Jennifer Lind

Pacifism or Passing the Buck?: Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy

have pointed to Japan as proof that countries can opt out of the violent world of realpolitik. Constructivist scholars in particular argue that the “culture of antimilitarism” that developed in Japan after its surrender in World War II led it to adopt a highly restrained foreign policy and to forswear the development of offensive military forces. Japan’s postwar behavior, these scholars argue, demonstrates the potential for domestic politics and norms to determine a state’s security policy; it also underscores the salience of constructivist theory in international politics.1 On the surface these claims appear strong. Japanese society is imbued with paciast norms. Despite the predictions of realist scholars that Japan will eventually behave as a “normal” great power, Tokyo has continued to show great restraint.2 But is there evidence that Japan’s antimilitarist norms actually con-

The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements

In North Korea, the upcoming leadership transition in the Kim Jong-il regime will be a precarious time for the Kim familys hold on power. A collapse of the North Korean government could have several dangerous implications for East Asia, including “loose nukes,” a humanitarian disaster, a regional refugee crisis, and potential escalation to war between China and the United States. To respond to a collapse and these problems, neighboring countries may perform several military missions to stabilize North Korea. These include the location and securing of North Korean weapons of mass destruction, stability operations, border control, conventional disarmament, and combat/deterrence operations. Assuming that collapse occurs in a relatively benign manner, military missions to stabilize North Korea could require 260,000 to 400,000 troops. If collapse occurs after a war on the peninsula, or if it sparks civil war in North Korea, the number of missions—and their requirements—would grow. Because of the size and complexity of these missions, and because of the perils associated with mismanaging them, advance and combined planning is essential. Combined planning should include those actors (e.g., China, South Korea, and the United States) that could otherwise take destabilizing action to protect their own interests.

Apologies in International Politics

This article examines the growing conventional wisdom that apologies and other acts of contrition are necessary for international reconciliation. I create and test a theory that connects a countrys remembrance with that countrys image—threatening or benign—in the eyes of former adversaries. I evaluate the theory in two post-World War II case studies: South Korean relations with Japan and French relations with Germany. This article offers three major findings. First, it substantiates the claim that denials inhibit reconciliation. Japanese denials and history textbook omissions have elevated distrust and fear among Koreans (as well as Chinese and Australians). Second, although whitewashing and denials are indeed pernicious, the conventional wisdom about the healing power of contrition must be seriously reconsidered. Evidence from the Japanese and other cases suggests that contrition risks triggering a domestic backlash, which alarms former adversaries. Finally, there is good news for the prospects of international reconciliation: countries have reconciled quite successfully without any contrition at all. West Germany actually offered very little contrition at the time of its dramatic reconciliation with France; many other countries have restored close and productive relations without contrition. The best course for reconciliation is to remember the past in ways that are unifying, rather than divisive, and minimize the risk of backlash.

Spirals, Security and Stability in East Asia

In his article “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,”1 Thomas Christensen argues that East Asia is primed for conoict. He contends that security dilemma theory, and two other exacerbating factors, predict spirals of tension between China and Japan. First, Chinese historical memories of Japanese aggression make China especially fearful of increases in Japanese military activities. Second, because China regards Taiwan as a renegade province rather than an independent country, the acquisition of even defensive weapons by Taiwan or Japan (a potential Taiwanese ally) threatens China and may provoke spirals. Based on these arguments, Christensen concludes that the United States should limit the Japanese role in the U.S.-Japan alliance. For example, the United States should not codevelop theater missile defense (TMD) with Japan because this could trigger spirals between Japan and China (p. 75). In this letter I argue that Christensen greatly overstates the potential for conoict in the region. First, I argue that he misapplies security dilemma theory to East Asia. Security dilemma theory actually predicts stability in the region, not dangerous spirals. Second, I show that Christensen’s application of security dilemma theory is falsiaed by evidence from the past afty years. This evidence conarms my argument that spirals are unlikely in East Asia, despite historical grievances and the issue of Taiwanese sovereignty. The implication of my analysis is that U.S. alliance policies in East Asia need not be hamstrung by fears that the region is primed for conoict. Japan can and should be a full and active member of the alliance that guarantees its security.