Dirk Foremny

Overlapping Political Budget Cycles in the Legislative and the Executive

We advance the literature on political budget cycles by testing separately for cycles in expenditures for elections in the legislative and the executive. Using municipal data, we can separately identify these cycles and account for general year effects. For the executive branch, we show that it is important whether the incumbent re-runs. To account for the potential endogeneity associated with this decision, we apply a unique instrumental variables approach based on age and pension eligibility rules. We find sizable and significant effects in expenditures before council elections and before joint elections when the incumbent re-runs.

‘Hold that Ghost’: Using Notches to Identify Manipulation of Population-Based Grants

We study local government incentives to misreport the information required to implement a formula grant. We focus specifically on population, in theory the easiest variable for the grantor to verify. We analyze the Spanish case and show how a switch from the use of census to registered population data (the latter administered by the municipalities) led to a manipulation of the population numbers used by central government to allocate grants to municipalities. As a result, registers included a proportion of ‘ghost’ citizens, that is, people who presented no trace of actually residing in the municipality. We identify the effects of grants on population over-reporting taking profit of notches in the grant scheme (i.e., one based on weighted population with the weights increasing at specific population thresholds). We document an excess mass of municipalities to the right of the notch threshold and a density hole to the left of it. There are several indications that manipulation (rather than real population responses) is the mechanism at work.

Relocation of the Rich: Migration in Response to Top Tax Rate Changes from Spanish Reforms

A Spanish reform granted regions the authority to set income tax rates, resulting in substantial tax differentials. Using administrative data, we find that conditional on moving, taxes have a significant effect on location choice. A 1% increase in the net-of-tax rate for a region relative to others increases the probability of moving to that region by 1.7 percentage points. We estimate an elasticity of the number of top taxpayers with respect to net-of-tax rates of 0.85. The mechanical increase in tax revenue due to higher tax rates is larger than the loss in tax revenue from the net outflow of migration.