David J. Brulé

Congressional Opposition, the Economy, and U.S. Dispute Initiation, 1946-2000

Does congressional opposition constrain the presidents conflict behavior in response to poor economic performance? Other research has shown that legislative constraints such as divided government reduce the executives propensity to initiate conflict. But institutional constraints on democratic leaders may also make them likely to use force abroad when faced with deteriorating domestic conditions. The author argues that legislative constraints on presidential action during periods of economic decline compel the president to pursue alternatives that he can implement without congressional approval to display his leadership skills—including the use of military force abroad. The author examines the interactive effects of congressional opposition and economic performance on the propensity to initiate militarized interstate disputes from 1946 to 2000. The president is more likely to use force in response to economic decline when facing an opposition Congress than during years in which he enjoys partisan support in the legislature.

War Voting Interstate Disputes, the Economy, and Electoral Outcomes

This article explores the interactive effects of the economy and the use of force on incumbent parties’ electoral performance. Research on the diversionary use of force assumes that leaders (especially democratic leaders) use force abroad to bolster their domestic political fortunes during hard economic times. But other research suggests that crises either lead to removal from office or have no effect on incumbents’ political fortunes. Although a good deal of scholarship assesses the role of the economy on electoral outcomes, no research has explicitly examined the interactive effects between dispute involvement and the economy on leaders’ share of the vote. We argue that the salience of the economy conditions voters’ sensitivity to the costs of conflict, which reduces electoral support for incumbent parties engaging in dramatic foreign policy events. Moreover, we expect executives’ efforts to emphasize foreign policy during economic downturns to be met with electoral punishment as voters prefer to see leaders working on a remedial economic policy. To evaluate this argument, we examine incumbent parties’ vote shares in elections among nine advanced democracies from 1960 to 2000. Our results support the hypothesis that during economic downturns voters care more about domestic politics than foreign policy. Furthermore, our results have implications for the diversionary hypothesis, gambling for resurrection argument, the democratic peace, and economic voting research agendas.

Democracy and Diversion: Government Arrangements, the Economy, and Dispute Initiation

Do legislative constraints constrain or compel democratic executives’ conflict behavior during periods of economic decline? Although institutional constraints are thought to reduce democratic executives’ propensity to engage in interstate conflict, other research suggests that such constraints may provide incentives to engage in diversionary uses of force. Incorporating work from the comparative study of economic voting and cross-national research on the diversionary use of force, this article contends that government arrangements — coalition, minority, weak party cohesion — influence democratic conflict behavior by (1) shaping the extent to which the executive is held accountable for the economy and (2) determining the executive’s capacity to address the economy with legislation. Specifically, the argument presented here suggests that governing parties in coalition governments share the blame for a poor economy, reducing the likelihood that the executive initiates disputes in response to the economy. Compared to single-party majority governments with high party discipline, executives presiding over minority governments, or whose parties are plagued by a lack of cohesion, are more likely to initiate disputes when faced with poor economic conditions, because these executives are likely to face resistance to remedial economic policy. Probit analyses of the interactive effects of government arrangements and economic performance on dispute initiation among industrialized democracies, 1950—97, support the argument. The article concludes with implications for research in comparative politics and international relations, including, for example, executive—legislative relations and strategic conflict avoidance.

Opportunities and Presidential Uses of Force A Selection Model of Crisis Decision-Making

Political vulnerability is thought to influence the opportunities available to the US president to engage in uses of force abroad. Conventional theories linking economic misfortune and partisan opposition to presidential uses of force detail the incentives and constraints facing the president in decisions to use force. In contrast, these theories’ strategic counterparts focus on the ability of US adversaries to respond to the president’s vulnerability through either avoidance or exploitation. The behavior of US adversaries is thought to critically affect the president’s opportunities to use force. Conventional and strategic accounts of the linkage between domestic political vulnerability and the use of force provide contradictory expectations. To assess these theories we identify hypotheses related to four dependent and selection variables corresponding to dispute initiation and reciprocation involving the US. These hypotheses are tested with a two-stage Heckman Probit model to account for selection effects due to strategic interaction. The results are most supportive of orthodox diversionary theory. Our findings challenge the other perspectives evaluated—the strategic conflict avoidance (SCA) perspective, Howell and Pevehouse’s party cover approach, and Schultz’s signaling model.

Blank Check or Marching Orders? Public Opinion and the Presidential Use of Force

Abasic assumption in democratic societies is that government policy is shaped by the preferences of the citizenry. This belief concerning the influence of public opinion applies to the realms of both domestic as well as foreign policy. Moreover, in the case of the United States, no other foreign policy issue is more provocative and salient to the public than those concerning the use of military force abroad (e.g., Mueller 1973; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987b; Barnet 1990). While some scholars argue that foreign policy is (or should be) beyond the reach of public pressure (e.g., Almond 1950; Lippmann 1955a; Cohen 1973; Morgenthau 1973), the assumption that the influence of public opinion on foreign policy is at the heart of prominent theories in international relations (e.g., Kant [1795] 1939; Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett 1993). Yet, there are hardly any quantitative, systematic studies evaluating the influence of public attitudes toward the use of force and presidential crisis decision making.

Predictably Unpredictable: The Effects of Conflict Involvement on the Error Variance of Vote Models

British Journal of Political Science / Volume 44 / Issue 02 / April 2014, pp 287 299 DOI: 10.1017/S000712341200083X, Published online: 18 March 2013 Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S000712341200083X How to cite this article: Laron K. Williams and David J. Brule (2014). Predictably Unpredictable: The Effects of Conict Involvement on the Error Variance of Vote Models . British Journal of Political Science, 44, pp 287-299 doi:10.1017/S000712341200083X Request Permissions : Click here