Danielle E. Warren

The Meaning and Meaningfulness of Corporate Social Initiatives

In response to pressures to be more socially responsible, corporations are becoming more active in global communities through direct involvement in social initiatives. Critics, however, question the sincerity of these activities and argue that firms are simply attempting to stave off stakeholder pressures without providing a corresponding benefit to society. By drawing on institutional theory and resource dependence theory, we consider what factors influence the adoption of a meaningful social initiative - an initiative that is sustainable and has the potential for a significant positive impact on society - as opposed to a symbolic initiative. In addition, we raise the question of how social initiatives - both meaningful and symbolic - participate in the institutional war over the meaning of corporate social responsibility.

The Emotion-Evoked Collective Corruption Model: The Role of Emotion in the Spread of Corruption Within Organizations

We draw from research on emotions and moral reasoning to develop a process model of collective corruption that centers on the role of moral emotions in the spread of corruption within organizations. Our focus on a well-intentioned and deliberative path to corruption is a departure from previous theory, which has focused on mindless and ill-intentioned paths. In our model, moral emotions play a critical role in both the initial recruitment of a target individual (the direct process), as well as the spread of corruption to a broader group of nontargeted individuals through emotional contagion (the vicarious process). For both processes we explain how self-directed moral emotions (guilt, shame, embarrassment, and pride) facilitate the spread of corruption and how other-directed moral emotions (anger and contempt) do not. We conclude by discussing the implications of our theory and directions for future research.

Conflict in Roles Lying to the In-Group Versus the Out-Group in Negotiations

This empirical study examines how group membership affects the likelihood of lies occurring in a two-person negotiation setting involving an experimental design with a repeated ultimatum bargaining. To better understand the reasoning of the negotiator in in-group and out-group bargaining exercises, the authors also examined perceptions of fairness in relation to offers for the in-group and out-group. The authors find that when negotiating, individuals tell lies of greater magnitude to out-group members than to in-group members. In both situations, the magnitude of the initial lie predicts the likelihood that a concealment lie (i.e., another lie to conceal the initial lie) will be told. The study also finds that in negotiations with in-group members, the relationship between the initial lie and the concealment lie is moderated by the negotiator’s perceptions of unfair treatment toward the in-group bargaining partner. The authors assert that concealment lies with in-group members allow the individual to appear to maintain both the roles of a self-interested negotiator and a fair group member. The authors tested three hypotheses using a natural group of 42 undergraduate students who belonged to a sports team at a large Northeastern university. Implications for stakeholder research are addressed.

Deception in Negotiations, Organizations, and Markets: Theoretical and Empirical Insights

Deception pervades interpersonal and organizational life. In this symposium, we discuss our state-of-the-science theoretical and empirical research on the characteristics, antecedents, and conseque...