Dietmar Fehr
Heidelberg University
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Publication
Featured researches published by Dietmar Fehr.
SP II 2014-206 | 2010
Dietmar Fehr; Julia Schmid
Contest or auction designers who want to maximize the overall revenue are frequently con- cerned with a trade-off between contest homogeneity and inclusion of contestants with high valuations. In our experimental study, we find that it is not profitable to exclude the most able contestant in favor of greater homogeneity among the remaining contestants, even if the theoretical exclusion principle predicts otherwise. This is because the strongest contestants con- siderably overexert. A possible explanation is that these contestants are afraid they will regret a low but risky bid if they lose and thus prefer a strategy which gives them a low but secure pay-off.
Journal of Monetary Economics | 2018
Dietmar Fehr; Frank Heinemann; Aniol Llorente-Saguer
Abstract In an experiment using a coordination game with extrinsic random signals (“sunspots”), we systematically vary the stochastic process generating these signals and measure how signals affect behavior. We find that sunspot equilibria emerge naturally with salient public signals. However, highly correlated private signals can also lead to sunspot-driven behavior, even when this is not an equilibrium. Private signals reduce the power of public signals as sunspot variables. The higher the correlation of extrinsic signals and the more easily they can be aggregated, the more powerful these signals are in distracting actions from the action that minimizes strategic uncertainty.
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy | 2018
Dietmar Fehr; Julia Schmid
Contest designers and managers who wish to maximize the overall revenue of a contest are frequently concerned with a trade†off between contest homogeneity and inclusion of contestants with high valuations. In our experimental study, we find that it is not profitable to exclude the strongest bidder in order to promote greater homogeneity among the remaining bidders, even though the theoretical exclusion principle predicts otherwise. This is because the strongest bidders are willing to give up a substantial portion of their expected rent in order to minimize the chance of losing the contest.
European Economic Review | 2015
Dietmar Fehr; Rustamdjan Hakimov; Dorothea Kübler
Archive | 2011
Dietmar Fehr; Frank Heinemann; Aniol Llorente-Saguer
European Economic Review | 2017
Dietmar Fehr
Games and Economic Behavior | 2018
Dietmar Fehr; Matthias Sutter
Games and Economic Behavior | 2018
Dietmar Fehr
SP II 2015-204 | 2015
Dietmar Fehr; Rustamdjan Hakimov; Dorothea Kübler
Archive | 2011
Dietmar Fehr; Julia Schmid