Krystina A. Finlay

The Role of Empathy in Improving Intergroup Relations

This article analyzes the role that empathy can play in improving intergroup relations. Three types of empathy are defined: cognitive empathy and twotypes of emotional empathy, reactive and parallel. Research indicating that empathy causes prosocial behavior is reviewed, along with studies indicating that training can be used to increase levels of empathic skills. Intergroup relations programs that employ empathy are also reviewed. Studies of the effects of empathizing with outgroup members on prejudice are discussed, andseveral processes by which empathy may mediate changes in prejudice are presented (e.g., reducing perceived dissimilarity and anxiety concerning the outgroup) and cognitive dissonance. The ways in which empathy can be introduced into intergroup relations programs are discussed, along with a series of recommendations for its implementation.

Affective and cognitive control of persons and behaviours.

Three studies assessed the relative contribution of affect and cognition to determining behavioural intentions for a variety of behaviours using both between-participants and within-participants analyses. The between-participants analyses showed that affect tends to make more of a contribution than does cognition for more behaviours. However, the within-participants analyses indicated that there are strong individual differences among people. Some people are more under affective control, across behaviours, whereas other people are more under cognitive control. The most interesting finding was that, despite the potential independence of between-participants and within-participants analyses (Mischela, 1990), between-participants analyses on subsamples created from the within-participants analyses showed significant dependence. The predictive validity of affect vs. cognition depended upon whether participants were affectively or cognitively controlled.

The Role of Affect in Determining the Attributional Weight of Immoral Behaviors

Theories about why immoral behaviors carry a large amount of attributional weight tend to emphasize traditional cognitive variables. In contrast, the authors propose that the degree of negative affect that these behaviors induce in observers is largely responsible for their attributional weight. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate an association between the amount of negative affect induced by immoral behaviors and their attributional weight. Studies 3 and 4 provide causal evidence for this idea by either “adding in” or “taking away” the negative affect associated with immoral behaviors to influence their attributional weight. Finally, Study 5 demonstrates that negative affect can be induced through a variety of negative emotions (disgust, sadness, and fear), with similar results. It is argued that it is difficult to account for these data solely on the basis of traditional cognitive variables, and so a theory that includes an emphasis on affect as a causal variable is desirable.

The prediction of attitudes from beliefs and evaluations: The logic of the double negative

One of the most intriguing aspects of Fishbeins (e.g. 1980) theory of reasoned action is the logic of the double negative: if a behaviour is thought to be unlikely to result in a negatively evaluated consequence, then the product of the two negatives (an unlikely consequence that is negatively valued) is thought to provide an impetus for the formation of a positive attitude towards the behaviour. The present experiment tested two derivations from the logic of the double negative. First, according to this logic, whether beliefs and evaluations are positively or negatively framed should not affect their ability to predict attitudes. Second, the multiplicative assumption of this logic (a negative x negative = a positive) suggests that a multiplicative model should be a superior predictor of attitudes compared to an additive model that does not allow for the logic of the double negative. The obtained findings contradicted both of these predictions.

The relationship between normatively versus attitudinally controlled people and normatively versus attitudinally controlled behaviors

Abstract We proposed a hypothesis that not only can people be under attitudinal or normative control across a large number of behaviors (Trafimow & Finlay, 1996), but behaviors can be under attitudinal or normative control across a large number of people. Further, both types of findings can be obtained using the same sets of people and behaviors. To test the hypothesis, a large number of participants were asked to indicate their attitudes, subjective norms, and intentions towards performing 30 behaviors. On the basis of within-participants multiple regression analyses, participants were deemed to be generally under attitudinal or normative control across the 30 behaviors. In addition, consistent with previous research (Trafimow & Finlay, 1996), the unique variance in intentions accounted for by attitudes and subjective norms was highly dependent upon whether attitudinally or normatively controlled participants were used. Finally, however, attitudes accounted for more variance in intentions than did subjective norms for some behaviors, even when normatively controlled participants were analyzed! Thus, the hypothesis was strongly supported.

Evidence for improved sensitivity of within-participants analyses in tests of the theory of reasoned action

Abstract Two studies involving 26 behaviors were performed to test four hypotheses. Between-participants and within-participants analyses of attitudes, subjective norms, behavioral intentions and actual behaviors suggested the following conclusions. First, consistent with Trafimow and Finlay (1996), the prediction of intentions from attitudes and subjective norms is better when within-participants analyses than between-participants analyses are used. Second, behavioral intentions are a good predictor of actual behavior, regardless of whether between-participants or within-participants analyses are used. Third, attitudes can predict unique variance in behaviors even when controlling for intentions, but it takes within-participants analyses to detect the effect. Fourth, subjective norms can predict unique variance in behaviors even when controlling for intentions, but it takes within-participants analyses to detect the effect. We conclude that within-participants analyses should be used for more sensitive tests of the theory of reasoned action.

An Investigation of Three Models of Multitrait Representations

Two experiments were conducted to test three models of person memory concerning multitrait expectancies: the trait-specific, complete association, and dual-coding models. Participants in Experiment 1 were led to expect a target person to display two traits, then they were presented with congruent and incongruent behaviors ostensibly performed by the target person, and finally they were asked to recall the behaviors. In contradiction to the complete association model, which predicts that participants form congruent-congruent associations as often as congruent-incongruent associations, incongruent items were better recalled than were congruent items. Furthermore, conditional probability analyses contradicted the implications of the trait-specific and dual-coding models. Findings from Experiment 2 reinforced the lack of support for all three models.

The Accessibility of Group Memberships

Abstract The authors performed 2 experiments to examine the accessibility of thoughts about group memberships (i.e., collective self-cognitions) relative to thoughts about traits, states, and behaviors (i.e., private self-cognitions). Few collective self-cognitions were accessible for the present participants from an individualist culture. Furthermore, collective self-cognitions were highly associated with each other in a self-structure. The findings were interpreted in terms of the two-baskets theory that private and collective self-cognitions tend to be stored relatively separately in memory (D. Trafimow, H. C. Triandis, & S. G. Goto, 1991).