Doug Porter

Framing participation: Development projects, professionals, and organisations

Major efforts have been made by development organisations to make their systems of project and programme management more participatory, in order to be accountable to local participants (or beneficiaries), while also creating opportunities for them to shape their own processes. These measures may look participatory, but have in effect become new (and often costly) forms of management and control, which do not result in great benefits for project participants. The authors argue that the dominance of three components- projects, professionals, and organisations-has been taken for granted; and that they involve practices and processes which are primarily instruments of control, rather than of participation. Attempts to generate participation will thus require a fundamental change in the way in which these components operate. In the meantime, the authors call for attention to be paid to the ways in which the current tools of participatory development, including PRA, can be used to promote either participation or control, depending on how they are used.

Inclusive planning and allocation for rural services

The authors draw on experience from Ugandas commitment to decentralisation. This commitment is transforming the way services are planned and financed; new associations between local governments, NGOs, and private sector agencies are being created. Much attention has focused on the adoption of various techniques-such as participatory rural appraisal-through which direct and intensive forms of participation can be encouraged in decentralised planning. This trend is critically examined and potential unintended consequences are highlighted. A broader concept of accountability is outlined to illustrate a more inclusive approach to planning and allocation for more equity and sustainability in rural services.

The Justice-Security-Development Nexus: Theory and Practice in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States

In this paper we draw on our work at the World Bank to provide practical guidance on how the Bank and other donors might operationalize the WDR 2011 so as to promote the emergence of legitimate and effective institutions to manage justice and security in fragile and conflict affected states (FCS). Our approach reflects three propositions about how justice and security institutions develop and how donors can engage. First, we understand that justice and security are not merely the remit of particular forms of institution, but rather represent core functions of all public authorities. This requires a broader view of the arenas and entry points through which development policy and programming may impact on justice and security. Second, engagements to support legitimate and effective justice and security institutions requires looking beyond the laws, procedures, skills and technologies that are the usual focus of development programs, to the processes of elite bargaining, collective struggle and normative change that shape institutions over time. Third, the impacts of development interventions on these processes extend far beyond the typically narrow remit of technical “capacity-building”. Understanding these implications — intended or not — requires a closer review of social and political change in particular contexts.

Managing Public Finance and Procurement in Fragile and Conflicted Settings

ABSTRACT Successful transition from conflict and fragility hinges on the quality and legitimacy of public financial management (PFM) systems. This article shows that such systems develop asymmetrically in these settings. Formal aspects of modern systems are adopted, but a layered series of informal arrangements govern resource management. Analysis of data from Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability assessments of 101 countries explores aspects of this asymmetry and different explanations are considered for why elites seem to choose not to invest trust, resources, and capacity in making mainstream PFM systems functional. These explanations focus on the incentives created by three “public” resources: illicit flows, domestic revenues, and strategic or aid flows. Mainstream PFM systems are applied to a small part of these flows. The illustrative case of Cambodia shows how a layered system has emerged to govern such flows, undermining the influence of formal public finance management systems. The article offers suggestions to address these issues.

Righting the Resource Curse

Abstract The poor record of liberal reforms sponsored by the international community in postcolonial settings underscores the real politik of institutional change. What we call a ‘new normal’ in development policy and practice foregrounds the role of agency – leadership, networks of connectors and convenors, entrepreneurs and activists – but it has less to say about the political and economic conditions of possibility in which agents operate. The putative powers of agency seem most challenged in contexts of extreme resource dependency and the resource curse. The particular case of Edo, a state in the oil rich Niger delta region of Nigeria, illustrates the intersection of agency and structural conditions to show how ‘asymmetric capabilities’ can emerge to create, constrain and make possible particular reform options.

The Impact of Funding Modalities on the Performance of Indigenous Organisations

Governments’ choice of funding modality can produce powerful incentives for organisations to perform in preferred ways, but it can also divert limited resources, narrow accountability, and undermine capability. Through literature review and interviews, the research explored the international literature on public finance management in developing country contexts, and compared this to case studies of Indigenous organisations. The situation in Australia was found to differ in three ways: (1) performance indicators are imposed, rather than negotiated; (2) few existing public funding modalities reward performance or provide incentives; and (3) funding arrangements do not generally require receiving organisations to be accountable to their constituents. Stability and durability of funding modalities, and clarity in functions and jurisdictional boundaries, were also found to positively influence performance. Further research is required to design new performance frameworks that build around the organisation, rather than the grant, with indicators of governance capability and downward accountability to constituents.

Multi-Scalar Governance and Institutions: Intentional Development and the Conditions of Possibility in the Extractive Sector

The World development report (WDR) 2017 is centrally interested in the conditions under which three headline development outcomes (growth, equity, security) can be achieved by improving the effectiveness and legitimacy of governance institutions. This background paper explores all three mechanisms through the lens of efforts to improve the governance of extractive industries, in particular, to enhance the dividend of growth, equity, and security for host countries in the Global South. The authors consider the case of the extractive industries transparency initiative (EITI) which may be understood as an assemblage of power, norms, and capacities to create new institutional arrangements to govern relations between oil companies, host country governments, and citizens. The point of departure is the WDR’s recognition that institutions are always exercises in and products of, that is to say they are thorough saturated with, power. The structure of the paper is as follows part one begins by noting that a feature of globalization in the post-cold war period has been the development of a range of global modalities to intervene in the regulation of economic activity and to reconfigure the power, norms, and capacities of governance institutions so as to achieve particular equity and security outcomes. Part two provides an account of the conditions of possibility, all traceable to the character of post-cold war globalization, that saw the rise of the norms and rules central to EITI that, in little over ten years have enrolled 48 countries and more than 80 major oil, gas, and mining companies. Part three examines the apparently paradoxical case of EITI’s enthusiastic adoption in Nigeria.

Securing a New Ordering of Power in Timor-Leste: The Role of Sub‑national Spending

A crucial aspect of Timor-Leste’s economic performance and political stability in the aftermath of the 2006 crisis has been the way the government has managed a five-fold increase in public spending, and an even more rapid increase in capital spending. While the country’s experience has been widely acknowledged as an exemplar of ‘buying the peace’, less well documented has been the range of unorthodox arrangements adopted by the government to manage this fiscal expansion and to re-order the local political landscape. Sub-national spending was pivotal, despite amounting to only around 3 per cent of the budget. Recent research undertaken by the World Bank,2 including a joint study with the Government of Timor-Leste of its sub-national development programs, provides empirically grounded insights into how public spending can be used to dynamically trade-off and balance competing technical, social and political priorities in the immediate aftermath of conflict. This chapter’s assessment of