Daryl G. Press

The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy

For nearly half a century, the worlds most powerful nuclear-armed states have been locked in a condition of mutual assured destruction. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the nuclear balance has shifted dramatically. The U.S. nuclear arsenal has steadily improved; the Russian force has sharply eroded; and Chinese nuclear modernization has progressed at a glacial pace. As a result, the United States now stands on the verge of attaining nuclear primacy, meaning that it could conceivably disarm the long-range nuclear arsenals of Russia and China with a nuclear first strike. A simple nuclear exchange model demonstrates that the United States has a potent first-strike capability. The trajectory of nuclear developments suggests that the nuclear balance will continue to shift in favor of the United States in coming years. The rise of U.S. nuclear primacy has significant implications for relations among the worlds great powers, for U.S. foreign policy, and for international relations scholarship.

The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy

FOR ALMOST half a century, the worlds most powerful nuclear states have been locked in a military stalemate known as mutual assured destruction (MAD). By the early 196os, the nuclear arsenals ofthe United States and the Soviet Union had grown so large and sophisticated that neither country could entirely destroy the others retaliatory force by launching first, even with a surprise attack. Starting a nuclear war was therefore tantamount to committing suicide. During the Cold War, many scholars and policy analysts believed that MAD made the world relatively stable and peaceful because it induced great caution in international politics, discouraged the use of nuclear threats to resolve disputes, and generally restrained the superpowers behavior. (Revealingly, the last intense nuclear standoff, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, occurred at the dawn of the era of MAD.) Because of the nuclear stalemate, the optimists argued, the era of intentional great-power wars had ended. Critics of MAD, however, argued that it prevented not great-power war but the rolling back of the power and influence of a dangerously expansionist and totalitarian Soviet Union. From that perspective, MAD prolonged the life of an evil empire.

Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons

How strong are normative prohibitions on state behavior? We examine this question by analyzing anti-nuclear norms, sometimes called the “nuclear taboo,” using an original survey experiment to evaluate American attitudes regarding nuclear use. We find that the public has only a weak aversion to using nuclear weapons and that this aversion has few characteristics of an “unthinkable” behavior or taboo. Instead, public attitudes about whether to use nuclear weapons are driven largely by consequentialist considerations of military utility. Americans’ willingness to use nuclear weapons increases dramatically when nuclear weapons provide advantages over conventional weapons in destroying critical targets. Americans who oppose the use of nuclear weapons seem to do so primarily for fear of setting a negative precedent that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons by other states against the United States or its allies in the future.

The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare

On February 24, 1991, U.S. ground troops, supported by British, French, and Arab forces, moved north from Saudi Arabia to liberate Kuwait and destroy the Iraqi military. Four days later the job was apparently done: The Kuwaiti oag once again oew over Kuwait City, and what remained of the Iraqi military was in full retreat. Astonishingly, only sixty-three Americans were killed in a ground operation that most analysts expected would cause thousands of U.S. casualties. How did the coalition’s ground forces destroy the Iraqi army so quickly and with so few coalition casualties? Does the Persian Gulf War herald a future of U.S. military dominance and low-cost U.S. military operations? What are the lessons from the aghting for U.S. foreign policy? The conventional wisdom among historians, military analysts, and foreign policy decisionmakers is that air power neutralized the Iraqi military before the ground war began. This interpretation of the Gulf War has important imTheMyth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future ofWarfare Daryl G. Press

Protecting “The Prize”: Oil and the U.S. National Interest

American national security policy is based on a misunderstanding about U.S. oil interests. Although oil is a vital commodity, potential supply disruptions are less worrisome than scholars, politicians, and pundits presume. This article identifies four adaptive mechanisms that together can compensate for almost all oil shocks, meaning that continuous supply to consumers will limit scarcity-induced price increases. The adaptive mechanisms are not particularly fragile and do not require tremendous foresight by either governments or economic actors. We illustrate these mechanisms at work using evidence from every major oil disruption since 1973. We then identify the small subset of disruptive events that would overwhelm these adaptive mechanisms and therefore seriously harm the United States. Finally, we analyze the utility of U.S. foreign military policy tools in addressing these threats. Our findings suggest that the United States can defend its key interests in the Persian Gulf—the worlds most important oil-producing region—with a less-intrusive, “over the horizon” posture.

The effects of wars on neutral countries: Why it doesn't pay to preserve the peace

SINCE THE END of the cold war, Americans have struggled to understand the new threats and opportunities created by the changed international environment. The threat that captivated the United States for half a century—that a hostile great power would conquer most of die industrialized world—is now gone. Not only has the Soviet Union disappeared, but no new peer competitor is on the horizon. Furthermore, while the nuclear revolution does not guarantee peace, it does guarantee that great powers can no longer be conquered. What are the remaining international threats to the United States? If they are small, can the United States reduce its overseas commitments, cut its defense budget dramatically, and enjoy its enormous security and prosperity?

The Credibility of Power: Assessing Threats during the “Appeasement” Crises of the 1930s

became chancellor of Germany and immediately began breaking his country’s international agreements. From 1933 to 1938 Germany violated its treaty commitments by rearming, remilitarizing the Rhineland, and seizing Austria.1 Although Britain and France complained after each German violation, they refused to respond with force. In September 1938 Hitler threatened to invade Czechoslovakia unless Germany was given a piece of Czech territory called the Sudetenland. Once again, the British and French acquiesced to German demands; at the infamous Munich conference, they agreed to pressure Czechoslovakia into surrendering the Sudetenland to Germany. Finally, in 1939, as Germany was preparing to invade Poland, Britain and France took a arm stand. They warned Hitler that if he attacked Poland, they would declare war on Germany. By this time, however, Hitler no longer believed their threats. As the German leader told a group of assembled generals, “Our enemies are worms. I saw them in Munich.”2 The lessons of Munich have been enshrined in international relations theory and in U.S. foreign policy. For deterrence theorists, the history of the 1930s shows that countries must keep their commitments or they will lose credibility.3 U.S. leaders have internalized this lesson; the most costly and dangerous moves undertaken by the United States during the Cold War were motivated by a desire to preserve credibility. Concerns about credibility led the United

Lessons from Ground Combat in the Gulf: The Impact of Training and Technology

Many of the ideas in this article were developed through conversations with Eugene Gholz, Colonel Michael Kephart (U.S. Marine Corps), Ken Pollack, Barry Posen, Jeremy Shapiro, Lieutenant Colonel Mike Trahan (US. Army), and Lieutenant Colonel John Turner (US. Marine Corps). Stephen Biddle commented on an earlier draft. Although he and I still disagree, his detailed comments refined my understanding of his argument and helped me sharpen my own

Why States Won't Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists

Many experts consider nuclear terrorism the single greatest threat to U.S. security. The fear that a state might transfer nuclear materials to terrorists was a core justification for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and, more recently, for a strike against Irans nuclear program. The logical basis for this concern is sound: if a state could orchestrate an anonymous nuclear terror attack, it could destroy an enemy yet avoid retaliation. But how likely is it that the perpetrators of nuclear terrorism could remain anonymous? Data culled from a decade of terrorist incidents reveal that attribution is very likely after high-casualty terror attacks. Attribution rates are even higher for attacks on the U.S. homeland or the territory of a major U.S. ally—97 percent for incidents in which ten or more people were killed. Moreover, tracing a terrorist group that used a nuclear weapon to its state sponsor would not be difficult, because few countries sponsor terror; few terror groups have multiple sponsors; and only one country that sponsors terrorism, Pakistan, has nuclear weapons or enough material to manufacture them. If leaders understand these facts, they will be as reluctant to give weapons to terrorists as they are to use them directly; both actions would invite devastating retaliation.

The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence

Nuclear deterrence rests on the survivability of nuclear arsenals. For much of the nuclear age, “counterforce” disarming attacks—those aimed at eliminating an opponents nuclear forces—were nearly impossible because of the ability of potential victims to hide and protect their weapons. Technological developments, however, are eroding this foundation of nuclear deterrence. Advances rooted in the computer revolution have made nuclear forces around the world considerably more vulnerable. Specifically, two key approaches that countries have relied on to ensure arsenal survivability since the dawn of the nuclear age—hardening and concealment—have been undercut by leaps in weapons accuracy and a revolution in remote sensing. Various methods, evidence, and models demonstrate the emergence of new possibilities for counterforce disarming strikes. In short, the task of securing nuclear arsenals against attack is far more difficult than it was in the past. The new era of counterforce challenges the basis for confidence in contemporary deterrence stability, raises critical issues for national and international security policy, and sheds light on one of the enduring theoretical puzzles of the nuclear era: why international security competition has endured in the shadow of the nuclear revolution.