David C. Nixon

Nash equilibrium in multiparty competitionwith “stochastic” voters

Theoretical spatial models of electoral voting tend to predict either convergence to an electoral mean (when voting is probabilistic) or chaos (when voting is deterministic). Here, we construct an empirical model of voting for the Israeli Knesset in 1992 (based on a large electoral sample and on analysis of party declarations). The probabilistic voting model so estimated fits the known election results. We then use the same model to simulate the effect of expected vote maximization by the parties. Contrary to the usual results, there is no unique convergent Nash equilibrium under this objective function. We do infer, however, that the two large parties are “Downsian”, in the sense that they maximize expected vote (up to the margin of error of the model). We suggest that the empirical results are compatible with a hybrid model of utility maximization, where each party computes the effects of its policy declaration both in terms of electoral response and of post-election coalition negotations.

The Supreme Court and Opinion Content: The Use of the Federalist Papers

Many scholars of the Supreme Court and many justices assert the importance of the Federalist Papers. They provide important evidence of original meaning and interpretation of the Constitution, and there is evidence that there is an increase in citations to the Federalist Papers in Supreme Court opinions. While some may view this increased citation use as a positive development because it demonstrates reliance on legal authority in judicial decisions, we provide evidence that in a period marked by dissensus and controversy, the use of the Federalist Papers represents externally and internally oriented strategic attempts by the justices to add legitimacy to constitutional interpretation, and to sway colleagues. We use a combination of descriptive and multivariate techniques to examine Federalist citations from 1953 to 1995 to demonstrate our interpretation.

Confirmation Delay for Vacancies on the Circuit Courts of Appeals

Supreme Court confirmation is an exhaustively studied phenomenon, but lower court confirmation is less well understood, in part because lower court nominees are very rarely rejected, and the Senate fails even to hold a recorded vote for most appointees. However, the length of time it takes to fill a judicial vacancy serves as alternate evidence of conflict between the president and the Senate. We present an empirical assessment of appellate vacancy conflict, based on a continuous time-proportional hazard model of vacancy duration. Our results demonstrate that female and minority candidates are confirmed only after unusually long vacancies, and this has nothing to do with the qualifications of the nominees. Our results also demonstrate that institutional and partisan conflict between the Senate and the White House drive the confirmation process for the federal appeals courts, but delay tactics employed by the Senate are only partially strategic.

JUDICIAL RETIREMENT STRATEGIES The Judge's Role in Influencing Party Control of the Appellate Courts

If judges are politically strategic, they may try to retire at times that maximize the chances that an ideologically compatible successor will be appointed. Using biographical data on all appellate judges who have retired since 1892, a heteroscedastic panel probit model is used to examine retirement timing as a function of personal and political factors. We determine whether retirement from the bench can be explained exclusively by personal factors such as salary, pension, and workload, or if political considerations enter into the decision. The data reveal that retirement decisions are affected primarily by nonpolitical considerations, but presidential elections may factor into a judges decision. The only important strategic political consideration in evidence is whether a judge contemplating retirement faces an opposing party president and how far off that presidents next election is.

Regional Court Influence Over Bureaucratic Policymaking: Courts, Ideological Preferences, and the Internal Revenue Service

While there have been numerous studies demonstrating bureaucratic control of administrative and regulatory agencies, many argue that the Internal Revenue Service is an agency out of control, and one not subject to political constraints. However, some recent studies have shown that the IRS is subject to some political control in shifting policy between the often competing concerns of efficiency and fairness. We extend these studies to examine judicial control of the IRS. Examining cross sectional time series data from 1960 until 1988, we use regression with panel corrected standard errors to show that, while efficiency is always very important, the IRS shifts audits between the wealthy and the less affluent in response to the prevailing median ideology of the relevant federal court of appeals. As the median appeals court judge becomes more liberal, the IRS shifts its audits in that region in favor of equity by reducing the audits on the poor and increasing the audits of the more affluent. As the median appeals court judge becomes more conservative, the IRS shifts the audits in that region in favor of greater efficiency by increasing the audits of those in the lower economic strata. Courts provide an additional measure of control of bureaucratic behavior.

APPOINTMENT DELAY AND THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Appointments to regulatory agencies are rarely the subject of empirical analysis, and when they are scrutinized, the focus is institutional factors. Instead, the authors examine the policy environment to determine if external factors influence the appointment process. To illustrate this, accident rates are analyzed to determine their effect on appointment duration at the National Transportation Safety Board. The most important explanatory variable for delay is a statutorily required cross-party nomination—an institutional factor. However, the policy environment is also important: A 1 standard deviation increase in the accident rate leads to a 30% increase in vacancy duration for the agency.

Institutional Conflict and Perceived Property Rights in Appointment Politics

Despite the importance of political appointees in U.S. politics, most of what we know about bureaucratic appointment centers on institutional conflict between the separate legislative and executive branches, and ignores personal qualities of nominees that so often seem pivotal to the selection debate. Using data drawn from every appointment to four U.S. independent regulatory agencies, I present empirical evidence that perceived property rights relating to party, race, and gender of appointees powerfully structure appointment process and outcomes. A new model of race and gender of appointees demonstrates that race and gender of an appointees predecessor is a significant predictor of who gets selected. A separate model of appointment duration demonstrates that partisan factors significantly contribute to delay, but that race and gender considerations do not significantly extend vacancies.

Setting the Agenda for Federal Agencies: Rulemaking Petitions at the FCC

ABSTRACT A consideration of rulemaking petitions to the Federal Communication Commission takes advantage of a highly formalized process to help systematically examine the influence that regulated parties have on agenda formation. Since the 1960s, submissions of petitions for rulemaking to the FCC have generated an increasingly large share of the agencys entire rulemaking agenda, and success for petitions is clearly greater for powerful organized interests. But an analysis of the 237 petitions for rulemaking at the FCC demonstrates that powerful interests are limited in their ability to control the agencys agenda. For example, efforts to divert the agencys attention by submitting comments opposing petitions are, at best, inconsequential and may be counterproductive. In addition, the most powerful organized interests who submit petitions for rulemaking at the FCC experience less success when confronting a more liberal commission majority.

State tax subsidies to bolster the long-term care insurance market

This paper examines long-term care insurance sales to assess whether state income tax subsidies are effective in encouraging the private purchase of long-term care insurance. Drawing from the most comprehensive available sales data on long-term care insurance policies, cross-state and over-time variation in sales data during the late 1990s and early 2000s are analysed. This analysis uses a panel model with fixed effects controls for potential endogeneity between state provision of tax subsidies and actual sales of long-term care insurance policies. Income, health and family support factors are significant determinants in the sale of long-term care insurance, but the tax incentives provided by many state governments do not induce any more sales of long-term care insurance than could be expected without such incentives. These costly subsidies have not been prudent uses of public dollars, and have not helped states cope with the challenge of long-term care costs.