time-pressured and chaotic world of the foreign policy practitioner and the theoretical and sometimes inward-looking world of international relations scholars. Gyngell and Wesley’s attempts to marry theoretical understanding of foreign policy concepts and preoccupations with the practical realities of the Australian institutions produced an excellent study that has helped to demystify the opaque and complex foreign policy process. Gyngell and Wesley did a good job then and, thankfully for me, who now must deliver the occasional academic lecture, they have done a better job with the second edition. Critiquing themselves, they say the earlier book was long on the process and short on the substance of Australian foreign policy. This second edition therefore includes four new chapters that rectify the situation. The new chapter 10 addresses Australia’s place in the world, while chapters 11 13 cover the issues of security, prosperity and values in Australian foreign policy. Chapter 10 deals with the ongoing debate about Australia’s place in the world, defined by geography and history as a western country, enmeshed by alliances with the United States and the United Kingdom, yet involved with the Asia Pacific region. The chapter touches on the idea of ‘middle-power’ status and role, before concluding with an examination of Australia as a regional actor and the existence of a sense of Australia being a ‘country apart’. This edition was published as the Rudd government ascended */ a government much more