Désirée Teobaldelli

Prosocial behavior in the production of publicly provided goods and services: an overview

This paper offers a selective review of research on the existence and effects of prosocial behavior among individuals who work in public organizations. We first present evidence from the empirical literature documenting the importance of such phenomena and their features. We then discuss theoretical works that analyze the implications of prosocial behavior for the optimal design of incentive schemes and for organizing production in public firms. Some policy recommendations from the literature are also discussed.

Istituzioni, regole costituzionali e risultati economici: quale nesso di causalità?

Il presente lavoro discute gli effetti delle regole costituzionali sulle politiche fiscali e analizza come alcuni fattori economici possano, a loro volta, influenzare la scelta delle regole costituzionali stesse. In particolare, il lavoro si focalizza su due istituzioni specifiche: la forma di governo e il sistema elettorale. Dopo averne analizzato gli effetti sulle politiche fiscali e, di conseguenza, sulla distribuzione del reddito della societa, l’articolo presenta i meccanismi attraverso i quali la disuguaglianza del reddito possa influenzare, a sua volta, la scelta delle regole costituzionali stesse. Infine, si illustrano alcuni casi storici di scelte costituzionali coerenti con la teoria da noi esposta. This paper discusses the effects of constitutional rules on fiscal policies and how some economic fundamentals can in turn affect the choice of such rules. In particular, the paper focuses on two specific institutions: the form of government and the electoral system. We present the effects of these institutions on fiscal policies and, therefore, on income distribution; then, we illustrate the mechanisms through which income inequality affects the choice of constitutions. Finally, some historical cases of constitutional choice are presented.

Optimal Incentives in a Principal–Agent Model with Endogenous Technology

One of the standard predictions of the agency theory is that more incentives can be given to agents with lower risk aversion. In this paper we show that this relationship may be absent or reversed when the technology is endogenous and projects with a higher efficiency are also riskier. Using a modified version of the Holmstrom and Milgroms (1987) framework, we obtain that lower agents risk aversion unambiguously leads to higher incentives when the technology function linking efficiency and riskiness is elastic, while the risk aversion-incentive relationship can be positive when this function is rigid