Dries Lesage

Global Energy Governance in a Multipolar World

Contents: Introduction Part I Global Energy Governance Today: The global energy challenge Blueprint for a global sustainable energy regime The institutional landscape of global energy governance. Part II Bringing in Multipolarity: Major power concerts and global energy governance The players in the multipolar energy game The G8s track record in global energy governance. Part III Conclusions: G8 leadership in global energy governance: an evaluation Prospects for energy cooperation in a multipolar world Bibliography Index.

Neo-liberalism at a Time of Crisis: the Case of Taxation

This essay explores how the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 has affected the stability of what Stephen Gill has termed the ‘new constitutionalism of disciplinary neo-liberalism’, 1 more precisely, in the realm of international tax policy. Rather than providing an in-depth and complete empirical study of the matter, this essay will highlight certain interesting developments and touch upon a series of possibly relevant questions that could form the basis for a future research agenda. In the first section, we will examine the remarkable strength and resilience of the new constitutionalism as the institutional component of neo-liberal hegemony. Then we will proceed to an exploration of the impact of the crisis on this hegemony, also paying attention to deepening geopolitical multipolarity as an additional variable. The final, more empirical section will investigate the case of international taxation in this context, and demonstrate that new constitutionalism remains a crucial supporting pillar of neo-liberal globalisation.

Rising Powers and Multilateral Institutions

The rise of new powers such as China and India is sending shockwaves through the global multilateral system. Yet, not every multilateral institution is affected in the same way and many institutions have developed different responses to the global power shift. This volume is the first to systematically examine these different responses. It looks in detail at 13 multilateral institutions ranging from exclusive Western clubs (NATO, OECD, IEA, IASB, and G8) over global institutions in which rising powers are deprived of equal decision-making power (UN Security Council, IMF, and World Bank) to global institutions in which rising powers have equal decision-making power (WTO, WIPO, UNFCCC, CBD, and the G20). The contributors offer an interpretation of why some institutions are proving highly resilient thanks to the innovative outreach and reform activities they deploy, while others have more troubles to adapt as they become paralyzed by gridlock or even retreat from the global scene.

Analytical Framework and Findings

In the years and decades after 1944, the United States (US) took the lead in constructing a grand liberal multilateral order (Ikenberry, 2001; Patrick, 2009). This US-sponsored global architecture covered both security and economic affairs. Some institutions were created immediately after World War II, such as the Bretton Woods institutions and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Others came later and were set up for different reasons - the monetary and oil crisis of the early 1970s, for example, spawned the G7 and the International Energy Agency (IEA). Many of these institutions had a truly global span, and even those that were confined to the Western camp often took on global aspirations after the end of the Cold War.

Global Taxation Governance after the 2002 UN Monterrey Conference

Over the past 10 years, global tax issues, such as inter-state tax competition, tax havens and the case for “global taxes”, have been receiving more attention than ever. During the preparation for the 2002 United Nations (UN) conference in Monterrey on Financing for Development, the UN considered international and domestic taxation as a vital component. The conference itself, however, did not yield many results on this point. In this context, some circles have made a case for an “International Tax Organization” (ITO). Our discussion of global taxation governance will be centred upon the ITO proposal. The most important argument put forward to support such a proposal is that it gives the South a real seat at the table in global tax governance. After having outlined the current architecture of global tax governance, four questions will be addressed. First, wherein lies the possible value-added of an ITO? Second, how has the idea thus far been received internationally? Third, what are the prospects for an ITO? Fourth, does the South really need an ITO to advance its fiscal interests? The paper analyses the political obstacles to the idea of an ITO, but also points at politically feasible alternative forms of South–South and North–South co-operation.

The EU–Turkey relationship needs a new paradigm

By geography, the EU and Turkey are destined to be strategic partners. Yet, the relation is in a bad shape. This essay argues that neither can afford this. There are two keys to an improved relationship. The first is that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the governmental Justice and Development Party (AKP) use their unprecedented power to kick-start a long overdue domestic pacification process, and put the country back on track towards a pluralist democracy. The second is that the EU and other western partners begin to appreciate the shared responsibilities for the deepening democratic deficit in Turkey, including their own. Both keys are linked in an intriguing way.

Rising Powers and IMF Governance Reform

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has long been under fire for not adapting to the changing world order. Quotas and votes of a number of emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs) are said to be out of line with their growing economic weight. Another element of con-tention is the actual veto power of the United States, given the 85% threshold for a range of important decisions. In contrast, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) as a group lacks a veto. Europe, in its turn, with eight of the 24 chairs, seems to be overrepresented in the Executive Board, the Fund’s most relevant decision-making body. A 2010 reform package was meant to address these shortcomings. However, on closer inspection it appears to be quite modest. What is more, most of the package has not been implemented yet, with several deadlines already missed. This chapter discusses the reform and its follow-up, and advances explanations for the outcomes. Part of the research is based on interviews. Between March 2011 and April 2012, we carried out 19 interviews of six Executive Directors, four Alternate Executive Directors, five Senior Advisors, both from advanced economies (9) and EMDCs (6), as well as four senior IMF staff members. We also interviewed three European officials involved in IMF matters. The interviews were granted upon condition of anonymity.