David Trafimow

How Priming the Private Self or Collective Self Affects the Relative Weights of Attitudes and Subjective Norms

Three experiments tested the hypothesis that the accessibility of the private self and the collective self affects the relative weights given to attitudes and subjective norms when forming a behavioral intention. The results of Experiment 1 indicate that increasing the accessibility of the private self caused participants to place more weight on attitudes than subjective norms but that increasing the accessibility of the collective self caused participants to place more weight on subjective norms than on attitudes. Experiments 2 and 3, using a subtle priming procedure, replicated this pattern of results. In addition, the findings of Experiment 3 provided direct evidence for the differential priming of the two self-concepts. Hence, the data suggest an intimate connection between the accessibility of the private and collective selves and whether people use attitudes or subjective norms to make behavioral intentions.

Does the Temporal Stability of Behavioral Intentions Moderate Intention-Behavior and Past Behavior-Future Behavior Relations?

This study tested the hypothesis that the temporal stability of behavioral intentions moderates relationships between intentions and behavior and between previous experience and subsequent performance. Respondents (N = 164) completed measures of theory of planned behavior variables, with respect to studying over the winter vacation, at two time points prior to the vacation and subsequently reported their study behavior. Intention stability was computed from within-participants correlations between Time 1 and Time 2 intention items. Intention stability moderated the intention-behavior relation such that stable intentions were more likely to be enacted than unstable intentions. The past behavior-future behavior relation was also moderated by intention stability. When intentions were stable, past behavior was not related to subsequent performance. In contrast, when intentions were unstable, past behavior was the best predictor of future behavior. Findings also revealed that theory of planned behavior variables and past behavior had different associations with stable as compared to unstable intentions.

The Effects of Language and Priming on the Relative Accessibility of the Private Self and the Collective Self

An experiment addressed some limitations and implications of previous findings obtained by Trafimow, Triandis, and Goto suggesting that private and collective self-cognitions are stored in different cognitive locations. Consistent with expectations, priming the private self increased the retrieval of private self-cognitions, but priming the collective self increased the retrieval of collective self-cognitions. Further, retrieval of private and collective self-cognitions was clustered by type. The fact that such clustering was obtained with collectivist subjects in their native country, and even using their native language, supports the generality of the Trafimow et al. theory to both individualistic and collectivist cultures. In addition, however, the data indicate that using a collectivist language can increase the cognitive accessibility of the collective self relative to when an individualistic language is used. Finally, we present some speculations about possible implications of this accessibility effect.

Hypothesis Testing and Theory Evaluation at the Boundaries: Surprising Insights From Bayes's Theorem

Because the probability of obtaining an experimental finding given that the null hypothesis is true [p(F\H0)] is not the same as the probability that the null hypothesis is true given a finding [p(H0\F)], calculating the former probability does not justify conclusions about the latter one. As the standard null-hypothesis significance-testing procedure does just that, it is logically invalid (J. Cohen, 1994). Theoretically, Bayess theorem yields p(H0\F), but in practice, researchers rarely know the correct values for 2 of the variables in the theorem. Nevertheless, by considering a wide range of possible values for the unknown variables, it is possible to calculate a range of theoretical values for p(H0\F) and to draw conclusions about both hypothesis testing and theory evaluation.

Mental habits: Metacognitive reflection on negative self-thinking

In 8 studies, the authors investigated negative self-thinking as a mental habit. Mental content (negative self-thoughts) was distinguished from mental process (negative self-thinking habit). The negative self-thinking habit was assessed with a metacognitive instrument (Habit Index of Negative Thinking; HINT) measuring whether negative self-thoughts occur often, are unintended, are initiated without awareness, are difficult to control, and are self-descriptive. Controlling for negative cognitive content, the authors found that negative self-thinking habit was distinct from rumination and mindfulness, predicted explicit as well as implicit low self-esteem (name letter effect), attenuated a positivity bias in the processing of self-relevant stimuli, and predicted anxiety and depressive symptoms 9 months later. The results support the assumption that metacognitive reflection on negative self-thinking as mental habit may play an important role in self-evaluative processes.

Affective and cognitive control of persons and behaviours.

Three studies assessed the relative contribution of affect and cognition to determining behavioural intentions for a variety of behaviours using both between-participants and within-participants analyses. The between-participants analyses showed that affect tends to make more of a contribution than does cognition for more behaviours. However, the within-participants analyses indicated that there are strong individual differences among people. Some people are more under affective control, across behaviours, whereas other people are more under cognitive control. The most interesting finding was that, despite the potential independence of between-participants and within-participants analyses (Mischela, 1990), between-participants analyses on subsamples created from the within-participants analyses showed significant dependence. The predictive validity of affect vs. cognition depended upon whether participants were affectively or cognitively controlled.

Habit as both a direct cause of intention to use a condom and as a moderator of the attitude-intention and subjective norm-intention relations

Abstract Undergraduates at an American university were asked questions about their attitudes, subjective norms, habits, and intentions towards using a condom during sexual intercourse. Consistent with previous research (Chan and Fishbein, 1993; Trafimow, 1994), intentions were well predicted by attitudes and subjective norms (r = 0.88 and r = 0.73, p < 0.01 in both cases). Intentions were also well predicted by habits (r = 0.77, p < 0.01). More interestingly, however, for participants who were in the habit of using condoms, attitudes and subjective norms were not significant predictors of intentions to use condoms in the future (r = 0.18 and r = 0.10, p<0.1 in both cases). In contrast, attitudes and subjective norms were strong predictors for participants who were not in the habit of using condoms (r = 0.81 and r = 0.61, p < 0.01 in both cases). These findings were replicated in a second study.

Replication, falsification, and the crisis of confidence in social psychology

The (latest) crisis in confidence in social psychology has generated much heated discussion about the importance of replication, including how it should be carried out as well as interpreted by scholars in the field. For example, what does it mean if a replication attempt “fails”—does it mean that the original results, or the theory that predicted them, have been falsified? And how should “failed” replications affect our belief in the validity of the original research? In this paper, we consider the replication debate from a historical and philosophical perspective, and provide a conceptual analysis of both replication and falsification as they pertain to this important discussion. Along the way, we highlight the importance of auxiliary assumptions (for both testing theories and attempting replications), and introduce a Bayesian framework for assessing “failed” replications in terms of how they should affect our confidence in original findings.

Mapping Perfect and Imperfect Duties onto Hierarchically and Partially Restrictive Trait Dimensions

Four experiments tested a proposal that hierarchically and partially restrictive trait dimensions pertaining to morality can be explained by Kant’s distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. Consistent with the proposal, Experiment 1 demonstrated that people change their positive expectancies about others at a faster rate in response to violations of perfect than imperfect duties. In addition, however, Experiment 2 showed that situational factors mitigate the negative trait attributions resulting from violations of imperfect duties more than those resulting from violations of perfect duties. Experiment 3 demonstrated that differences in trait attributions as a result of violations of perfect or imperfect duties are not due to implications of these violations for future behavior. Finally, Experiment 4 further supported the prediction that situational factors mitigate the negative trait attributions caused by violations of imperfect duties more than those caused by violations of perfect duties.

The Role of Affect in Determining the Attributional Weight of Immoral Behaviors

Theories about why immoral behaviors carry a large amount of attributional weight tend to emphasize traditional cognitive variables. In contrast, the authors propose that the degree of negative affect that these behaviors induce in observers is largely responsible for their attributional weight. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate an association between the amount of negative affect induced by immoral behaviors and their attributional weight. Studies 3 and 4 provide causal evidence for this idea by either “adding in” or “taking away” the negative affect associated with immoral behaviors to influence their attributional weight. Finally, Study 5 demonstrates that negative affect can be induced through a variety of negative emotions (disgust, sadness, and fear), with similar results. It is argued that it is difficult to account for these data solely on the basis of traditional cognitive variables, and so a theory that includes an emphasis on affect as a causal variable is desirable.